MAP of CHINA

showing the places mentioned in the book.

MANCHURIA
CHIHLI
Peking
SHANSI
SHANTUNG
LU
(Old Feudal State)
HONAN
KIANG SU
Nanking
Chinkiang
Shanghai
ANHWEI
HUPEH
Hankow
Wuchang
Kiukiang
CHE-KIANG
EAST CHINA SEA
HUNAN
KIANGSI
FU-KIEN
KWANGTUNG
Swatow
Canton
Hong Kong
KOREA
JAPAN
0 200 400 600
English Miles

Central BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

KANSAS CITY, KANSAS

CHINESE REALITIES

CHINESE REALITIES

BY

JOHN FOSTER

"The Revolution is not yet complete.'
From the Will of Sun Yat Sen.

"While 'the Revolution is not yet complete,' while the work of destruction is still at its height, Young China is already at work upon the new foundations."
Extract from Chap. iv.

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TO MY WIFE

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

It would need a very old and a much-travelled man to write as an eye-witness of all that is recorded here. The author is far from being such a one, but he can at least claim that he is on the spot.

From the windows of this house can be seen many places which are landmarks in new China's history. Just across the river lies the site of those old "factories" where the foreign traders of last century were barracked together on old China's threshold. To the south stand the forts which the British shelled when in 1840 they came knocking at old China's door. The whole countryside is full of memories of Sun Yat Sen, the "Father of the Revolution," and the first of new China's sons. To the north can be seen the trees of the Foreign Concession, where the shooting of June 1925 opened a new era in the story of Chinese nationalism. A stone's throw away is the former residence of the nationalist Foreign Minister, where the Soviet Adviser, Michael Borodin, was a frequent guest in those days of almost-war with Britain. The last chapter was written to the accompaniment of continuous machine-gun and rifle fire, and intermittent artillery barrage; while the sky was red with the glare of a city in flames. and every one was whispering of wholesale looting, reckless

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murder, and all the bloody signs of a short-lived Communist triumph—all this little more than a mile away! So one might go on.

This book is written from Canton, the metropolis of southern China. Doubtless it reveals all those shortcomings that might be expected in one which looks at China from the southern point of view. And yet the south is perhaps the only place from which a book on modern China can be written. In the north men must feel that new China is not yet fully upon them; in the centre that new China is too much on top of them; we in the south were initiated earlier, and are able to step back and look at what has happened.

It will be objected—it always *is*—that the southern provinces are not China, and are dangerous particulars from which to generalize: "Your Southerners are so excitable and extreme!" We in the south are getting rather weary of this, and feel that the significance of the south should by now be recognized. In the early years of this century the south was a hotbed of revolution. And, "Our Southerners," they said, "were so excitable. It could never come in the north." In 1911 it came. In 1925 the south was the stronghold of the Nationalist Party, and there was almost a state of war with Britain. "Our Southerners," they said, "were so extreme. It could never happen in the Yangtze Valley." In 1927 it happened and with still more excesses.

We are different, and we know it. But our very difference is our significance, as an index of the trend of the times.

It is to be hoped that the reader will be anxious to

follow further into the heart of old China (of old China's religions, for example) than this book is prepared to lead. Only one chapter has been given to the old, just sufficient to form a background for the new. Books on these subjects, by men of long experience, are plentiful, and the author felt it his task rather to add than to repeat. For perhaps only a younger man would venture to write about modern China. The whole story is of youth and youth movements, in a land which has become young again.

Indeed the " movements " here described—Nationalist, Literary, Labour, Anti-religious, and Religious—are most of them so young that there has been little time for their histories to appear. Hence there are few acknowledgments for the author to make to other writers : books on these subjects are all too few.

There are, instead, acknowledgments to be made to a host of colleagues and friends, Chinese, British, and American, who by their careful criticism and sound advice, a sharing of their wider experience and of their wiser judgments, have helped to add something of value and to subtract much of error. Those who have helped most have done so all unwittingly : they are Chinese friends, whose friendship has been gained in sharing the everyday tasks of building the Kingdom of God in China.

J. F.

CANTON, *December* 1927

EDITORIAL NOTE

As will be seen from the Author's Preface, Mr Foster wrote this book in China. While in most ways this was, of course, an advantage, the distance between China and Britain precluded much consultation between author and publishers. Mr Foster was unable, for reasons of distance and time, to read proof ; and the editorial committee of the U.C.M.E. take responsibility for the final form in which the book appears.

In particular, it should be stated that the title is not of the author's choice.

E. SHILLITO

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CHINESE REALITIES

CHAPTER I

OLD CHINA MEETS THE YOUNG WEST

" The sun of those dead heroes is long since set,
But their record is before me still,
And as the wind whispers under the eaves
I open my books and read,
And my heart glows with a borrowed fire."

WEN TIEN HSIANG (1278).

" Those suns are set. Oh rise some other such!
Or all that we have left is empty talk
Of old achievement and despair of new."

The Task, COWPER.

" We persist in thinking that we can squeeze the new future which is pressing in at the door into the framework of the old and the known. . . . But it was of most profound psychological significance when Christianity first discovered, in the orientation towards the future, a redeeming principle for mankind. In the past nothing can be altered, and in the present little, but the future is ours and capable of raising life's intensity to its highest pitch. A little space of youth belongs to us, all the rest of life belongs to our children."

Analytical Psychology, JUNG, p. 277.

I

THERE is truth in most fiction, and there is history in many a fairy tale. The picture which most truly represents relations between the West and China in the middle of last century is that of Hop-o'-my-Thumb at the door of the Giant's castle.

To-day young China talks of the "cultural invasion," and some in the West are busy studying the "clash of civilizations." Before the invasion came the clash, but earlier than either was the knocking at the door. The young West who knocked was a very small figure, and the door was a very big door.

And yet the door shook, and the Giant within quaked exceedingly. "These British rebels are barbarians, dwelling in a petty island beyond our domains . . . yet we cannot help fearing [that intercourse with them] will eventuate in something strange!" Thus, according to contemporary documents, spoke a Chinese orator in Canton in 1843. Modern history is the fulfilment of his fear. This book will have to deal with that "something strange."

Indeed, the sequel is so strange that we must start from the very beginning, look at cause before we turn to effects, examine the door before we think even of the knocking. For there, in the middle of last century, lies the key to any understanding of what is happening in China now. If it had not been just such a door, in just such a castle, which housed none other than the Old Man of the World, the knocking of the young West could not have caused such trepidation, nor his entry such a clash.

It is then of first importance that we should remember from the outset that this Old Man of the World lived in a castle which, like himself, was very, very old, with pillars enduring and immovable, and doors fast bolted and barred; and that these three characteristics were possessions in which old China gloried: the tradition of an age-long past, the close-knit

civilization handed down, and independence of the outside world.

II

First, China was an old, old building.

More than six centuries ago a book on China was published in the West, a book so strange that at first it was read as fiction. For it told of baths in the houses of the rich, and public baths for the poor of the capital—luxuries unknown till modern times in the unhygienic West. It talked of the quarrying of " black stone " for fuel to those who knew the warmth only of wood and peat. It praised the system of communications over that vast land, preventing the dearth and famine then only too well known to European peasants. It spoke of silken gowns beyond the dreams of yeomen in their coarse woollen home-spun, of jewels and of gold which would dazzle the eyes of western knights and kings. Thus Marco Polo made his farewell bow to the civilization of the court of Kublai Khan.

But the scholars at that court were far from regarding those as China's halcyon days: the empire was far-flung as that of Alexander or of Rome, and much was new and of the Mongol's making. But China was old. A poet of that day looks far beyond Kublai and sings:

See up the stairway of the steep, steep road to Heaven,
The Emperor Shun the Good travels, the stars his comrades.
The Emperor Yao has already reached those celestial Halls,

And in the balconies makes music, while the winds blow from the South.
. . . May our Emperor also be given a worthy and lofty name
Among those noble Emperors of the past! [1]

His eyes are not on Kublai, but look far, far away to the glories of a bygone age.

Six centuries before Kublai Khan, had there been a Marco then he would have witnessed in the capital of China such a gathering of embassies from divers tributary states as Europe seldom saw until the Jubilees of Victoria. Such was the Empire of the T'ang Dynasty, A.D. 630. But even those emperors did not regard themselves as the crown of China's civilization! While our savage Danish forefathers were busy trampling down all traces of the culture which Augustine tried to plant in Britain's stony soil, T'ai Tsung was building, next to his palace, a library for two hundred thousand books—that he might look back to the wisdom of the ancients. "Confucius," he said, "is for the Chinese what water is for the fish."

That meant a backword look over twice six centuries more to the Feudal Age, when Confucius was born, 552 B.C., beyond the beginnings of the people called English; when even Roman history is but the story of a town on the banks of the Tiber; when Cyrus the Persian was just rising to power and the Jews in Babylon were sighing for deliverance: then it was that the Master lived in the feudal state of Lu.[2]

[1] A 13th-century poet, quoted in Lady Hosie's *Two Gentlemen of China*, p. 50.

[2] In the southern part of what is now Shantung.

And *he* looked back too—indeed it was Confucius who set the fashion of the backward gaze in China—back to the reigns of Yao and Shun (2356-2205 B.C.). These were almost as long before his time as Jesus was before ours ; earlier than the Exodus from Egypt by more than a thousand years ; almost as old as Egypt's Great Pyramid itself ! And this is the period to which Confucius bids us look back as China's Golden Age.

The Master said, Great indeed was Yao as a sovereign ! Majesty of majesties ! Heaven alone is great and Yao alone may be compared thereto. Vast, vast is his virtue ! His people could find no name sufficient for it. Majesty of majesties in the works that he accomplished ! Glorious in the music and the ceremonies that were his ! (*Analects*, VIII. 19.)

The Master said, Greatly filial was Shun ! In virtue, a sage ; in dignity, the Son of Heaven ; his riches all within the four seas. (*Doctrine of the Mean*, XVII.)

China was then perhaps one-tenth of its size to-day, and in what we read of both the majesty and the virtue of its rulers much must be allowed for that which always happens—idealization of the past. The difference between Confucius's ideal rulers and the actual Yao and Shun was possibly as great as between our own King Arthur and the actual kings of Britain. The fact remains : old China had four thousand years of what was to some extent history, four thousand years of some degree of civilization, and beyond the four thousand years the tradition of a Golden Age.

China was an old, old building, with pillars enduring and immovable.

The first of old China's glories was the fact of an

age-long tradition: the second was the content of that tradition, the civilization handed down.

There are three pillars necessary to the structure of any civilization—a literature, a social order, and a religion. In old China's treasured heritage we find all three: the Classics, the Confucian ethics, and the Confucian state religion. The name of Confucius is so closely connected with these that he is often regarded as their founder. To him and to the disciples he inspired are due their survival and development, but not their origin. Confucius himself never claimed to be an originator—only a collector and transmitter of the proprieties of the past: "I am not one who was born in possession of knowledge, I am one who is fond of antiquity and earnest in the search for knowledge there." (*Analects*, VII. 19.)

The literature consists of the *Five Classics* and the *Four Books*.[1] These do not, of course, exhaust the list of China's great literature, but these are the books pored over, memorized, imitated by generation after generation of young Chinese. It was the ambition of every family that some day, outside the family's ancestral hall, with granite pillars and dragon-decked roof, a high pole might be planted between slabs of stone to witness to the world that one of the family had entered the aristocracy of officialdom. This would honour the ancestral dead and remain the glory of posterity. The only gateway to office was the civil service examination, and the path was knowledge of the classical literature and capacity to write essays in its style. If a boy would be educated at all, even

[1] See Appendix I.

though he might never hope to get within sight of the gate, he must walk at least a little way along this path.

Thus the *Classics* were the background of all life, even of village life: the venerable Mr Wang, village elder (with a beard long enough and grey enough to call forth respect even outside his own village) would declare that the District Magistrate could back his every action with a proof-text from the *Classics* He himself when he talked with Mr Ho, head of the Ho household (which boasted two poles outside the Ho ancestral hall), would always try to finish every conversation with, " . . . So, as the Master said, . . ." And Ho (who lived rather on the family's literary reputation than on any scholarship of his own) would know enough to rebuke in classical language any unfilial conduct of the younger Hos, and to urge the boys to diligent study of their books with " Learn-and-always-practise-it " (being the first sentence from the *Analects*). So even the amahs and the kitchen boys would gather some crumbs that fell from the Ho children's table and rejoice in the possession of a few proverbs and more than a few ideas as to how things should be done in true classical, orthodox style.

A cursory glance at any volume of the *Classics* makes one feel that their chief concern is with the conduct of rulers and officials. " What is there here," one asks, " for the children of the family—much less for the amah and the kitchen boy? " But a cursory glance is not enough to bring you to the heart of the vast amount of teaching which the literature contains.

A modern Chinese critic (Z. K. Zia) gives as the distinct contribution of Confucius, his " doctrine of

Jen." "It is this," he says, "that Confucius dwelt upon, constantly talked about, and carefully searched into"—the key to his work, whether as commentator, original teacher, or editor of the more ancient writings. Legge, in his translation, renders "Jen" by "virtue," "goodness," "benevolence," as the context seems to require. Zia suggests "charity" as a better translation. Giles explains it as "an inward and spiritual love for all mankind, of which 'Yee' (duty towards one's neighbour) is the outward and visible manifestation." The burden of the *Classics* is this "charity" and the fact that "charity begins at home." Or perhaps the wide meaning of the term may best be rendered by "right relationship." Then "right relationship" begins at home: the relationship which matters first is the nearest, and the means whereby wider relationships may be set right.

So, to return to the small boy of the family: he begins his studies with the *Analects*, and what does he find? "Among men who show themselves filial sons and submissive younger brothers, there are few who wish to offend against their superiors. . . . The Princely Man attends to what is racial and, that being established, all systems naturally grow: filial piety and brotherly submission—are not these the root of all right relationship?" (*Analects*, I. 2.) His whole duty, as a commoner, towards the State, is thus summed up in right relationships within the family.

Next he proceeds to *The Great Learning*. "The ancients," says Confucius in the one chapter which he himself wrote, "cultivated their own characters, then regulated their families; their families being

regulated, their states were rightly governed; their states being rightly governed, the whole kingdom was peaceful and happy. From the Son of Heaven down to the mass of the people" this principle holds good. And the small boy sees that, even for the emperor, family comes before all wider duties.

He turns to the writings of Confucius's disciples: "Right relationship is the essence of manhood, and in love for one's relatives finds its best exercise. . . . The duties of universal obligation are five . . . between sovereign and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elder brother and younger brother, and belonging to the intercourse of friends." (*Doctrine of the Mean,* XX.) Again, far the biggest emphasis is upon relationships within the family.

Now he comes to Mencius—and here are fascinating stories. Mencius, for example, meets a prince who plans to act as peacemaker between two warring chieftains. Mencius tells him that his aim is good but that his arguments are unworthy; for the prince means to show the chiefs the unprofitableness of war, instead of teaching them this principle of right relationship:

> The armies will rejoice at the ending of war, and find pleasure in pursuit of profit: ministers will serve their prince for profit . . . sons their fathers and younger brothers their elders, all for profit; the result will be that, abandoning the principle of right relationship and duty to others, prince and minister, father and son, younger brother and elder brother, will carry on all their intercourse with this one thought of profit. But never has there been such a state of society without ruin. (*Mencius* V. 4.)

Unworthy motives in a monarch the boy hears rebuked chiefly because they will filter down to the mass of the people and wear away these fundamental family relationships.

As an older student he will read the more ancient writings, and from the *Book of Odes* will learn (at least Confucius says he should) " the more immediate duty of serving his father and the remoter one of serving his prince." (*Analects* XVII. 9.) In the *Book of Rites* he will find the words, " Verily a wise man, who governs the world, with his face towards the south, takes the part in which mankind has to walk [*i.e.* the family] as his starting-point." In all the world this is chief ! Indeed so constantly, in this book, are right relationships the refrain, especially those within the family, that " from conning such precepts the lad is imbued with a respect for parents that finally becomes intensified into a religious sentiment, and forms, as he increases in age, his only creed—the worship of his ancestors." [1]

This brief survey of Chinese literature has prepared us for what we shall find when now we turn to examine old China's social order.

When a British exile speaks of " home," he means one of two things : either one fireside and the two or three who sit round it, or the hills and woods and villages and fields and—spring in England. If he were to burst into song, it might be " *There's an old-fashioned house in an old-fashioned street,*" or again it might be " *O to be in England now that April's here !* " He means either home or homeland.

[1] *The Middle Kingdom*, S. Wells Williams, Vol. I., p. 646.

Now Wang too is away from home ; but there is no such vagueness about his vocabulary. By " home " he always means " the old-fashioned house " ; except that, instead of one house " in an old-fashioned street," he thinks of court after court of the same big family compound ; and as for " *two* faces so gentle and sweet," he can hardly count the number of those who make up the family ! Not homeland nor individual hearth but family is what matters. And small wonder : Wang's family home has been, is, and always will be the very centre of his life. He was born there, and there he lived with his parents and his father's brothers and their families, with grandparents and even grandfather's brothers and their sons and grandsons and with great-grandparents too, head of all the household ! All that he had—even his education—came from the combined family purse, and a large part of what he earns now goes back to the family to educate younger brothers and paternal cousins.

The family will decide when and whom he is to marry : he acquiesces, for he never meets a woman of his own class except in distant formalities ; and " How," thinks he, " should I decide so well as my mother, aunts and grandmother, who know so much of womankind ? " Besides it is more of a family concern than a private one ; does not the *Book of Rites* tell him that marriage is " to make a union between two persons of different family, the object of which is on the one hand to serve the ancestors in the family ancestral hall, and on the other hand to perpetuate the succeeding generations ? " In the old family compound his wife will live helping his mother, and there his children

will be born, as he was—even though business should keep him still in exile. If he succeeds in that business, or in life itself, it will mean wealth or fame not to him only but to all the Wangs; or if he were to fail, or lose his money, the disgrace would be his family's—they would even pay his debts! "Home" he will return (as indeed he always tries to return now) every New Year and Spring Festival; at New Year to congratulate grandparents and parents on attaining to another year of age, and in spring to pay homage at the family graves to Wangs who have gone before. And always when he goes back there is the ancestral hall with its little life-like images of the man and wife who founded his branch of the clan, and tablets all around the back with the names of fathers of families right away from their sons (centuries ago) down to his own great-grandfather. Small wonder if he dreams of home! Family is always with him; he is never alone. When life opened, he joined the throng of the family in those grey court-yards; when life closes he will join the throng of ancestral shades behind the tablets of that grey ancestral hall; in honourable endeavour family is his guardian angel, in shameful occupation family is his accusing ghost; always family haunts him—he is never alone. He is no individual—not because he is less, but because he is more—he is eternally one of the family.

Wang is a type of old China's millions to whom all the business of life meant family, family, family.

Of course, there must always have been some unfortunate few who, by mischance of birth or infancy, were disconnected, strayed, stranded and alone. The

modern novelist, Lu-shun, gives us a glimpse into the mind of such a one. He has no family, no home, no regular employ ; he does odd jobs for the villagers by day and at night sleeps like a beggar in the outhouse of a temple ; no one even knows his family name (not surname—added name—but the one to be added to, in China). He is utterly alone, and entirely cut off from all relationships. Yet when he is reviled, his retort is, " My ancestors were greater than yours ! " When he meets a village elder, whose son has just won the honours of the government examination, he thinks covetously, " My sons will be greater than yours ! " Later he is condemned for complicity in one of the revolutionary riots, and is told to sign a paper. Unable to write, his mark is to be a circle. He is signing his death-warrant, but he does not know it—what worries him is that his hand trembles and he cannot make the circle round : " My sons and grandsons will be able to draw round circles ! " is his comfort. In the tumbril on the way to execution, a proverb rings in his ears, " After twenty years there will be born another hero like myself . . ."

Family, family, family—even for the man of unknown ancestry and with no relations in the world !

But while in old China a man was more than an isolated individual, was a member of the family, he did not feel himself to be in any real sense a member of the larger group, the nation. The teaching of the *Classics* was literally carried out in the series of patriarchies which formed old China.[1] Wang, for example, was first and last a Wang, not a national,

[1] See Appendix II.

not even (until he travelled to another part of the country) a provincial; just as we, until we get into communication with Mars, shall never realize that we are citizens of this planet. Nation, province—these were wider than Wang's world: his world was family, or, if bigger, only slightly bigger.[1] For if trouble arose over money or land or water rights, it was family money, family land, family water rights, and the head of the family would arbitrate a settlement: it would be shameful to go outside the family to settle an internal difference. If the trouble were with members of another family of the village, the two heads of families would meet to settle it; perhaps the village elders, fathers of the village fathers, would assist. If the offender were from another village then at last the elders might approach the District Magistrate—"the Father and Mother Official," he was called, the patriarch of village patriarchs. Except for such rare occasions, the village was a separate self-contained state, independent of the whole gamut of officialdom, joined to the Imperial patriarchal system only by its own patriarchs, the village elders. A Chinese writer says,

> Nominally it is governed by the central government, through a hierarchical series of officials. Actually [with a few exceptions] the village is as independent of the central government as any British self-governing colony. . . . Police, education, public

[1] The various branches of the family combine to form the clan. One clan often comprises the whole village, or two or three clans the whole countryside. Thus it is no uncommon thing to find thousands of inhabitants of one village bearing the same surname, recognizing a common relationship, and being, in effect, nothing more than an enlargement of the family.

health, repairs of roads and canals, lighting, and innumerable other functions are managed by the villagers themselves.[1]

People in the West read of civil war, of changes in the nominal government, of the absence of any real government, and they imagine that this means, as it would mean in the West, anarchy, an end to peace and law and order. Meanwhile in China, millions of villagers, though they may have heard that the Manchu dynasty has fallen, have for a large part of these seventeen years of " anarchy " felt little difference in their simple ordered lives. The passing of an army has meant billets, press-gangs, looting, temporary loss ; bandits have multiplied and made life generally a little harder, and disaster to the family a little more frequent. But family and inter-family (*i.e.* village) relationships have until recently remained unchallenged and unchanged, and it is on these foundations that the amazing stability of old China's civilization was built.

Of the state religion there is less to say, because in common with all affairs of state, most of it mattered little to the ordinary man. " Confucianism " was a state religion, not because it provided for the religious needs of the people of the state, but because it provided religious sanction for the state system. Unlike Judaism, in which the state was submerged and almost lost in the religion, in Confucianism religion was subservient to and almost lost in the state.

A scholar of the thirteenth century, so loyal to Confucian principles that he languished in prison and

[1] *Village and Town Life in China*, by Y. K. Leong and L. K. Tao, p. 5.

laid down his life rather than acknowledge Kublai Khan, usurper of the throne, is equally loyal to the spirit of Confucian religion when he writes :

There is in the universe an Aura, an influence, which permeates all things and makes them what they are. Below it shapes forth land and water ; above, the sun and stars. In man it is called spirit ; and there is nowhere where it is not. . . . Such is this grand and glorious spirit which endureth for all generations ; and which, linked with the sun and moon, knows neither beginning nor end. The foundation of all that is great and good in heaven and earth, it is itself born from the everlasting obligations which are due by man to man.[1]

Chu Hsi, the greatest expositor and commentator of the *Classics*, had, a generation before, reduced all that they say of "Heaven" and "the Ruler on High" (Shang-ti) to Nature and Natural Law, and succeeding generations of China's scholars have followed his interpretation ; but Wen's philosophy is doubtless nearer to the days when the ancients instituted the worship of God as revealed in Heaven, in Earth, and in Men. To Wen this was the meaning of those rites on the night of the winter solstice. In the Temple of Heaven they had gathered, emperor and officials of state, before the greatest altar that the world has known, open to the sky and lit by the stars. There with ancient hymns and prayers [2] and sacrifice the emperor had worshipped on behalf of

[1] Wen Tien Hsiang, 1278. Quoted by H. A. Giles in *China and the Chinese*, p. 114.

[2] For some of the hymns and prayers used see Legge's *The Notions of the Chinese concerning God and Spirits*, p. 23 *et seq.*, or W. E. Soothill's *Three Religions of China*, Chap. XI.

them all. For who should worship Heaven but the Son of Heaven himself? This was the meaning too of the sacrifices which Wen, as an official, had had to offer for the people: sacrifices to this embodiment of deity, or to that departed hero. Doubtless vulgar beliefs were different and depraved, but happily he, an official and a scholar, was there to act on the people's behalf, as the emperor acted on his.

And the people—what part had they? According to orthodox Confucianism (though how should the unlearned remain orthodox?) they, first and last, were families, and, as such, confined to family worship—the worship of their ancestors. Not that the people were despised and given an insignificant part: on the contrary Wen says that all "is born from [these] everlasting obligations." Ancestor worship was indeed the first duty of the emperor himself—at the imperial sacrifices the tablets of the royal house were included in the worship along with that of Heaven. It was the first duty of officials too: Confucius, while in office, had "sacrificed to his ancestors as if they were present, and to the spirits as if the spirits were present" (*Analects*, III. 12). But for the people this was the only obligation towards the Unseen. As Confucius said: "For a man to sacrifice to a spirit which is not of his own [ancestors] is mere flattery" (or, to use a phrase of Jesus, "vain repetitions"). And again, "Honour the spirits, but leave them alone"—except for those duties prescribed by filial piety, leave the spiritual world to those who may understand it better.[1]

[1] This seems to have been the attitude of Confucius and of succeeding generations of literati, but it is in contrast to the actual

Thus, in religion, too, the same principle is fundamental and regulative: that the relationship which matters most is the nearest. State religion, like the state itself, is divided into a series of hierarchies: for the emperor, there is the worship of his ancestors, and, since he is responsible for "all under Heaven" (*i.e.* the empire), the worship of Heaven; for the officials, their ancestors, and, since in the place of their appointment there is this or that state temple, there is official worship of some lesser deities; for the people, the worship of their ancestors, and—because they are families and only families—nothing more.

In the literature we have seen family as the ideal, in the social order family as the fact; in the religion we see family's inspiration, these relationships "intensified into a religious sentiment." It is the interdependence of these three pillars and their common foundation in family and local relationships which made old China's civilization so enduring, so apparently immovable.

China was an old, old building, with pillars enduring and immovable, and doors fast bolted and barred. That was the third of old China's glories—independence of the outside world. Bounded on the north by the desert steppes of Mongolia, on the west by the snowy peaks of the Himalayas, and to the east and south by the China Sea, China was naturally secluded.

practice of the people, who worship a multitude of deities, mostly local, however. Sacrifice to Heaven by the people themselves is practised, but it has nothing to do with true "Confucianism," any more than have the other popular religious rites apart from ancestor worship.

Had the boundaries been more confined, China might have been forced to cross the barrier of the sea—even as necessity made Britain a sea power and gave us dominions overseas. But China did the very opposite : she strengthened the barriers which God put round her with fifteen hundred miles of wall to the north ! It is not insignificant that the world's greatest man-made barrier should be in China, and that China's contribution to the wonders of the world should be a wall. She had ample room for expansion and for the exercise of dominion within her own borders. China was self-contained.

Within these boundaries her civilization found no competitor. Tartars from the north, both Mongol and Manchu, usurped the Dragon Throne—only to be conquered by the superiority of the native civilization, even as vanquished Greece conquered her victor Rome. To the east China knew Japan : the land of " dwarf slaves " she called it. And while the Japanese were stung by her contempt the fact remained that they owed to China, so to speak, their very ABC. From them she had nothing to learn. To the west she knew well only Annam and Burma, and such "lesser breeds without the law" : recognition of nominal sovereignty and a more or less regular tribute were all that China looked to gain from that point of the compass. China little knew !—yes, and little cared, for China was self-sufficient.

So when others from the West eventually appeared ; when, for example, in 1834 Lord Napier came to make a commercial treaty and secure for foreign traders on China's threshold privileges equal to those of Chinese

abroad, the Viceroy of the Province looked up to the lone height of the Imperial throne and said :

On the face of the envelope [containing Lord Napier's credentials] the forms and style of equality were used, and there were absurdly written the characters " Great Britain." Now it is plain that in keeping the Central [China] and the Outside [foreign nations] apart, it is of the highest importance to maintain dignity and sovereignty.[1]

" The Viceroy is a presumptuous savage," was Napier's comment. " He was stupid and unpolished, having come from without the bounds of civilization," reported the Chinese Viceroy. Which was right ? It is well to look at the Viceroy's point of view before pronouncing judgment :

In itself this [trade] affects not the treasures of the revenues to the value of a hair or a feather's down. . . . The said country exists by commerce, and all its merchants come in crowds. . . . Besides, the rhubarb, tea, chinaware and raw silk of the Inner Land are things absolutely necessary to the said country, which cannot be without a traffic with the Central Flowery Land.

Doubtless the old gentleman pictured us as " barbarians," as living wholly upon rhubarb sticks and tea, but he had grasped the essential difference : we were dependent on foreign trade, while China was self-contained and self-sufficient.

Now Napier had served as junior officer at Trafalgar and had helped to teach Napoleon that " a nation of

[1] This and following quotations are from contemporary issues of the *China Repository*, 1834.

shopkeepers " could fight. But here in China he had entered into a different world: scholar, farmer, craftsman, merchant, soldier—this was the scale of values. " The Celestial Empire," the Viceroy told him, " appoints officers, civil ones to rule the people, military ones to intimidate the wicked. The petty affairs of commerce are to be directed by the merchants themselves." In a land so self-contained as to despise its own merchants and discourage foreign trade, the ambassador of a nation of shopkeepers was indeed of low estate. " The common disposition of the English barbarians," the Viceroy told the Emperor, " is ferocious, and what they trust in are the strength of their ships, the effectiveness of their guns. . . . Except in guns and firearms they have not one single peculiar talent." Ambassador of a warlike nation? In a land so self-sufficient as to dismiss all thought of rivals the soldier's was the lowest estate of all! Who will say that that old Viceroy, and the old China for which he stood, were altogether wrong? Presumptuous? But with much ground for those presumptions: self-satisfied with the glories of an age-long past; self-confident in the stability of her close-knit civilization; self-sufficient in the wideness of her own domain—such was old China, a world in herself and, to all appearances, enduring as the world. Was there anything in creation which could move her?

III

It was at this old, old building, standing four-square, and standing alone, that the young West came

knocking; as I have said, a veritable Hop-o'-my-Thumb on the steps of the Giant's castle. The knockings which history has recorded are the embassies of Macartney, Amherst, Napier—embassies which failed. But among the old documents of 1834, unheeded for the most part by historians, is the record of a more significant knocking. The month after Napier's failure, a group of British merchants met together in Canton, and the minutes of their meeting declare:

> We are now to make the trial, whether the Celestial Empire, after it has defeated all efforts to bring it into alliance with the nations of the world, will not yield to intellectual artillery. . . . The end of our course is far distant; the barriers high . . . our advance therefore may be slow. Yet . . . we are glad to engage in a warfare where we are sure the victors and the vanquished will meet only to exult and rejoice together.

This "Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge," formed by men who were barracked together in the old "factories" outside Canton (and more or less confined to barracks lest they cross the threshold) must have seemed a strange, futile, piteous thing. History records the wars of 1840 and 1856, which thundered on the door and forced it open, but it was gentler tapping, such as this, which, as it tapped, placed its finger on the real weakness of those walls which seemed impregnable. From the minutes of this obscure society I select—almost at random—a few phrases: "In our days many nations have begun the race for improvement"—"The God and Father

of all designed that there should be a community of interests" (between the nations)—"The light of science and the force of truth." And there you have the young West's most truly typical features: Progress, National and International relationships, Science. If it was true that China was impregnable save by "intellectual artillery," if her danger lay only in the realm of ideas, could any ideas be imagined more antithetical than these to old China as we have seen her? If any ideas could threaten her stability, these were the ones, and these happened—by chance, or in the providence of God—to be the very equipment with which the young West came.

The very antithesis of old China! If space would permit, we could repeat the survey just completed, writing young Britain for old China, and for everything else exactly its opposite. Young Britain's first glory was, not the traditions of an age-long past, but progress. From the seventeenth century onward men ceased to look back to the grandeur that was Rome, and began to catch that attitude of mind which now, however we may talk of "good old days," our every action presupposes: the looking forward to a to-morrow of achievement and discovery, brighter than the best of yesterdays. The pillars of her civilization (new, not old) were built, not on local and family relationships, but on national and international relationships, or, if we must use terms which to-day are in disrepute, on nationalism and imperialism. How many of our classics, from Shakespeare onwards, echo and resound with British partiotism and British power! For the *Book of Odes* we have our poets,

for the *Book of Records* our historians, for the *Analects* our essayists and philosophers—and this refrain runs through all. And our society? During the very years when the young West was knocking at the door of old China, Hume, Mill, Bright, and Cobden were declaring that the industrial revolution with all its ills had destroyed old local attachments and had given birth to a new social order. "Your system of patronage," they are quoted as saying, "and of patriarchal government is now physically impossible. Newspapers, railways, great cities, have made the workman independent." And not only did these years mark the rise of individualism, but, already sighted and only a little way ahead, were national suffrage and national education, which were to connect the ordinary working man with the life of the nation, and with every far-flung market overseas. This age was rapidly making us, not only "fellow-citizens of one great people . . . heirs of a nation's history," but still more "participators in the life of mankind, and joint-heirs of the world's inheritance," individuals with vital interests in the nation and the world. And religion? From the days of Luther onwards there had never been wanting an ideal of nationalism which had found its inspiration in Christianity; and now when commerce was binding the world together, in Christianity too men found sanction for this interdependence: "The God and Father of all designed that there should be community of interests."

And instead of old China's independence of and ignorance of the outside world, young Britain had

western science, science which had already meant for us the end of self-complacency around the parish pump, the end of self-sufficiency in our little island home. One smiles at Lo Tai Tai (the official's wife in *Two Gentlemen of China*), a sympathetic smile, when one reads her words: "I want my daughters to have hearts open to receive knowledge, so that, though they may have to live in the women's courts, the wideness of the world may be within their minds." Here was a wideness of knowledge so different from the lofty but narrow wisdom of the Chinese *Classics* which would burst, not only the women's courts, but the family home, and the old social order, and the confines of their self-contained civilization itself!

Such were we, who stood there knocking, and such were our possessions as the door began to open. And what had we brought? All this, and more; not for its own sake, but (except on the part of a few, such as that obscure society) accidentally; thrown in with our "clocks and watches, broadcloths and camlets," stowed away in the cramped cabins of our tea-clippers, smuggled along with our opium. Opium? Everyone has dwelt upon our responsibility there, but a greater responsibility stares us in the face. It seems as if old China detected the danger and bade us and our new ideas keep out. The year 1840 saw us break down the door, and these last two decades have seen our new ideas shake the foundations and lift off the roof.

Such were we, and such were our possessions: was it by chance or by the providence of God? If chance, then as you read of China's glories sigh and say, "The

old is dead and done with ; what an accident to cause!" But if in history you find the workings of a Master Hand, if you can grasp one fraction of His purpose, you will rather seek young China as he sits among the ruins and will say (as some have said), " God used young Britain all unwittingly to destroy old China ; I would consciously be used, if so He wills it, in the building of the new."

CHAPTER II

YOUTH AND A RUIN

"China is now in the process of nation-making. In the past the family, not the state, has been the unit. The Revolution will not be complete until more of the people can transform their mind from the family idea to the state idea. This will make the Revolution a success."

T. Z. Koo, in the *North China Daily News*, February 23, 1927.

"Every age, every man, will look on the past primarily either as a thing to flee from or a thing to follow, will either prefer to build a house for himself or to live in his ancestors'. What we need is a temper or a principle which will take us above this unceasing clash, some ideal for the sake of which we shall be content to abandon our father's house, even if we love it, some plan to guide us in building the new one for ourselves if we are compelled to do so."

F. S. Marvin, *The Century of Hope*, p. 9.

I

But how far have these "new ideas" penetrated? Is the case so serious as I have stated? Have they reached the foundations—or only the doorways of the treaty ports and the surface of China's life? Perhaps, after all, the many changes of the "Changing China" that we so often hear of will only amount to patching up or rebuilding of the frontage.

Mr A is a traveller, and can give evidence of these "new ideas." In Canton, for example, he will tell you that thirty-five miles of new motor roads pro-

claim the ideas of Macadam, and the motors on them yet more loudly those of Ford, while the ferro-concrete buildings at the side might almost be branch Selfridge's —with roof-gardens and all! But in two minutes he was in streets only eight feet wide and paved with granite slabs, where only a "chair" or his own legs could take him past shops with their open fronts and perpendicular signs. Apart from this metropolis, so he was told, there is little change even in the frontage of the old walled cities of the province. The Revolution? Why, that meant that in 1911 the old hierarchy was decapitated, and now instead of the emperor at the head are rival military dictators: on the surface the name of democracy and the new ideas of Rousseau and Robespierre, but underneath the same old system worked by one or other of these reactionary Napoleons. And the people? Most queues have suffered an "Eton crop," and there are now many youths with western ideas of dress. The leopard *can* change his spots, but even spots are only skin-deep: so are the changes, whether in places, politics, or people.

Mr B is an old resident in one of the Concessions, and about the people and popular movements he will tell you more; especially (after these last few years) about political agitation, labour troubles, and anti-foreign boycotts. His servants, he says quite truthfully, were unwilling to strike until intimidated by just a small group of leaders with "new ideas" from Russia. The merchants he does business with remained friendly, but did not dare buy British goods: the handful of hare-brained irresponsible schoolboys whom they feared were drunk with the western idea of

patriotism—too heady a beverage for the East. And whatever there is of popular anti-foreign feeling may have new tags and labels, and on them the new ideas of anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism, but he was out in the old Boxer days, and it is the same ignorance and the same hate though mixed by different hands.

From such reports as these, fairly typical of those newspaper correspondents who still talk of " maintaining the *status quo*," one might indeed conclude that there are cracks in the mortar of old China's building, but that the surface only needs repointing ; that the inhabitant of China is still the Old-Man-of-the-World, and to talk of " Young China " is to mistake second-childhood for full-blooded youth. But the fact is that the old building has crashed to the ground, the old glories are a heap of ruins, the old foundations have sunk in the sands of time ; that, moreover, the old, old man who lived there is dead and his son has come into the inheritance—the inheritance of a heap of stones and the task of beginning again from the very bottom. I am not talking of streets and motor-cars and buildings : they are insufficient index of real change. Nor am I speaking yet of social and political " movements " : we cannot understand people in the mass till we have met them individually. I am talking of breakdown in the realm of ideas, and of typical young Chinese with whom I walk among the ruins.

II

When we speak of " Young China " it is the China of young ideas which we mean rather than any definite

demarcation of age: Chinese of modern general education as opposed to old classical education, and therefore of modern outlook. "Modern," let us say, rather than "western": a Chinese friend recently corrected me even when I spoke of "western music," remarking that one cannot stake out knowledge by continents—truth, beauty, goodness, are never foreign but the rightful heritage of all the world. Modern education began long before 1911, though it is since the Revolution that it has spread and grown. Thus, while most of young China are young, very young, in years, there are some of the previous generation who must be classed with them. Such a one was Sun Yat Sen himself, their leader, their hero, their type. A few sentences of his will serve to illustrate the outlook of young China:

Take whatsoever race on earth you will for comparison: in population the most numerous, in race the greatest, with civilization and learning for four thousand years, we ought to be abreast of any nation of Europe or America. But here in China we have only family and clan solidarity, never yet the spirit of race (nationalism). So in spite of there being four hundred millions united together in one China, in reality there is only one bank of wind-blown sand; until to-day we are the poorest and weakest nation in the world and occupy in international intercourse the very lowest status. Others are the knife and the chopping-board: we are the bit of fish. (*The Three People's Principles.*)

Old China, we have seen, was for ever looking back to the glories of the past. Young China looks back at "civilization and learning for four thousand years"

with only the thought of the urgent need for progress: "We ought to be abreast. . . ." This applies not only to politics but to all young China's thinking. It applies for example to Wang. As a schoolboy he was in my class for western history, and he never awoke till we reached the French Revolution and burst upon the modern world—the rest was waste of time. Now when we are both in a theological college I am aware of his impatience when I teach historical theology—there is little of truth for him in the old historic creeds. His favourite text, I have no doubt, is "Behold I make all things new"; his cry is not for "more light, more light," but for a new creation. To old China that which was old was good, that which was oldest was best; to Wang everything old is suspect, and the newest he is predisposed to welcome as most nearly true. The hand of the past, which so long upheld China's stable static civilization, can in no way support him nor guide his steps: he feels it to be a dead hand and shakes it off. This revolt against the past, this loss of all the help which the historic past should give, is due to the fact that, for him, the old, old structure has cracked and crumbled and crashed, till the very foundations are shaken.

Old China's civilization, we have seen, was a series of hierarchies, based upon family relationships. To young China that erstwhile noble structure is but "a bank of wind-blown sand"—aye, a mound of crumbled ruins, dust and ashes of its former greatness. Why? Sixty years ago Legge said that the teaching of Confucius was "adapted to a primitive unsophisticated state of society"; he was "a good counsellor for the

father of a family, the chief of a clan . . . but his views want the comprehension which would make them of much service to a great empire. . . . Second, Confucius makes no provision for the intercourse of his country with other independent nations." The *Classics* are dusty in the college library because they fail to touch the twentieth century, and contain no promise for the twenty-first.

Individualism has come to young China—has come to Wang. What shall he do? His parents in his country home have arranged his marriage. He has not been consulted, but then the family has always fixed such matters; he does not know the girl, but then his father and mother never met until they were man and wife. Freedom—romance—one's own new home—are these realities, part of the "rights of man?" Or "filial piety and brotherly submission" and the old ties of the family home, must these hold him still? Individualism has come, and the old social order and the old moral code have for him broken down, and he must build again.

And second, nationalism has come to young China. Wang is impatient too of the old "family and clan solidarity" which has restrained the sense of nationality, which has kept him too conscious of being a Wang and too little aware that he is Chinese. Indeed, the old principles of Confucius have given way before *The Three People's Principles* of Sun Yat Sen. "Double Ten Day" (the tenth of the tenth month), anniversary of the Republic, Wang celebrates in many ways more joyfully even than New Year, for when he goes back to the old family home, how can he

reverence dead ancestors when his mind is full of the problems of " a living wage " ? How can he respect grey-beards when he is fresh from devouring new books ? How can he even honour his father and mother who belong to the old world when towards the youngsters of the family he feels like a prophet of the new ? Yes, he knows what it means for a prophet to feel a stranger " in his own country and in his own house "—his own village and his own family home. No more does he belong there ; no longer is he " one of the family." The consciousness of nationality and the problems of society have burst for ever the walls of that old narrow life. His home is the nation—but that is not yet built ; so he is left, in a larger world, but with no house to contain him, no code to restrain him, no roof to cover, no experience to guide.

And third—as if there were not enough without it ! —internationalism has come to young China : again, not a constructed sentiment, nor even a constructive ideal, but a devastating sense of being " the poorest and weakest nation in the world and occupying in international intercourse the very lowest status." Before Wang has adjusted himself to his new sense of individuality, before he is used to the larger spirit of nationalism, he must needs look out upon the world as a citizen thereof. And the world is too big for him. It is not only old China's legacy of debts and mortgages to foreign powers that makes him restless and malcontent ; it is the attitude of mind—" inferiority complex," if you will—due to this too sudden breakdown of the old walls which kept him from seeing the wideness of the world.

Old China, we have seen, was self-complacent in her independence of, and ignorance of, the outside world. Young China, keen to be "abreast of Europe and America," hails Marx and Einstein as "most famous scholars of the world," [1] welcomes Bertrand Russell and John Dewey on their lecturing tours, fills bookshelves with translations, and magazines with digests of every scientist and philosopher of the West. All that our fathers experienced when Darwin and Spencer burst upon a surprised world—that, and the crowded experiences of the seventy succeeding years, are for young China packed still more alarmingly into one short decade. It is as if old China in its fall has left a vacuum, and the four winds of heaven—all that is newest and most restless in the science and philosophy of the world—are rushing in to fill it. Who can rebuild in a howling waste? If young Wang finds it hard to shape his Christian philosophy amid the storm, what of his brothers who before had only the crudities of old China's old religions? For not only the old faiths, but the whole view of life, of which religion itself is but a part, has fallen.

Severance from the historic past, lack of adjustment to new and larger relationships, absence of any determined philosophy of life—these are characteristic of young China, and first essentials to any understanding of the situation to-day. And if this is not living in a ruin, I cannot imagine what a ruin must be like.

[1] Sun Yat Sen in *The Three People's Principles*. All quotations from Sun Yat Sen may be taken as being from the *Principles* unless marked otherwise.

III

Most people with any experience of China would agree that the foregoing description is typical of young China. The question is, Is young China (with these characteristics) typical of China? And here our friends the traveller and the old resident will protest, giving us the necessary reminder that perhaps one per cent [1] of China's four hundred millions can read and write, and of these only a small proportion can be said to have any degree of modern education. Thus of the vast majority of China's population all these statements about ruin and loss are untrue; of young China they may be true, but young China is of small size and therefore of small significance. That size and significance are necessarily connected seems a strange argument from those who would be the last to admit the significance of China in world history, in spite of her vastness. It would be a stranger hypothesis for anyone who had a true appreciation of China's own history during the last twenty odd years.

The China of to-day is not the old man and the old building—it is youth and a ruin. To prove this statement it would be preferable by a minute survey to show how far the ideas of young China had penetrated

[1] One hears various estimates. Ten years ago a Chinese statistician in Canton put the proportion of literacy as low as one per thousand (*i.e.* for the whole country). Most of such figures are, of necessity, mere guesses, but those on page 128 are authoritative. It must be remembered, however, that these refer only to union members, among whom there are very few women; also that they refer to the most progressive city in China—very much more advanced than the countryside.

to the mass of the people. For that I have neither space nor experience. It is hard to generalize about a country of continental size when one's own lot has fallen in one small corner and among one small section of the people. What I can do is to show how inevitable that penetration is and has been for nearly twenty-five years.

At the bottom of my garden is a tree, and on it is a placard fixed by zealous student hands; such placards are everywhere to-day. It bears the legend, "The Revolution is not yet complete."[1] The reason why so many people see only surface cracks and deny that the foundations have been shaken is that they fix attention on one isolated happening in 1911, forgetting that the crumbling of old China began before, has continued since, and now proceeds apace.

In 1905 young China inherited the status of the old literati. Of the latter too it might have been said that they were few in number and therefore of small importance. Yet, as we have seen, their philosophy was the background of all life, even of village life; and in any examination of old China they must be taken as the type. Why? Because of China's age-long veneration of scholarship; because from them the officials of the empire were recruited; because they embodied the ideals of the old civilization. Two parties at the Court had long been struggling, the one for, the other against, the destructive inrush of new ideas. After China's miserable failure in the madness of the Boxer year, it only needed Japan's success in the Russo-Japanese War to convert even the Empress

[1] From the Will of Sun Yat Sen, see Appendix III.

Dowager. In 1905 the old examination system was abolished; China must change. But little did the Dowager or the people realize how radical a change it was! Respect for the old scholar lingered on, and the world of the villager seemed different not a whit. What had really happened? The old tradition was dethroned. The day of the old literati was done. "Returned students" from the universities of Japan, America and Europe, and students of the modern schools which began to be established in China, had succeeded them. The smallness of their numbers, so far from rendering them an insignificant factor, in some ways heightened their influence: in a land so largely illiterate the words of even an elementary schoolboy were listened to with respect. For they had inherited the status of the old literati: these were the new scholars, and to them was given the scholar's universal veneration; from them would come the new officialdom; and they were to embody the ideals of the new civilization, whatever that might be. From that day young China was to be increasingly the type, and their philosophy the background of China's new life. The first of old China's glories, the old tradition, was broken. If, twenty-three years ago, we had had the eyes of a prophet, we should have seen youth and a ruin.

In 1911 young China discredited the old civilization. This may sound a strange description of the Revolution. Yet who can say that the Revolution established a republic? Its work was destructive, and if it established anything it was the principle of destruction—of revolution: a revolution which, having

destroyed the head of the hierarchical system, was bound to attack in turn the lesser hierarchies [1] which through tens of centuries had been built up into old China's social order. The Revolution was not a widespread popular movement. Public opinion was not demanding a democracy—indeed there was little public opinion to demand anything. A small band of returned students, the Tung Men Hui, had been planning revolution for the past ten years ; they were the nucleus. Among the people, famine, high taxation, and consequent local unrest ; among the official classes, provincial opposition to the government's policy of centralization : these were the actual causes of the outbreak. In this respect it was little different from the many other revolutions of China's long history when a section of the people had shown the Son of Heaven high heaven's displeasure. The difference came when the young China party led in the demand, not for another dynasty as heretofore, but for a republic. Strong enough to make this demand, young China was not strong enough to see it carried out. The present " tuchun " system evolved, with president and cabinet dominated by whichever military group happens to control Peking.

What concerns us here is that young China had discredited the old system. According to the principle of " right relationships," the *Classics* (whose writers surely knew old China well) teach, not only that submission within the family makes for peace within the empire, but the converse too, that destruction of the latter will ultimately affect the whole society. A

[1] See Appendix II.

decapitated system can last little longer than a decapitated man. Once the roof of the house is lifted off, the wind can reach the walls and the rain the foundations. Democracy, freedom, self-determination—call it what you will—was established in principle, and implied first and foremost rebellion against ancient authority. "Our people," said Mr Eugene Chen, speaking before the Central Asian Society in 1913, "have reversed the teachings of forty centuries." The second of old China's glories, the very civilization itself, was shaken. Seventeen years ago it needed somewhat less of a prophet to see in China youth and a ruin.

From 1919 onwards young China has been consciously engaged in making public opinion, or, as they themselves express it, "spreading the spirit of revolution." I happen to be writing on the seventh of May. There are no classes—it is a holiday. A holiday? The students are hard at work in the city and surrounding villages. If we were out we should see youngsters in groups about the streets, carrying flags and armed with handbills. Now and again they stop and address a few people at a street corner. One unrolls a map of China, and the speaker points to it —points to Shantung. And "*Our* China," he keeps saying, "*Our* China." Why? To-day is National Humiliation Day. Years ago, in 1915, while the other interested Powers were too busily engaged in the European war to intervene, Japan sent China an ultimatum, with a time-limit. No provocation, no pretence of moral cause, just a statement of Japan's intention to dominate, if not virtually to annex, the

young Republic, so it seemed: the famous—the infamous—Twenty-One Demands. The European war went on. So did life in China. Life as usual for the villager—these demands did not touch family land or the ancestral temple, so how should they concern him, even had he known? Business as usual for the merchant—in the towns some of the great guilds perhaps were fearful, but still more afraid of disturbance and the loss of trade; after all Shantung, which was chiefly affected, did not happen to be their province. The war came to an end in Europe; so did peace in China—for the merchant, if not for the villager. For the Versailles Treaty ratified some of Japan's demands, and in May 1919 the students of China turned out in processions of protest. In the capital the procession became a riot, sacked the house of a cabinet minister and defied the government. Three ministers resigned, and the Chinese delegate withdrew from Versailles without signing. All over the country young China burned Japanese goods, hung samples on the street gates to tell people what they must not buy, and enforced a boycott which temporarily ruined Japanese trade. Not the masses of the people nor the mighty merchant guilds, but mere handfuls of schoolboys—they acted for China. And each succeeding year similar bands of schoolboys on that selfsame day have talked to coolies, farmers, merchants, about China, *their* China, and their rights.

One of the greatest British authorities on China, the late Sir John Jordan, said, " Public opinion, which was formerly non-existent or inarticulate, is now a growing and powerful influence and the student movement is a

factor which no government can afford to ignore." Young China's ideas were spreading to the masses: not much longer could even the villager live a self-complacent little life. The last of old China's glories was shaken. Nine years ago it should have been evident to all that modern China was best represented by youth—youth and a ruin.

Had this been all, the process would have been quick enough in the treaty ports, along the railway line, even in more distant towns where there were organized bodies of students. But such amateur attempts to rouse public opinion were speedily reinforced by those of the Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang). This party then controlled the government only in and around Canton, and even there control was often precarious owing to the vagaries of local militarists, upon whose goodwill it was at first dependent. But the nationalists were already followed by the majority of young China throughout the country, and they were the first party to appreciate the support of this nucleus of public opinion and to make a bid for its extension. Extension—whither? The merchants, already organized (in their ancient guilds), seemed the natural leaders of public opinion. But they were for the most part reactionary, and while it was so often necessary to touch their pockets, this very fact made it the harder to reach their hearts. Labour was uneducated, unorganized, and therefore hard to capture. But it was towards Labour that young China was now turned. The organizing of unions was accompanied by their " education " in the revolutionary ideas of young China. The efficiency

of their work was tested and proved in the Hong-Kong Seamen's Strike of 1922. The sense of ruin, the spirit of revolution, was spreading fast.

By 1925 the effects of the alliance of the nationalists with Russia began to appear—again contributing to the more rapid spread of young China's ideas, plus many newer ones of their own. They spread first in the south; then, as the nationalist armies and bands of propagandists swept northwards to the Yangtze and on to Shanghai, there too, with the added impetus afforded by success. Nor is north China altogether unaffected, for the propagandists do not wait for the armies but precede them, finding everywhere, in young China, an instrument ready to their hands.

Russia [said T. Z. Koo, in 1927] has given of her experience of party organization and propaganda to a group of earnest people who feel they have benefited thereby. . . . This contribution has led to the awakening of the third section of the Chinese people, namely, the peasants. This class represents China's man power. . . . They are now organizing themselves into Peasants' Unions. It is yet too early to estimate the significance of this last awakening.

It is too early, except to say that now at last, away back in many villages of the interior, away from the treaty ports, away even from the railway line, "the old order changeth, giving place to . . ." what? At first, discontent, disorder, disruption, ruin, for it is too early to estimate the significance of the new. This is not local. Even a most critical observer of the nationalist cause writes from central China:

All the country from the Indo-China frontier to a hundred miles north of the Yangtze valley is now affected, and although in the northern provinces the storm still only mutters below the skyline, it will burst there before long.

Now, is old China fallen? Is the old, old man who lived there dead?

It is after such a survey that we could profitably listen to Mr B's talk of strikes and boycotts and anti-foreignism, or walk with Mr A about the streets, observing this time not only the signs of the shops but the true signs of the times. Everywhere are evidences of this first destructive stage of revolution. The posters, streamers, banners are emblazoned with the characters "Down with! . . . down with! . . . down with! . . ." The slogans shouted at meetings, demonstrations, processions, celebrations, resound with the same "Down with . . .!" The societies which have sprung into being and the "movements" which have gained most notice have been "Anti-this" and "Anti-that." "The rain descended and the floods came and the winds blew," and with the house coming down about one's ears it was often hard to keep one's head. First came the crash in south China—and in 1926 some one sent to the *Daily Mail* an article on "millions wasted" on Christian missions in China. Then throughout central China—and in 1927 men who should have known better reported from Shanghai that "the life-work of thousands of missionaries has been hopelessly shattered . . . the whole structure has virtually collapsed throughout China." We should have known better, we who know

how much is founded upon the rock. But from doubting that old China could really change at all, some have suddenly come to fear that good and bad and all are gone. The crash deafens us, the dust blinds our eyes, and for the moment it may seem that in the cataclysm nothing can stand. The history of the Fall of Rome has told us that amid the ruins of the empire the Christian Church remained. In China "the Revolution is not yet complete," not even the first stage, the stage of destruction; but in south China, where the crash came first, the dust is beginning to clear and to reveal that which still stands, "towering o'er the wrecks of time." As for old China—that has gone for ever. We see only youth and a ruin.

IV

From the ruin let us turn back to the youth. If we appreciate this fact, that young China is living in a ruin, we shall have more chance than the traveller who sees only the surface, or the old resident who dismisses it all as a "fake"; more chance of understanding the present unrest, of forgiving the many mistakes, of sympathizing with those for whose hands there waits the stupendous task of rebuilding. Yes, we can sympathize, for it is always youth that feels "the time is out of joint"; many of us were revolutionaries in our student days, and we have all dreamed our dreams of re-making the world. But in few lands is it so true as it is in China that youth actually has this responsibility.

We talk of young England as the England of

to-morrow, but young China is the China of to-day: while young England prepares for life's struggle on the playing fields of Eton, or in the local recreation grounds, young China is already in it, in the dusty banner-strewn streets of Peking or Canton. While English schoolboys are discussing which is likely to be "cock-house" this year, Chinese students are helping to organize Labour. Instead of the Cup Final, they grow excited over "unequal treaties." No mere debating society interests engage their attention, not the mock solemnity of make-believe parliaments: young China has full-fledged political meetings and makes known its demands to the government and the public. I do not say that it is healthy. Thank God, if, to our western youth, "life's a game that's just begun"—there is no need to bear the burdens of adult responsibility too soon. But even with us it has not always been so. I well remember in the bad old days of the war, a dignified old gentleman standing hat in hand at the corner of a London street while we marched by—youth in the place of age. And we must take off our hats (as he did then) to those who, when age has failed and the old has broken down, forsake the pleasant paths of peace—their rightful heritage as well as ours—and shoulder the burdens of their country.

But it is not healthy: and while I would have you respect young China, I would not have you idealize him. His position is not a healthy one—nor was the atmosphere of 1914. If the war made heroes it also made moral wrecks, and if we heard more of the heroes, perhaps that was because England's own youth

were concerned. With regard to China, the newspapers may make more of the other side of the picture. It is my purpose neither to emphasize nor to ignore the failings of young China, but to take those of which one commonly hears and put them in their setting. You can understand the youth when you have already seen the ruin.

To-day the first thing I saw on opening my newspaper was the head-line "Foolish Students' Wild Threats"—there are similar news items most days. Young China is "foolish," "wild," extreme. But remember the ruin: in this abnormal position is it to be wondered at if many of the actions, most of the sentiments, and the whole outlook, of young China are abnormal? If they call for a blotting out of all past treaties and a new beginning which takes no account of the old—that only reflects their own severance from the historic past. If nationalism seems "too heady a beverage for the East," if demonstrations are quickly turned to riots—that is the result of new and larger relationships to which adjustment has not yet been made. If young China is easy prey for any unscrupulous agitator—that is because the old philosophy of life has gone and nothing but a whirlwind fills its place. Life in a ruin cannot be normal.

In the same paper I next see "Mission College in Trouble—Students the Storm Centre": the storm centre, that is it—young China is turbulent. This story too has had to be told again and again. A Chinese friend informs me that government school students in his town do about three months' work a

year [1]—to such an extent is the time-table interrupted by political meetings and propaganda work. One hears of schools where (in spite of such conditions) he would be a bold master who failed a boy in examinations, and others where he would be bold to examine boys at all. But remember the ruin. With young China in this abnormal position, is it any wonder that one finds among young China not only many "old heads on young shoulders" but many heads that have been turned? It is hard to command before you have learned to obey.

Youth suffers a third criticism—one which we who live with young China most often feel inclined to make; one too with which you who live in England are most concerned. I have just been reading the review of a book by Wang Ching Wai, which repeats it: "His outlook would seem to be purely on foreign policy, he does not mention internal reform."

Why is it that young China seems more intent on raising international status than on improving internal conditions? Why will he not understand that reform, like charity, begins at home? Some foreigners say that it is the old self-complacency in the new guise of national pride. Others blame the old philosophy with its lack of self-criticism. The distant past may have some explanation to make, but recent history contains the ruin—and remember how it happened.

[1] See *China To-day through Chinese Eyes*, Second Series, p. 95: "Ever since the May Movement (1919) the student body has been dominated by a small group of radical students. . . . These have made conditions in school so bad that in many institutions it has not been possible for students to do any real study during the past few years." Also *Ibid.*, p. 88.

Old China bade us keep out—and we came in ; old China struggled against the inrush of new ideas, but they prevailed. Since then all the " isms " of young China (even patriotism) have come from the West. All his education has been filled with western subjects and conducted on western lines : he could not learn mathematics without our figures, nor medicine without our terms—he could not even study his own literature without our methods of literary criticism. Young China is not denationalized—nay, the very fact that he is nationalized points to the West. All his attention has been fixed on foreign lands and foreign thought and foreign ways. And the inevitable has happened : he has been educated as a citizen of the world, and by that very process he has discovered himself a citizen of China ; so naturally that which chiefly stirs him is the relationship of China and that western world. Moreover, " anti-imperialism " has been the call that rallied the students in the Nationalist movement, and they in turn have used the bogy of " foreign capitalism " to awaken Labour. In the destructive phase of the revolution attention has, at first naturally, and later purposely, been fixed on the West. It is hard to see your own house when the walls are down and you are looking abroad on the world.

V

" The Revolution is not yet complete," not even in its first destructive phase. But the prophets tell us that the day of the extremists is almost done, that the time of worst destruction is nearing an end. I

have no intention of joining them—a Saul among the prophets! Yet no one can help thinking of the stage of reconstruction towards which the whole movement looks. From examining the history of the ruin can we make any forecast as to the process of rebuilding?

Three facts stand out: first the tremendous influence of the student class, the nucleus of China's nationalism; second, the awakening through them of Labour to a sense of power; third, the fact that in the case of both, attention has largely been fixed upon the West. With the two former we shall deal at greater length later; of the last there is here still one more word to say. We have passed through three years in which attention has been fixed upon the West—for the purpose of finding our failings and using them for the spread of that spirit of dissatisfaction which is revolution's destructive weapon. Suppose (it seems a likely supposition) that in the stage of reconstruction, attention is still fixed upon the West: what will it fasten on? what will it use? Suppose (it is at least a possibility) that it is focused, as it has been hitherto, on Great Britain: what will young China look for?—what will young China see?

And since there are two sections of the Chinese population which in modern history have come to count for most, in my answer to that question I should at least reply that the two corresponding sections of the British population will have these next few years vast possibilities of influence in China: I mean British student life, and the British Labour Movement. And the Christian Church? Yes, the Christian

Church. But not alone through her missions and her missionaries: in so far as Christianity in Britain can capture and inspire the student world and the working classes, the influence of the West may lead China to the One Foundation for her rebuilding.

CHAPTER III

NATIONALISM[1] AND THE NEW FOUNDATIONS

"If we are to get clear of our dangers we must stand for the principle of Race, first band ourselves together, then join each small weak race to break down Might with Right. When Might is broken, and in all the earth there are no more wild-hearted men, then will be time enough for *us* to talk of Internationalism."

The Three People's Principles, SUN YAT SEN.

"Oriental against Anglo-Saxon, Democracy against Dictatorship, Socialism and Communism against Capitalism—these are the conflicts which surpass and aggravate the rivalries of nations and empires. Aristocracy and bourgeois, within each state, are united for the defence of their rights, but divided on the choice of a civilization. Inversely, men of the same religion, or cherishing the same ideals, kill one another in the name of their nationality. Herein lies the tragedy of our century, and the immense risk for the future. The two ideals of civilization and nationality are disconnected. It is for the young Europeans to work at their reunification."

Nationality and Civilization, LUCIEN RONSIER.

I

MARCH 1925 marks the end of a strangely romantic career, that of Sun Yat Sen. At his passing there were many sighs. Young China's was a sigh of

[1] It is important to remember the distinction between the Nationalist Movement and the Nationalist Party (Kuo Min Tang). All propagandists of the Party, and most foreign reporters too, speak of them as identical, the former of set purpose, the latter because their interests are generally confined to politics. These last few years the Party has indeed attempted to swallow the

sorrow for a lost leader; many others sighed with relief for one trouble-maker the less. Looking back upon the years since then, I cannot but remember that parable of the grain of wheat that fell into the ground and died.

For at his death most men would have accounted Sun Yat Sen a failure. The old-style official, still in the majority in China, would so regard him. Though twice called president, even his enemies could find nothing to show for his official position in the shape of bonds in foreign banks or property in foreign concessions—and by the standards of most officials that is failure indeed! The peace-loving merchant classes also would account him a failure. Of his forty years' political activity more than half was spent in striving to overthrow the Manchu dynasty. At that time he was a fugitive in foreign lands, with a price upon his head. That price would have been won, but for British justice and a British friend, by the Chinese Legation in London in 1896. Seemingly successful at last, and rewarded in 1913 with the honour of being China's

Movement: nationalism has been talked of as though confined to the Party, and no one outside the Party has been considered a true progressive patriot. Such appropriation cannot long continue: it is as impossible as the action of the lean kine of Pharaoh's dream. The Movement is a bigger thing (see p. 99 for example), and a more enduring. Whatever there is of failure, disintegration, and discredit (and recently there has been so much of all), they belong to nationalism as the property of a political party, not to the Nationalist Movement.

The merging of the one in the other has, however, been so far successful that I find it impossible always to extricate them in recounting their history. The reader will need to remedy this defect by bearing in mind that there is such a distinction.

first president, he was soon called upon to resign in favour of Yuan Shi Kai, a statesman of the old order who seemed to have more chance of gathering the divided loyalties into one. This meant more failure and more striving: for Yuan, while strong, was reactionary. Sun must again become the revolutionary, this time in Canton; sometimes again a fugitive, this time to Hong-Kong and Shanghai. To China's hard-headed practical business men this seemed sure sign of failure.

Foreign criticism went deeper and attacked, not only his failure in achievement, but his apparent lack of constructive plans. For when at last in 1921 the southern provinces were, if not yet safe for democracy, at any rate tolerably safe for Sun, he spent his strength as "President" of the Canton government, not in putting down the brigands, not in consolidating the territory he had won, but in preparing for his everlasting "punitive expedition" against the "northern militarists" and attacking (verbally) the foreign concessions which had been his refuge. If some of us accounted him an unpractical dreamer, it was not without cause. I was living then on the borders of Kwangtung, and during three months of that year our city was twice lost to the Nationalists and twice regained. Meanwhile brigands abounded throughout the countryside, and the soldiers of both North and South, according to what we saw of the press-gangs and the billeting, and what we heard of loot, murder, and rape, were but an added evil of a similar kind. What manner of success was this?

Before the northern expedition of 1926 Sun was dead,

a local politician of a local nationalist party, with little authority, except in student circles, beyond the limits of his home province, Kwangtung. It seemed as if the " Father of the Revolution " had ended his life as a petty chieftain, as if a great warrior had died engaged in a sordid family broil. Judged by achievement, judged by policy, we accounted him a failure. Those of us foreigners who attended his memorial services went to honour him as an idealist ; but we added in our hearts unpractical idealist. Young China mourned their hero, and we sympathized ; but our thought was rather of heroic failure.

And we were wrong. Two years afterwards, through all the southern half of China, including the populous and progressive province of Kwangtung and the Yangtze Valley, main artery of China's life, he is not a dead failure, but the patron saint. He is hailed as such by an official newspaper of the Nationalist Party, which adds :

Meetings of the Party, and even school sessions in nationalist territory, are opened formally by making three bows before the portrait of Sun Yat Sen. There is hardly a student's room in any college in China to-day where his picture does not hang. His utterances tend to become a sort of Bible of the Nationalist Movement.

We need no official assurances of this. His portrait ? It is on the dollars that you spend, and it almost seems as necessary for the dollars you would earn. For if to-day you would sell frames, you enclose Sun's portrait ; if watches, you put one in the case ; even if it is only cigarettes, you print one on the packet !

His utterances? My Chinese calendar displays a new one every day, much as foreign calendars have Bible texts. Placards and slogans about the streets din them in my eyes and ears. I even find one written on my fan! *The Three People's Principles* is read in all the schools. Illiterates are being taught to read it, just as Christians learn to use their Bibles. It is produced in scores of different editions for all ages, and has the vogue of a best-seller. Its terminology is affecting newspaper style and even common speech to such an extent that language teachers recommend it as a text-book of modern Chinese. During the spring of 1927, which witnessed the split between Communist and Nationalist Parties, it has been the court of appeal for both sides in proving orthodoxy and winning popular support. A "patron saint" and "a sort of Bible" to the best half of China, and a growing influence in the rest! Truly, Sun Yat Sen is a greater power dead than alive. The movement he started is to-day not only nationalist in principle, but almost national in extent. How, in two short years, has this change been wrought? To answer this we must look at the fateful year 1925 which opens a new era in the history of China

II

First, in March, Sun Yat Sen died, and death made him a national hero. Alive, Sun was regarded by the military governors of other provinces as a rival, one other local governor, and by the shadow government at Peking as an enemy, disputing the validity of its

title "Central." Dead, he was remembered only as the "Father of the Revolution" and one of the first patriots of China. It seems significant that he died in Peking, not in Canton—almost a prophecy that death would lift him out of the sphere of provincial politics. It was significant that he was buried not in Canton but in Nanking, the ancient capital of the empire, the Westminster Abbey of old China. Once more, and more than ever, he was a national hero.

Second, Sun's legacy was a call to the nation. In March and April memorial services throughout the land recalled young China to a sense of duty. For at them all his strange Will was read, and what he left was not property in foreign banks, but the unfinished task of "achieving freedom and equality for China." [1] What are the proposals to which the Will refers? Sun himself summarized them thus:

If in the future we are really to enjoy peace and unity we must exterminate the militarists; to do this we must break the militarists' evil intrigues with imperialism; to do this we must abolish all unequal treaties between China and foreigners; doing this we shall get back the concessions, control of customs, and consular jurisdiction, China will be loosed from the bonds of foreign countries, and we shall recover our original freedom. . . . If we still fail to bestir ourselves to make a national spirit, united in heart and strength for this task, our China will soon no more be counted among the nations of the world, nor we Chinese as nationals.

Now, one part of this policy was necessarily provincial, in that it could only be carried on where

[1] See Appendix III.

nationalist power was supreme, namely, the "anti-militarist" programme. Obviously in territory controlled by the aforesaid northern militarists themselves, it was vain to call young China to "struggle on." But this was not all: fundamental to the whole policy was "anti-imperialism," and this was a cry which could everywhere and immediately be taken up. In the words of Dr Yui, "The Chinese people are divided by many things, but they are absolutely united in the national movement to abrogate the unequal treaties."

Here we foreign critics had made our mistake: we had criticized the wholesale classification of the powers as imperialists as out of date and the inference that foreign privilege was being used to prolong China's civil war as, in most cases, obviously untrue. We had looked at the programme from the point of view of reason and of practicability and had said "The abolition of foreign privilege is not the means to, but will come as the result of, peace and unity." We should have regarded it not as reasonable or unreasonable, not as practicable or impracticable, but as psychologically sound for "making a national spirit united in heart and in strength."

Thus China had a national hero and a national call. But a third factor was necessary before there could be a truly national movement. For as yet, though national in extent, it was limited to the student class of the nation. It had spread out, but not down. True, as we have seen, young China had begun the awakening of Labour, but this awakening was not yet nation-wide. Already China had begun to learn

Russia's " experience of party organization and propaganda," and the Chinese Communist Party was steadily growing; but this growth was still local. Sun had said,

What Chinese most fear is extinction of the clan. Clan will strive with clan, reckless of sacrifice of life. If we can make them realize their present dangers, that before long their country may be broken and their families destroyed, they will then be able to transform all inter-clan contentions into contention against the foreign powers, and become united into one national body.

How was such a sense of crisis to be brought home to the ordinary man, so that he would feel his very family threatened and his clan in danger? Certainly not by mere talk of " imperialism " and unequal treaties!

The memorial services were held in March and April. At the beginning of May came the days for remembrance of " National Humiliation," this time with something like the old vigour. At the end of May, news was spread about Shanghai that a Chinese workman had died as the result of ill-treatment in a Japanese mill. Young China and Labour organized processions and meetings of protest. In the International Settlement where demonstrations were prohibited, the police interfered with one which was being held in spite of the bye-law, and was considered a danger to the peace. Following numerous arrests, a mob attacked the police station. The police were inadequate to meet the rush, and . . . the order was given to fire. It is difficult to apportion the blame.

" Shooting to kill " is a desperate means of preserving the peace, and had sufficient precautions been taken it might never have been necessary. If, on the other hand, it were possible to prove that turbulent young China and the skilled agitators behind the scenes were wholly to blame, it would affect the case but little. The fact that Chinese youths upon Chinese soil were shot by foreign rifles under foreign orders—whatever the cause—that was enough to show, not vaguely through the intricacies of normal intercourse, nor slowly through the examination of history, but in one vivid lurid flash, the meaning of nationalism and of Sun Yat Sen. Talk to a coolie about imperialism, he will open his mouth ; tell him of unequal treaties and he will yawn ; but hold up a bloody shirt and say " It's *that* ! " . . . Is it any wonder that demonstrations in sympathy with the Shanghai " martyrs " gave rise to similar incidents in Chinkiang, Kiukiang, Hankow, and finally on 23rd June 1925 in Canton itself ?

Of the last and most serious incident, in what was then the headquarters of the Nationalist Party and their Russian allies, it is necessary to add the two interpretations, because they represent two distinct points of view upon the whole of this third stage. I had friends who were eye-witnesses on the British and French Concession, and friends among the demonstrators on the other side. The latter believe implicitly [1] the Chinese official version that the British

[1] Some critics, who have a larger circle of Chinese acquaintances than I have, here make the query, " Do they *still* believe it ? " It is true that many Chinese no longer look upon us as the aggressors. Their grievance is rather that the return fire was so murderous as

and French were the first to fire. Certainly these students would not have taken part in anything but what they considered to be a peaceful demonstration. The foreign eye-witnesses, on the other hand, support the testimony of the Danish Consul, who states in his official dispatch, "There is not a shadow of doubt in my mind that the affair was prearranged and the fact that armed troops took part in an otherwise peaceful demonstration precludes any doubt." In confirmation they now add that when, on Good Friday 1927, the Canton government "cleaned up" all Communists in the city to prevent a *coup d'état*, the Chinese themselves stated that an attack on foreigners had been planned by the extremist minority in order to "create an incident" and swing the left wing into power. If in 1927, why not in 1925? You may look upon the May and June incidents as a new and wholly spontaneous outburst of nationalist feeling clashing with the old safeguards of foreign life and property. Or you may suspect them as having been staged by a few extremists to show China's situation in a lurid light, to place the powers more obviously in the wrong, to make the common people "realize their present dangers."

Whatever your judgment, the effects remain. June 23rd opened a period of what practically amounted to war between Britain and nationalist China, a war not of battles and armies and shells, but of boycotts and pickets and propaganda. Britain was singled out from

to make the punishment out of all proportion to the crime. There is no doubt, however, that the British and French regarded it as the beginning of a general attack on the Concession.

the first and has long borne the brunt alone. This at least seems to have been deliberate, partly because of Britain's leading position, partly because of Russia's influence, partly because of China's desire to isolate and deal with the powers singly. The surrender of the British Concession at Hankow, while that of Japan was defended by force of arms, even the declaration by Britain of a policy more enlightened than that of any of the powers, came too late to affect the choice or to change for the present the direction of this " awakening " propaganda.

Whatever the cause of the incidents, their chief significance lies in their effects. And the effects are not to be measured by their success in changing the policy and position of the powers, and thus achieving the more distant goal of the Nationalist Party. The effect which matters most is the reaching of that nearer goal, the fulfilment of that clause in the Will of Sun Yat Sen which says, " I must awaken the masses. . . ." A Chinese friend sums up the situation in a sentence, " We had to have an enemy." And many hold that when this Bismarckian policy of raising a national spirit has served its purpose, Chinese attitude to the changing policies of the foreign powers will not be so extreme and uncompromising as to result in the deadlock which at times has seemed inevitable.

III

This brief history of the progress of the Nationalist Movement in recent years must be added to our review of the destructive stage of the Revolution.

But we are now examining nationalism rather as one of the chief forces which will rebuild the ruin. What plans for the new structure are forming in the mind of nationalist young China ?

Any answer can only be in the broadest terms. The Nationalist Party, at present the only approach to a political party in China, will ultimately prove to have been a coalition of many different elements. Already [1] Nanking has excommunicated Hankow as Communist, and Hankow has described Nanking as counter-revolutionary. This breach has been healed, but only at the cost of further divisions ; and—alas for China and for nationalism !—many of them are due not to difference of principles, but to personal ambitions, personal jealousies, and the presence of cliques within the party.

Apart from these most un-nationalist divisions, however, it is evident that " nationalism," which means support of national interests in face of dangers from abroad, must change as those dangers are removed, must divide when the question of the day becomes not destruction from without but reconstruction within. Even to-day there are many divergences : here a radical minority is in power ; there another group has to appear more radical than it really is because of the " war mentality " which extremists have created. What we seek is not the extreme nor the extraordinary, but moderate opinion among normal young Chinese. And in deciding the norm, we must remember the writings of Sun Yat Sen, which will surely long remain the test of orthodoxy.

[1] When these words were written in November 1927.

What is young China, heir to the heap of stones, going to make of his inheritance? Naturally he thinks of using much of the old material, and his ideas tend to take form in something like the old plan. Take these words from *The Three People's Principles*:

Old China had much philosophy of government, the best-arranged being that in the *Great Learning*, which says . . . "cultivation of self, regulation of the family, right government of the state, peace in the whole kingdom." . . . Most Chinese do not cultivate their own character. . . . That is why foreigners regard us as incapable of self-government. The fundamental reason why we to-day suffer foreign oppression is that we do not cultivate self. . . . We must recover our original wisdom.

The passage from the *Classics* reads somewhat differently from the way in which we imagined the small boy of the family reading it.[1] And it *is* different: before, the emphasis was on family, here it is on nation. This is typical. Perhaps only the successors of old China could work out a scheme of rebuilding wherein the three pillars of literature, society, and religion should again be so closely interlocked, and only in a land where family has been fundamental to them all could the nation be made so definitely the basis of the new design.

What is to take the place of the old *Classics*? I will quote an official nationalist newspaper in reply: "In the schools nationalism is being taught instead of ethics, the old age-trusted ethics of Confucius and

[1] See p. 20.

Mencius . . . text-books were prepared with care, teachers were taught in normal schools how to teach nationalism." Chief among the text-books, the new classics, are *The Three People's Principles* of Sun Yat Sen. They are not, as were the old classics, the sole content of education, but they are to be as central. According to nationalist law as it stands at present, they are a compulsory subject in all schools, government or private. Apart from law, however, the modern student would demand them. Why should they have this place ?

One of the things which has most impressed young China is the national spirit of the West, and especially that of America, which is, according to Sun, " the most mixed community on earth " where education " really unites British, Dutch, French, German and the rest, and assimilates them into the one American type." American influence has been paramount in the formative period of Chinese education, and young China does not question that the end of education is citizenship. " This," says a Chinese writer, " is why education should belong to the nation. It is because they have not this aim that mission schools denationalize." But it is not only to the non-Christian that citizenship seems the be-all and the end-all in China : the Y.M.C.A. is emphasizing this aspect of its work, and many young Christians, in common with the rest of modern youth, seem unable to give time or thought to any other duties. Thus one finds in Christian magazines to-day such statements, half thought-out and ill-expressed, as this : " Jesus . . . considered it his meat to spread the Gospel. As His followers . . .

we should try our utmost to broadcast the principles of the revolutionary movement." There are many who attribute this exaggerated emphasis on citizenship (as well as the accompanying emphasis on the Revolution as the beginning of history) to the influence of American ideals in education.

But we can never explain China by any number of outside influences. Above all, we must remember the broken pillar of the old, old building, the literature which enshrined the ideal of the family. The new pillar rests upon the nation, no longer upon the family.

If now we were to seek the sons of the village family whose education in the *Classics* we tried to follow,[1] we should find them as boarders in the government school of the neighbouring market town. Young Ho is being brought up in this new tradition, away from his family and away from the influences of those departed Hos whose are the poles outside the Ho ancestral hall. There is also a change in store for the amahs and the kitchen boys of the Ho household, and indeed for the whole village of which they form a part. No longer are these unfortunates to be left to pick up mere crumbs of knowledge as they chance to fall. In the provincial city is already instituted a special school where picked men from the whole countryside are being trained in hundreds. Soon two or three of them will be back in the Ho village, and with them simplified editions of the *Principles*, which even the kitchen boy can learn to read, and endless discourses for villagers too hopelessly illiterate ever to learn. The old pillar rose almost haphazard

[1] In Chapter I.

as century by century rolled on. The building of the new foundation will be a more intensive task, for Sun has said, " Within the next ten years is the crisis which will decide the life or death of the Chinese race," and of the ten half have passed already since he wrote. The new doctrines must more quickly win their place and must be made accessible for all, for they are no longer merely of " right relationship " within the family, but the duties of all towards the nation.

IV

And what of the new society? Corresponding changes in the social order may already be seen, but the greatest changes are in the realm of thinking. For while nationalist governments here and there are interfering in labour disputes, registering unions, and regulating strikes, young China's thoughts go on to widespread state control. Most of the student class to-day seem to be turning in the direction of socialism of one form or another. In discussing his third principle, Sun says :

At present one group of young students believes in Marxian principles, and whenever they talk of socialism they propose to use Marxian methods to solve China's social and economic problems. They do not realize that China hitherto has suffered rather from poverty than from unequal distribution of wealth. Though in the latter kind of society one might use Marxian methods, declaring a class war to fight for equality, with China's agriculture and industry as yet undeveloped, Marxian class war and " control by the non-propertied class " become in-

applicable. So for us to adopt Marx's ideal is sound, but to use his methods unsound. We propose to solve the problem of " the people's welfare " not by arbitrarily declaring for one particular untimely and extremist method and then waiting for agriculture and industry to develop so that that method may be suitable ; we must use some thought-out preventive method to restrain individuals from accumulating great capital and to prevent future society from suffering the ills of extreme poverty and extreme wealth. Such a method is an appropriate one for solving the problems of Chinese society to-day.

Old China with its village communities independent and self-governing was surely history's best example of consistent *laissez-faire*. Young China, turning if not to Marx's methods at least to his ideal, has set his heart on some degree of socialism. For the new society, it seems, there are both new material and a new design, for could anything be more different from the old ?

What influences are behind this change ? The greatest outside influence upon nationalist circles, at least since 1925, has been Russian. Besides financial, military, and diplomatic help for China's revolution, Russia has been busy pushing on her schemes for world revolution : the slogans have been shouted concurrently, the placards have hung side by side. In this destructive period, with young China continually eager to hear some new thing, radical doctrines have found their opportunity. But from the passage quoted above, it is clear that the Nanking government can find plenty of proof-texts to show the Hankow clique that in true nationalism these extreme theories should

not prevail—and incidentally to remind us that we must seek something more than outside influence.

Again, we must remember the broken pillar of the old building, the social order based on family. After all, is not the new pillar that they plan to build of similar design? It is the foundation only which has changed: a policy of *laissez-faire* resulted from old China's extreme regard for family; the attraction of socialism is largely explained by young China's emphasis, similarly extreme, upon the nation.[1]

If memories of college debating societies in England serve me aright, the point is always raised as to whether a government would be sufficiently capable, honest, and enlightened to be entrusted with any large measure of state control. Chinese students raise their problems in the dialogue of a play instead of in a debating society, but I have never seen that one raised.[2] At the end of last term, the students of my own college brought up what is the biggest question among young Christian students: whether the nationalist Revolution will help Christianity, or Christianity will help the Revolution. Most of them had little doubt that, whichever came first, it was the politician's part to establish Utopia. They have until recently had unbounded faith in the Nationalist Party programme and personnel.[3] To young Christians it seems that by these means China will become, if not the kingdom of God itself, at any rate but little lower than the angels.

[1] See Appendix IV, Sun's plea for a government with greater power than that delegated to governments of the West.

[2] *Cf.* Appendix IV.

[3] See p. 71.

I met young Li the other day. It was he who told me, with natural pride, that the government, having abolished the system of slave girls,[1] was going on to set free secondary wives. Li is a student at a college which, like many others, has had to close because of impossible demands from its workmen's labour union. I asked him of next term's prospects. "General Chiang has guaranteed that we shall be able to open," he said, "as the government is making new laws about strikes in colleges." He asked what was the news in the English papers of political affairs in the north, and added that "local papers are government controlled, and people do not speak freely." A commonplace talk with a friend, yet in it you see that the marriage of a wife, the education of a child, the employment of a servant, even the gossip of the streets, such common, intimate, essential parts of the business of life, are no longer mere family affairs. Extend the conversation and you will multiply instances of the way in which young China takes for granted the central place of the nation in the construction of the new society.

V

The third pillar of the old building was religion: not the popular form of Buddhism and Taoism which met the real religious needs of the people, but the state religion which provided religious sanction for the state. Ancestor worship was the religious force which inspired filial piety, strengthened family ties

[1] This abolition, like so many reforms, exists on paper, rather as a pious resolve than as an actual achievement.

and so upheld the old family system of society. Is there indication of any new force, comparable with that, to be the inspiration of patriotism, to weld the nation together, and to support the national system ?

The first impulse was simply to patch up the old pillar, to have a reformation which would make Confucianism fit for a modern state. More like the emperor worship of the Romans than the ancestor worship of Confucius, it would have upheld the sanctity, no longer of family, but of nation. But there was no need for young China to dig deep into the ancient history of the western world ; an example lay close at hand in Japan. All the West is familiar with the amazing reconstruction which, in fifty years, had made Japan a modern state. Fewer realize the significant changes in Japanese religion which have proceeded alongside, and which in part explain the rebuilding of society. Shintoism, an old religion of animistic mythology and simple nature worship, has been filled with new content and changed into worship of the nation, or the symbol of the nation, the emperor.

Confucianism contained stouter materials to work on, and nature worship of a loftier kind : the worship of Heaven and Earth, hitherto confined to the emperor, would, in a republic, naturally become the proper activity of every citizen. Men's aspirations would rise beyond the limits of the family ancestors and reach the god of the nation and of " all under heaven." The result would have been no more an anachronism than the restoration of our own St Paul's Cathedral with modern concrete poured into the hollow pillars of Sir Christopher Wren. And perhaps this might

have been one way of fulfilling the hopes expressed by Sun Yat Sen :

We must recover our original morality if we wish to have that wherewith to uphold the might of our race. With the invasion of the new culture it has sunk low indeed. The old morality included first loyalty and filial piety. . . . Formerly it was loyalty (of an official) to the emperor. Now, although there is no longer any emperor, we shall forever need loyalty to the nation. . . .

But this was not to be. Such plans for reconstruction of the state religion found favour only with a few. " The invasion of the new culture " was the chief reason ; young China wanted all things new. The new culture came from Christian lands, and a second group turned their eyes to Christianity as the inspiration of China's new nationalism. In the early years of the Revolution many modern educated young men regarded Christianity as the necessary philosophy for life in the new world which they were entering. The new literature they read, the new society they dreamed of, were connected, however vaguely, with a new religion ; it was Christianity which would save China. To confirm these vague ideas came the pronouncement of missionary educators and preachers. " Save China" was the call that drew thousands of students into the ranks of the church.

Some to-day, even some missionaries, point to students of Christian schools whose faith has not stood the test of these hard times, when patriotism and Christianity have been made to appear as conflicting claims. Patriotism, they say, was, if not an

unworthy appeal, at least insufficient ground for acceptance into the church. For my part it seems that Jesus has walked by the Yangtze as once He walked by the Galilean lake; He has been willing to be hailed Deliverer of China, just as once He was called Messiah of the Jews; among His disciples may be found young Wang of the Kuo Min Tang, just as of old Simon the Zealot followed Him. And surely Wang is not the first who, when the patriotic cause seemed lost, forsook Him and fled. Indeed, I hold that many among young China have come to Christ, and some are coming still, by a very scriptural way. Again men have asked Him "Lord, dost thou at this time restore the kingdom [sovereignty] to Israel?" Again men have sought to take Him by force and make Him king. Again Judas, with the kingdom lost, has turned his hand against Him.

For in the early years of the Revolution a small group of ardent nationalists conceived a scheme whereby the Christian Church and the Nationalist Party should proceed together for the salvation of China. With the moral support of Christianity the party would prosper, while such unification of aim would sweep the whole student body into the Church. Christianity would be the official religion of the party: that meant, ultimately, of the new civilization. And Jesus hid Himself: it was another vision of the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them. Chinese leaders of the Chinese Church felt that such a union with politics could not be. I hear it said that the most prominent of these modern zealots is to-day the greatest influence behind the anti-Christian movement.

Although it would be too much to say that the day of the patriotic Christian appeal is past and over, it appears nowadays usually in a more defensive guise, to oppose the charges of denationalization. The change in the tide of young China's thought is well illustrated in the headquarters of nationalist propaganda. Opposite the main door is a life-size picture of a group of revolutionaries ; on the ground lie a broken cross and a trampled Bible ; held aloft in the hands of a student and radiating light upon all is *The Three People's Principles*. This seems to mark, not only the scrapping of the former plan, but the tentative sketching of a new one.

What of the new religion ? Again let me answer in the words of an official nationalist newspaper : " The new cult of nationalism . . . is not a creed, but a passion, a religion."

I have already quoted *The Three People's Principles* as a " sort of Bible," and told of the calendar with a " text " for every day. Add to these the difficulties which Christian schools at present have to face : legislation is prohibiting religious instruction as a subject of the regular curriculum, and requires attendance at religious services to be optional ; at the same time it enforces teaching of *The Three People's Principles* and, each Monday morning, obeisance before the portrait of Sun Yat Sen and reading of the Will. Is it any wonder that some observers, putting two and two together, say " The Principles instead of the Bible, the Will instead of the Lord's Prayer, veneration of Sun Yat Sen instead of worship of Jesus " ? This may be an extreme reading of the situation, but

regard for the "Father of the Revolution" falls little short of the religious. Take the following declarations issued in Wuhan on his birthday in 1926. That of the Clerks' Labour Union begins, "Though Sun is dead, his spirit is with us still"; that of a Students' Union reads, "Words without meaning are an insult to his spirit"; that of an Army Corps declares: "Sun is our leader and hero. We must revere him. Not only by shouting slogans (such is our duty), not only by venerating him as we do Confucius (he would not like us to worship him); we must arise and pursue his purpose, and with all strength press on . . ."

Do I mean that a new religion is being born before our eyes, that nationalism provides a new religious rival for Christianity? I should not express it so. Can we call emperor worship a real religion in ancient Rome, or Shinto in modern Japan, or the worship of ancestors in old China? These may perhaps be called secondary religions: it was Isis and the Mysteries, it was Buddhist and Taoist rites, which met the real religious needs of the people of these states. The secondary religions provided religious sanction for the state systems. Such was the old pillar which now must be rebuilt, and in young China's mind at present I find few traces of any other plan. I do not believe that Sun Yat Sen is being actually deified. I do believe, however, that in the lives of many young Chinese nationalism is claiming for itself those emotions of reverence and awe, that fervour of service and sacrifice, that devotion to some higher personality, which are the uncompromising claim of religion and of God.

CHAPTER IV

REBUILDING THE LITERATURE

THE LITERARY REVOLUTION AND THE NEW CULTURE MOVEMENT

" This, it must be remembered, deals with a population eight times as large as that of Europe at the time of its Renaissance. . . . This, at one bound, doubles the students of universal problems in the world. Who can foretell the consequences ? "

TIMOTHY RICHARD (1907).

" Jesus passed by the grand classical speech of religion, which was fast becoming a dead language to the living world, and took up the father and mother tongue, the dialect of the human heart."

T. R. GLOVER.

No one can live in a ruin for long. Even before the rain is over, or the floods have abated, or the winds have stopped blowing, men always feverishly begin to build again, hoping this time for a foundation more enduring than the shifting sand. And when they call in housebreakers to complete the work of ruin, and themselves join in the task of pulling down both their old barns and their old homes as well, it is only that they may the more quickly begin to build greater.

Thus, we have seen that while " the Revolution is not yet complete," while the work of destruction is still at its height, young China is already at work upon the new foundations. Nay more, as we leave the bird's-eye view attempted in the last chapter and now examine more minutely different portions of the

site, we shall recognize that here and there the task of rebuilding has actually begun. The walls are not everywhere up to a uniform height : more of permanent value and of solid gain has been done towards replacing the old literature than towards rebuilding the pillar of the social order ; and work on the latter, however tentative, has gone further than the settling of the future of religion. But young China has begun his task. The destructive phase may be far from finished, but stages of a revolution, as ages of history, overlap and intermingle. If our conclusions here are inconsistent with some that have gone before, it is only because life and history, movement and movements, are, by their very nature, changeful, inconstant, inconsistent.

I

Before turning to the new literature, we shall need to look again at the old. For though we have discussed, as fully as space permits, something of its content, we have not yet examined the old literary style. When first we came upon the small boy of the family he was already reading the *Analects* ; we did not trace his education from the time when he began to learn to read. Had we done so we might well have pitied him. For Jones Minor has to learn only twenty-six letters, and then stumbles along somewhat painfully, it is true, but with a fair degree of comprehension from the start. But young Ho, though you multiply the twenty-six by a hundred, will still not have finished learning his letters ; and when he does read he reads sounds that are largely meaning-

less and foreign to his spoken vocabulary! His first difficulty is that Chinese characters are not phonetic but hieroglyphic. Descendants of the old ideograms, "man" is still represented by a pair of legs, and "field" by a square divided into four, "calamity" by a flood on top of a fire, and "anger" by a woman between two men. This may sound obvious enough, but many of the characters have developed through the centuries into weird drawings comprising nearly thirty strokes, accumulating "men" and "fields" into one veritable calamity, where ideograms are altogether lost.

It is estimated that the difficulty of Chinese characters adds two whole years to the period necessary for young Ho's education.

His second difficulty is more surprising still: to learn to read is to learn a second and virtually a foreign language. The closest parallel is the position of Latin in mediæval Europe. Latin remained the one literary language, while the speech of the western European peoples gradually developed into Italian, Spanish, and French, with others less closely related, such as English, on the fringe. These may be compared to the northern, middle and southern dialects of Mandarin, and in China the "fringe" is the five distinct language areas of the southern provinces. Wenli is to the whole country what Latin was to Europe, but with this distinction: that it is nothing more than a literary language, and cannot be a means of spoken intercourse as Latin was—Cantonese, Fukienese, Mandarin-speaking people and the rest, even when reading it, have each their own pronuncia-

tion. But most of the words are foreign to the language which young Ho has lisped from babyhood in his village home.

Jones Minor may well rejoice that he was not born in the Latin Age—nor in China ; for he enjoys Blake's *Tiger* and the *Treasure Island* of R.L.S. as an introduction to literature infinitely better than delving into the mysteries of where Cæsar went into winter quarters or what Cicero thought of Catiline. But young Ho's first taste of his own literature is as difficult to digest as *Patres conscripti populusque Romanus.* And his teacher does not worry about his digestion at all ! If you passed his school you would hear the whole class reciting in monotonous sing-song, " Learn and always practise it " and other wisdom that " the Master said," with no single idea, as they practise, of what it is they are to learn. First recite from memory, later pay some attention to meaning, and finally copy the style : such were the stages of the old education.

To discuss the origin of these difficulties would be beyond the purpose of this book. If you ask why the writing of this land, so highly civilized, stopped short in its evolution at the hieroglyphic stage, it is enough to remark how well it fits the backward-looking China we have seen, the conservatism of the scholars, guardians of China's age-long tradition. It would be equally beside our point to enquire into the reasons for diversity of speech in a land so comparatively pure in race. What should be observed is how true such diversity was to the spirit of old China ; language areas as different and distinct as France

from Italy and Italy from Spain, within each a bewildering variety of village patois, and only the scholar rising above it all to the unity of the Wenli style. Even so, we recall, in old China family and village were the measure of most men's lives; few came to regard themselves even as provincials; and only the literary man, the official, bore direct relation to the state.

Nor shall we examine further this strange stylistic education, but only note that its narrowness, self-centredness and lack of practical application, harmonize well against the background of that old China which was itself narrow, self-centred, cut off from science and the work of the world.

Indeed those three characteristics in which old China gloried [1] may well be rewritten here in different terms: bondage to the past, bondage to locality, lack of science. And these three limitations were so essentially characteristic of China's civilization that they applied to its very means of expression—Wenli. It is easy to see that the impact of western culture has meant far-reaching changes, not only to China's thought, but ultimately too to Chinese written style.

II

Take the first characteristic—bondage to the past. Whatever you wrote, if you were to write well, had to be shaped in ancient moulds, fashioned after the style of ancient models. I was not in China to see the first dissatisfaction, but I can imagine how it

[1] See Chapter I.

came to those first modern students—and I remember that most of them were students in Christian schools. I can imagine, because one day I found a Chinese colleague writing an English letter to a fellow-Chinese. "You see," he explained, "in Chinese, even when writing to a friend, your style has to be that of 'Honoured Sir,' instead of 'Dear Old Bean'!" The more formal and stilted, the harder to understand, and the more replete with literary allusions, the better was your style and the more complimentary to your friend's intelligence. It is as if I were to ask that your five gold pieces be to me as the sandals of Mercury to Perseus, instead of asking in so many words for the loan of a five-pound note. Wenli gloried in its ancient usages and its classical quotations, and failed to feel the dead language a dead weight on the progress of the living, until . . .

Until (shall we say?) those momentous reforms of 1905 [1] when backward-looking China began to wheel round to meet the twentieth century, to join in "the race for improvement." Progress, the young idea then first officially welcomed, meant respect for new literature rather than old, new literature in what was necessarily a new style. For you cannot keep close to old models when you are enquiring into subjects that were not dreamed of in the old philosophy. What would happen to your classical allusions if you were to write of the flying progress of the aeroplane in the lame language of the Roman charioteer? It would need considerable skill in engineering of the vocabulary! So with Wenli: it felt the strain of old China's

[1] See p. 49.

jump from her leisurely interests in philosophy, philology, history and poems (the subjects of her greatest literature hitherto), into the throbbing life of twentieth-century progress.

Not that it waited for anything so sordid as the aeroplane first to break through the confines of the classical style. The pulsing of the human heart had done that long ago. Twelve centuries before, actors were performing in plays at temple festivals, youths were reading novels full of real and vivid life, poets were singing their lyrics and longer ballads of love. Take these lines from an eighth-century romance, the return of a monarch to his palace garden after the death of his lover :

That pink hibiscus is her face, her brows those willows frail.
Come home to these ? To stem his tears O what can here avail ?
They fall when the breath of the spring unfolds the blossoms of peach and plum,
They fall as the leaves of the wu-tung fall when the rains of autumn come.[1]

These may be the tears of an emperor, but whosesoever the sorrow, it is too near to life to be described in the style of a dead language. Similarly the novel and the drama *had* to break through to something nearer the life and language of their day. But their disregard of the classical style meant that they for the most part were themselves disregarded by the more punctilious literati of the last five hundred years.

[1] *The Ballad of the Eternal Sorrow.*

It remained for contact with the progressive western world, with its free language and untrammelled thought, to make such proud disdain of life and progress no longer possible, and later to bring this literature to honour. Progress meant new experiences, and new experiences meant a departure, not only from the backward-looking classical thought, but to some extent from the backward-looking classical style.

And take the second limitation, bondage to locality. To the great mass of the people books meant nothing at all; or rather they did mean something to be revered as containing that unknown mystery, the language of the literati. I suppose that the first philosophy to prove too democratic in its spirit, too universal in its appeal to submit to the restrictions of Wenli, was Christianity.[1] The Bible had to be put, not only into the literary language of the distinguished few, but into all the spoken languages of the many villagers. This breach of convention was at first, of course, ahead of the spirit of the age.

The first time that curiosity led young Ho's mother to venture into the little shop, lately transformed into a meeting-house for the " Jesus teaching," the Bible was being read in its colloquial version. But even so she did not understand: the Bible was a book and she did not expect a book to talk her language, so she did not listen. Unknown to her, her husband had

[1] *Cf.* Buddhism. It reached China about the time of the birth of Christ, yet only a few profound scholars have ever been acquainted with Buddhist literature. Modern Chinese students who wish to read about Buddhism use English texts rather than the obscure Wenli.

been similarly attracted and was sitting on the other side among the men. He heard what Christians call "the Holy Classic" read in the words of common speech, with full understanding, of course, but with full measure of contempt. "No flavour," was his verdict. "The language of a coolie, or like some trashy novel! This cannot be a religion for an educated man." That is why most preachers now first read the scriptures in the Wenli style, not to offend the taste of the learned few, and afterwards repeat it in their own words for the benefit of the illiterate majority. Such compromise between old and new was inevitable, for Wenli gloried in its distinction as the instrument of a literary aristocracy and of them alone, until . . .

Until, for example, the rise of the newspaper began to change men's minds. Sixty years ago in the whole of China there existed but one news-sheet, and that supposed to be the oldest in the world! China, which had her printing presses long centuries before Caxton; China, from whom the West twelve hundred years ago learned the art of making paper—China had never felt the need of news. For all her villagers lived a little local life, and what news was there save the price of rice and the gossip of the street? To-day there are hundreds of daily papers and scores of weekly and monthly magazines. Recent figures show twelve hundred periodicals registered at the Post Office, and there are many which have made no application for postal privileges and so are not included in this figure. They are published in the treaty ports and larger towns, and from there go out

along the railway lines and wherever the postal service can take them. In 1924 nearly one-fifth of the mail was made up of newspapers and periodicals. And a newspaper, whatever its politics, must be democratic in language at least; it cannot afford to cater for the privileged few. Journalistic style, while still a modified Wenli, has naturally tended to bring closer together the long divided writing and speech.

And the third limitation, lack of science. The first modern scientific training was being given by medical missionaries ninety years ago—orally because there was no other way. The difficulty of creating text-books we of these later days can well imagine. Only a few weeks ago a Chinese doctor educated abroad, and ill-acquainted with the advance of modern medicine in China, told a doctor friend of mine that English would have to be used in all medical schools because Chinese was impossible as a means of scientific instruction. "What would you find difficult to translate?" the British doctor asked. "Why, cholecystenterostomy, for example," said the Chinese. "Gall-bladder-intestine-join-together-like-lips-operation," translated my friend in simple Chinese such as any uninitiated layman could have understood. "What's the difficulty?" The difficulty was that the Chinese doctor could not imagine a Chinese text-book escaping from the limits of classical Wenli, especially as, with our English language generally so free, our learned professions have fallen into the snare of a "classical" jargon. And Wenli, the language of old China's professional men, is not, like Latin, fitted for exactness of expression. It gloried in a style so con-

densed as to leave room for a whole commentary, as if proud to belong to a pre-scientific age, until . . .

Why, until the establishment of foreign-style schools brought its necessary counterpart, the production of foreign-style literature. First came translations of foreign books, then by degrees original work in Chinese, until to-day, almost everything of moment published in the West is translated in China either wholly or in outline, and every type of western literature and every shade of modern thought are represented among the volumes turned out from China's busy press. The growing wideness of the western world, the stirring winds of a scientific age, could hardly be contained in the narrow limits of the old classical style.

Thus China came to the end of the classical age, which had continued unbroken and unchallenged for so many centuries, and reached an intermediate period, when "Easy Wenli" (a sort of Low Latin, if you will) served as a temporary medium, and broken fragments of the old ideas and an unassimilated mass of the new as a temporary culture. This was the time above all others when the future seemed to lie in the hands of Christian men. We have already hinted at the influence of Christianity behind and throughout these cultural changes, but it was greater than we have hinted at, greater than is generally known, as the following examples will show:

In the nineties *Progress* was the name of the organ of reform among the younger literati, and this and other propaganda of the party constantly echoed Christian ideas. In 1895 a memorial was presented to the throne, signed by ten thousand students, and its

demands for reform were practically copied from publications which the Christian Literature Society had zealously been distributing in the old examination centres. Shortly afterwards, the emperor himself was pleased to order a complete set of the Society's books and to invite one of its missionaries to Peking as his adviser in planning the new education and introducing the new culture! The reaction under the empress-dowager delayed reform for another ten years, but even so it was delay and not defeat.

Forty years ago, when there were to be found only seven newspapers in the whole empire, one was being edited by that same missionary-adviser to the emperor, Timothy Richard. As he records the fact, he rejoices that the other six papers reprint half his leaders, sowing his ideas from Peking to Canton, and from Shanghai to Hankow, and thus ensuring "the systematic and daily publication of the leading ideas of Christendom amongst the Chinese people at large."

And what of the influence of Christianity behind the spread of scientific knowledge? Take the words of Richard again:

> Instead of writing goody-goody religious tracts . . . we decided to enlighten China on all the chief factors in the world's progress, so as to put China in a fair way of saving itself. . . . We told them of a kingdom which embodied what is best in all earthly kingdoms, and which had other things besides, which transcends them all, just as the heavens are high above the earth.

Even an anti-Christian Chinese writer, after describing enlightenment in Japan as "the spread of modern ideas and of an agnostic spirit among the younger

members of the nation," after storming at Christianity in China as a chief factor in its disintegration, even he has grudgingly to confess, " Credit must however be given to the early missionaries for having translated and written a number of books on western learning."

Although men engaged in such literary work were pitiably few, although the great system of Christian education—primary schools, middle schools and Christian universities—was yet to grow in China, it seemed already that China's new culture might well be Christian culture, that the rebuilding of the literature might well be a Christian rebuilding.

That intermediate stage has come to an end.

III

Foreign newspapers talk of the Nationalist Movement as if it were wholly political, and indeed in days like these politics not only tend to blind the eyes of foreigners to all else, but to claim the whole attention of many young Chinese. Nevertheless it is the same burst of new life which, in the world of letters too, has announced that the time is fulfilled. Already the backward-looking is over, the old aristocracy gone, the pre-scientific age closed in China. But with the rise of national feeling the general wish for progress was transformed into aspiration towards national equality ; to the haphazard democracy of the newspapers was added a national democratic aim, and before long purposeful democratic propaganda ; individual interests in science were supplemented by the

ideal of a scientific national life. This is surely the meaning of *The Three People's Principles*—the Race, the Authority, and the Welfare of the People. The new foundation was provided—the nation.

In the light of nationalism, the difficulties of young Ho's education were seen to be no longer the troubles of an individual schoolboy—they too assumed national proportions. The difficulty of the characters now became an obstacle to national literacy and progress, and many have been the schemes these last ten years for overcoming it. They may be classed together under the "Movement for the Spread of Popular Education." A list of the thousand most useful characters has been prepared, and schoolboys have spent their scanty leisure and scantier pocket-money teaching illiterates to read. Forty phonetic characters have been framed and recommended by some to supersede the thousands of hieroglyphics. Others have looked to the use of the Roman alphabet with the addition of tonal marks. No definite and nation-wide solution has yet been reached, but some great change is inevitable with the progressive spirit that is abroad. It seems likely that a shorthand simplification of common and elaborate characters may provide the remedy, after the manner of Japan.

The difficulty of China's division into several language areas, with a literary language foreign to them all, came now to be regarded as an obstacle in the way of national unity and true democracy. This difficulty has been faced and is being overcome. In 1920 the northern and middle Mandarin dialects were chosen as the "national language" (Kuo Yu) and recom-

mended to be taught in the schools of every province. At the same time the movement led by Dr Hu Shih, for making this national language the medium for China's new literature, began to meet with success, and books began to be published in Pei Hua Wen (colloquial literary style). Dr Hu quotes the following as war cries of this "literary revolution": "No dead language can produce a living literature," and "Produce literature in the national language and you shall have a national language of literary worth." As a nucleus of the new literature, novels, poems and plays in the hitherto despised colloquial were re-assessed and accorded a new respect. Since then Pei Hua has been increasingly used for both prose and poetry, foreign translations and original work, new thought and commentary on old. In recent book lists I find items as different as poems by Rabindranath Tagore, Moffatt's *Life of Christ* and, strange irony, critical work on the old Chinese philosophy—all in the new colloquial. The newspapers mostly retain the "Easy Wenli," but Pei Hua has captured the magazines, almost without exception. Everywhere it is welcomed by young China: in letters it is more free and easy, in poems it is closer to life, in translations it is more like originals, in text-books it no longer conceals the matter in the style. And, perhaps most important seal of its success, this is the language of nationalist propaganda and of *The Three People's Principles* of Sun Yat Sen which have had a wider circulation than anything before, wider even than Christian propaganda and the colloquial Scriptures, with all their years of start.

The difficulty of the old stylistic education was seen to be an obstacle to the scientific development of the nation. This too is being overcome. Study of the ancient classical literature is neither to be neglected any longer, nor to crowd out science and the more modern subjects of education. Like Latin in the West, it is given a place among modern subjects in the courses of middle schools and universities, is indeed treated as one of them, and is taught with all the science of modern literary criticism. Dr Tsai Yuan Pei places scientific research central in the "New Culture Movement," and declares it to mean "not merely the introduction of European culture, but original contribution on the basis of what is already done in the West; not merely preservation of our national heritage, but the seeking by means of methods of scientific research to show what that heritage has actually been." If all this is planned, and some of it carried out, in a time of civil war, what may not China's contribution be in the future days of peace?

Thus China seems at last to have found the tools for reconstruction of her culture: a true spirit of progress, an efficient means of expression, and a sound scientific attitude.

As we pause to look at the beginnings of this new creation, we too can see that it is good. For long, Christianity had to struggle, almost alone, against mass illiteracy and ignorant conservatism. For long, Christian scholarship had to be scattered to meet the needs of different language areas, and was hampered by the use of an inadequate literary medium. For

long, Christian education, at least where Christianity was at its best, had been trying to guide men into *all* the truth, counting nothing secular, common, or unclean. Now Christian forces are not alone: in these respects they are at one with the modern "tide of thought." Whatever China does when she is awake, our forefathers toiled hard and long to wake her.

IV

But Christianity is not a pleased and passive beneficiary. Now that the intermediate period is over, now that the site is cleared and rebuilding of the culture is begun, will Christianity still be able to play her leading part? Any one can see that the position is altogether changed. Before China had forged for herself these tools for her rebuilding, men with the spirit of progress, with adaptability enough to use old forms and courage enough to find new, with knowledge of science and the wider world from which they came, men holding these tools which China had not found, and holding them for the service of their Master, planned her Christian rebuilding and were leaders in her preparation. It was noble work, and its completion a nobler dream, but now that dream for us is over. Some of us may help, but the heat and burden of the day will fall chiefly on China's own youth. The work of the past has ensured that through some of them Christianity will make its contribution. Take, for example, the Commercial Press, Shanghai, whose plant covers twenty acres and employs three thousand workpeople. It is China's

biggest publishing house, and indeed one of her biggest modern industrial concerns of any kind. Its founders acknowledge that their training and inspiration came from Christian missionary publishers with whom they worked in the nineties, and the character of their service to China's youth worthily maintains such a tradition. The contribution which Christianity will continue to make through authors and journalists, teachers and speakers, is harder to illustrate, because material abounds. From what I hear of some recent cinema productions by a Chinese firm in Shanghai, I might add that Christianity is beginning to make some contribution even through playwrights and film actors. It is enough to say that there are fine young scholars, ardent patriots, truly Christian rebuilders among the products of our Christian schools and members of our Christian Church—more than the outside world can hear of or than China herself can readily appreciate in these days of " war mentality " and noisy Jingoism. Christianity will make a contribution—but will it play its *leading* part ?

In the old days, when cultural influences from abroad came chiefly through the work of missionaries, useful subtractions could be made from the plan, leaving only " what is *best* in all earthly kingdoms " ; necessary additions could be made too—" things which transcend them all." When young China was very young, his reading could be guided, the good selected, the questionable cut out, the moral pointed —" This is the true Christian culture of the West." But to-day among young Chinese, as we shall see more clearly later, there are strong cultural influences at

work which have to be recognized and which recognize themselves as frankly anti-Christian. The child inevitably grows up, and claims, not only the run of your library, but the run of your life.

It is instructive to compare the birth of national literature in the West and these movements that we are looking at in China. With us it was during the period of the decline of feudalism and the growth of national consciousness; in China too it coincides with the fall of the patriarchal system and the beginning of nationalism. In England Christianity awoke with waking Englishmen: Dr Hu Shih himself puts as the first landmarks of modern English the work of Wyclif and of Chaucer—the translation of the Bible and the story of a pilgrimage. In China too Christianity has had a leading, if a very different, part to play. Since the days of Wyclif and Chaucer other factors have loomed large in western culture, and has religion kept its central place? It is not in the distant days when colleges were dedicated to Jesus, or to Mary Magdalene and other saints, but in these modern days of "secular" education that the new literature of China is to be built.

What does young China study? Philosophy? Then he hears most eminent philosophers speak vaguely of a "First Cause," or (still more likely, since Bertrand Russell is the hero here in China) blankly deny the hope of God. Psychology? Then he sees that while it is within the scope of modern science to study religion as "subjective experience" it is unscientific to enquire into its "objective reality." World history? Then he reads H. G. Wells's cautious

remarks about Jesus, " It is convenient to keep history and theology apart." Natural science? Then he takes courses like those in scientific faculties at home, where men are encouraged to look through microscope and telescope at the work of God's hands, but not to " see His face in every flower."

And so I could go on—except that I feel I am not being just. For I know that Christianity has maintained its central place in the individual lives of many modern scholars and that young student England's heart is often right, though never worn upon the sleeve. We in Britain have a long religious heritage: our most precious things are deepest down, most private and most secret. But are we right? One far more competent to judge than I has said:

When religion begins to succumb to tradition, and when progress and the broader and higher life, which it means, begin to be associated with a body of ideas actually or supposedly hostile to religion, we know by now what dangers await the spiritual life of a people: we have seen it again and again in history; we are face to face with those dangers to-day.[1]

I sometimes think that the course of the rebuilding, especially of this first pillar of the new China, is being affected and is to be affected nowadays far more by the influence of students in the colleges and men and women in the professional life of the West, than by the missionary and mission education. Lest this should appear to be merely the peroration of a preacher, I will quote from some who have no missionary axe to grind.

[1] Dr T. R. Glover.

In 1919 Dr Tsai Yuan Pei, selecting his staff for the National University, Peking, wrote the following wise words, which breathe the essential spirit of China's Renaissance:

All theories which can be maintained on rational grounds and which have not reached the fate of natural elimination, shall be allowed to be freely propagated.

In 1923 Commander King-Hall, a non-missionary observer, wrote:

The tone of the student class is set to a very large extent by the returned students from abroad. Many of these young men have recently returned with the conviction that advanced thought in the West has declared religion to be a back number.

In 1927 L. L. T'ang, author of *China in Revolt*, wrote:

The missionary regards a Christianity that is decaying or has become obsolete in the West among all thinking persons . . . a Christianity that is morally defective, intellectually absurd, and historically untrue, as a suitable religion for awakened China!

This last wrote from London, and was a student in London University. I write from China to youth there and everywhere; and what I feel like writing is, "What in God's name have we been doing?"

CHAPTER V

REBUILDING THE SOCIAL ORDER

THE SOCIAL REVOLUTION AND THE RISE OF LABOUR

"We are too prone to forget that we are in some measure responsible. It must be remembered that we foreigners originally forced the door of China's exclusiveness, and first by wringing from a reluctant Chinese government extra-territorial rights, special privileges and concessions, and then by opening up the country . . . we inculcated in the younger generation the belief that our methods and ideals were superior to theirs."

SIR RONALD MACLEAY, *H.B.M. Minister to China*, 1924.

"The transition to a sharing of the mind of Christ, to a man reared in a certain class, taught to exalt a certain nation, does involve something as drastic and difficult as rebirth."

DR ORCHARD.

I

A FEW months ago the English newspapers brought to us English residents in China the disquieting report that the total number of British nationals in China was "only about seventeen thousands, most of whom are shady characters" engaged in the "oppression of their Chinese employees." Fortunately not too long afterwards the home mail brought *Punch*, and we too were able to join in the laugh at such an amazing summary of the China situation. Its origin must be either gross misunderstanding or malicious lies.

Misunderstanding, I say, because such a statement

might be made, and made sincerely, by many young patriots in China. Indeed it will be seen that Sun Yat Sen himself talked similarly about "economic aggression." But if you enquire into his meaning you will see that he is thinking first of national policies rather than of individual enterprise, of foreign control of the Customs hindering China's industrialization rather than of foreign exploitation hastening it. When he does turn to the individual foreign trader, they are strangely unconvincing accusations which he makes. He condemns foreign shippers for holding a virtual monopoly while the Chinese carrying trade is undeveloped, and foreign bankers for being too well trusted for Chinese competition to succeed. In his eyes it seems a glaring case of exploitation that "foreigners merely have to print millions of notes, we immediately trust them, and so they come to have millions of dollars. To print each dollar costs only a few cash . . . and it is for these millions in paper that we exchange our millions of dollars' worth of goods. . . . Why cannot we issue notes like this? Because the poison of economic aggression makes the common people trust foreigners and doubt their own countrymen." With such a point of view, it might indeed be said that most foreigners are engaged in exploitation. But in England there are no such misconceptions about success and failure in banking. Customs autonomy appeals to our sense of justice; by adding these other unconvincing and unjust accusations Sun Yat Sen has only confused the issue.

But when any one in England speaks of "exploitation of the Chinese," it is none of these ideas, just or

unjust, which arise in English minds. What do arise are such questions as Christian men, trying to apply their Christianity in the world of Labour, asked me during furlough—" Is not the root of all the China trouble the bad conditions in foreign-owned factories ? " It is inevitable that people who have little opportunity for gaining knowledge of China, and none for actual experience, should have to interpret statements against the background of the England that they know and the experience that they have of English life. We must go a little farther—ten thousand miles farther, in fact—if we are to understand the social revolution which is taking place around young China.

A few years ago, four at the most, I was walking through the narrow streets of a Chinese country town while the occupying troops were preparing for a hasty retreat. Men with rifles were hurrying in straggling columns towards the west gate and across the river to the railway line. Others were strapping up bundles of bedding and cooking-pots and ammunition, and I know not what. From the neighbouring hills came the rattle of machine-gun fire, and now and then the more impressive booming of field-pieces. A group of farmers, who had carried in their vegetables to the town market, were standing about with their long bamboo poles—still talking of the price that marrows fetched, or wondering perhaps if the winding path back to the village would be safe. Two soldiers came running down the street, stopped at the group of farmers, seized one by the shoulders, and, heedless of his cries, hurried him off between them. Traditionally

the farmer might be counted second in the social scale, next only to the scholar in importance. Actually a man with a gun was unanswerable, except by a man with money; and the small farmer, working his family's land, mattered little to any one outside the family. I knew what it meant: hot days of weary toil carrying the army's baggage over the hills, little rice and no money, hard knocks with the butt of a rifle, and a bullet if he tried to run; all the time the family short of one of its breadwinners; then, weeks hence, months perhaps—freedom, and the weary miles of robber-haunted country to hazard back again. I knew what it meant, I say, and my blood was up. Revolutionary? It is sights like these that make an Englishman "see red." Then my glance rested on the others of the group and my anger died within me—they were *laughing*. True, it was the nervous laughter of the Chinese, which may cover fear or even sorrow, but I felt that those men were saying, "Lucky it was A-Fu they took, not me—and lucky that A-Fu is not of my family!"

The press gangs are still a curse, but they seem to have been less active recently, at least around Canton. One even hears sometimes of coolies being recruited and paid for carrying for the new nationalist armies. It is stories of a different oppression that come in from the countryside. I have before me a recent report from the Chinese minister of that self-same district: "There has been serious rioting by the Peasants' Union against the landowners. One of the latter was killed, and the next day they murdered his little son too. As this family is Christian the local church

became involved, the life of the preacher was threatened and he has had to flee." And the authorities, civil and military, dared to take no action! Such are the signs of the times in the country: the sufferers now are not so much the peasants as the more prosperous families; A-Fu is no longer the oppressed, but one of the oppressors.

And what of the towns? In 1924 the merchants of my town were being taxed to the limit of their endurance—which, by the way, extends far beyond ours: taxes for the civil authorities, taxes for the military, money to the local officials, more money to provincial ones. The last straw was a demand upon the merchants for the "loan" of some hundreds of thousands of dollars—like the fateful forced loans of Charles I. A delegation informed the authorities that trade could not support the added burden. The information went unheeded, and the delegates were "detained" until payment should be made. Then the Trade Guilds met, merchants and master-craftsmen, just as they used to meet in mediæval Europe. It was decided to protest. The open-fronted shops of the narrow streets were closed with wooden shutters, and bolted with stout beams. If you called on a merchant friend, a tiny wicket opened and your message was taken from behind an iron grating! Business was paralysed, and what could the officials do? Even ordinary taxation, the bird in the hand, seemed in danger, while the desired loan disappeared farther and farther into the bush. Such was the strength of the old Merchant Guilds, leaders of the town community, in the distant days of 1924.

And now ? There are still strikes—more than ever. Indeed, I find a Chinese estimate that in 1925 the number of working hours lost through strikes almost equalled the total of China's huge population. In 1926 and 1927 I doubt if one town that I know has been for more than a few days without a strike of some kind. But these are no more *general* protests, organized by the merchants and the guilds. September 1927 saw a situation in Canton exactly similar to that described above—leading merchants practically held to ransom until the Chamber of Commerce should have raised a huge sum of money. There was this time no general strike : the merchants submitted and paid. Their day of power is done. Indeed, I hear of merchants now, after these three years of social and industrial upheaval, oppressive taxation, and devastating civil war, who wish to close those wooden shutters, not as a brief protest, but to wait until some better day. And they dare not. Their employees would not accept dismissal, but would live on in the premises and dispose of the stock.

Young China, we have seen, is sympathetic towards Labour, but here is a report representative of many of the student class :

It is not that we object to strikes in general, so long as there is sufficient reasonable cause. . . . In general strikes mean stopping work, then leaving the premises . . . but lately they have acquired an opposite meaning. To occupy the premises, or have them surrounded and cut off all communications, is a part of the strike. Thus in the Commercial Press, Shanghai, the workers locked the factory and kept

the key themselves; in the missionary hospital, Canton, they took possession of the place, and left all the patients by the roadside; and in the Canton Christian College and the Drug Stores, Swatow, they laid siege to the place, and in the latter case murdered the owner who attempted to go out and procure food. Instead of keeping to capitalists and capitalism, they now aim at education. What will they do next? If there is more of this I am afraid that education in China will not be able to improve, for who will have the courage to run schools which must be at the beck and call of the workmen?

It may be noted that of the four examples given in the above quotation, the first is a Chinese concern, which according to what I know of the range and quality of its publications, and what I hear of its treatment of employees, is probably the most enlightened, progressive, and the nearest approach to a model company in China. Two are mission institutions, which add to the comparative good pay and conditions for which foreign employ is usually noted the further advantage of being Christian controlled.

Such, then, is a glimpse of the changing background life in a large and growing part of China. And having caught a glimpse of the scenery, we naturally begin to guess at the course of the play. With regard to the peasants, we suppose Act I to be something like the feudal aristocracy and peasant serfdom of our own Middle Ages, and Act II the equivalent of a Wat Tyler's rebellion. With regard to the towns, our minds are naturally full of that nineteenth-century upheaval called the Industrial Revolution. And in both cases the guess is somewhat wide of the mark. For as

applied to both agriculture and industry the words of Sun Yat Sen are true, " China has hitherto suffered rather from poverty than from unequal distribution of wealth." China never had a landed aristocracy, and China's Industrial Revolution has only just begun.

II

Let us look first at the " peasant " : who is A-Fu and what manner of life is his ?

According to news that comes in from the villages of Kwangtung, some of the members of the " Peasants' Unions " are simply thieves and bandits of the countryside, who have been drawn in by the hope of prey. Others are ne'er-do-wells of the villages, and local bullies, who would be in for a share of any mischief that is afoot. And along with these there are landless, luckless men, more deserving of the name of "peasant," who give their name to the whole. Let us give A-Fu the benefit of the doubt, and call him a genuine " peasant." What is his condition then ? There are three possibilities—he may be a casual labourer, or a farm labourer regularly employed, or a small farmer tilling rented land.

He may be a casual labourer—probably an unfortunate such as we have already met,[1] cut off from those relationships which give life meaning, and without family land, on which a proper livelihood depends. There is no permanent element of village life in the West quite so casual as the life of a casual labourer in China. The nearest parallel would be

[1] See pp. 24-5.

the passing tramp who may sometimes still be found to lend a hand with the haymaking, or at harvest-time. A-Fu's food would be different, rice-broth (corn-broth in the north) instead of the remains of the farmhouse dinner, but both wonder where the next meal will come from, and his shelter is the out-house of a temple instead of a haystack or barn. Both are really destitute. The one may end his days in an English county workhouse while the other may take to brigandage, but with both these are counsels of despair.

But any parallel between the poorest "vagrant poor" of British history and this miserable specimen from the Chinese countryside breaks down when you begin to ask the question, "Why?" With A-Fu it is not possible to talk of his inheritance of the ills of a distant feudal oppression, nor of the Enclosure Acts of his great-grandfather's time. The simple, obvious explanation of *his* misfortune is the failure of his family to hold together. Perhaps it was famine, from drought or flood, which sent them to the usurer (at six per cent per *mensem*!), and in the end meant the sale of the ancestral land. Perhaps it was the death of their fathers, and the huge funeral expenses demanded by filial piety; or the marriage of their sons and the elaborate feasting required by local custom. At any rate it was the failure not of society as a whole, not of some extensive economic system, but of that part of society which alone mattered in old China—the family, and family economy. But if A-Fu were to question that system, it would be as if the bottom had dropped out of life.

Then there are the two other alternatives: A-Fu may be a farm-labourer (not casual), or a small farmer tilling rented land. In either case this means that he is probably a member of a family which is not broken up, but which has fallen on evil days. Family wealth (which means land) has not increased with the increase of family numbers, and there is not enough to go round. So he must do one of two things, work for another family on land which is not his own, or borrow land from one more prosperous and pay a proportion of his crops as rent. In this he may seem more like his western brother, but again there is a fundamental difference. His landlords are not like western landlords; they are a family with a few surplus acres, not half a county. They are not absentees; most of the family, however prosperous, remain in the village, which is the old family home. Nor are they a landed aristocracy. While some of the family have attained scholarship, won literary distinction, and thus entered old China's only aristocracy—officialdom—other brothers have remained peasants, more prosperous it is true, but in status and occupation just like him. The land-owners are peasants, and the small farmer's family owns a little land. There is no class consciousness because there is no class distinction: there is only family consciousness. If A-Fu were to become a party to class strife, it would strike at the very foundations of his and of all village life. It would be a new grouping in a new society.

And that is just what has happened. Some one has come to his village and has said "From what you pay

to the Hos in rent, subtract so much. From what you save, make your contribution to the Peasants' Union, and in return the union's self-protecting corps will see that you are allowed to keep the rest yourself." I cannot give the exact proportions (in some places, I hear, all rent has been withheld, in others unions are less radical than the example taken), but something like this has happened. And the vagrant labourer, perhaps already at the " workhouse " stage of banditry, has heard with appreciation ; many of the peasants have welcomed their deliverance from debt ; others have feared what the " self-protecting corps " might do to blacklegs, and have joined. By August 1926 these Peasants' Unions in the province of Kwangtung were said to have six hundred and fifty thousand members. Since then they have developed in Hunan, Hupeh, and along the whole line of the nationalist advance, some more radical, some more moderate. The explanation seems to lie in such statements as that of a proclamation in Hupeh (December 1926) :

The leaders of the revolution in China and the leaders of the world revolution have all come here. We are almost beside ourselves with joy. We can make a new China and a unified world ! We enthusiastically shout " Back up Sun's policy of union with Soviet Russia ! Back up Sun's policy for peasants and labourers ! "

What was Sun's actual policy, and how it differed from that of the leaders of world revolution may be seen from the quotation on page 78 and from Appendix IV—The Welfare of the People. The Nanking

government recently outlined a more truly Sun-ist policy, promising to abolish sur-taxes on agricultural land, to deal with debts in famine areas, to limit rates of interest, to provide relief for flood and drought, to fix maximum tax and rental for land tenure, to aid co-operative societies, and " to uphold and strengthen organizations of workers."

Whichever of the many political groups may ultimately prevail—whether communism or the mild socialism of the nationalists will triumph in China—whether the organizations of the peasants, breaking down the limits of the old family life, will be a step towards national consciousness, or be still more a step towards world revolution—it would be futile at present to discuss. All that is certain is that along with national consciousness, class consciousness has been aroused in China, and that for the first time in China's long history.

III

And what of the worker in the town ?

Dr Hu Shih recently summed up his appreciation of the West in the words, " China has a man-power civilization typified by the ricksha, while the West has a machine-power civilization typified by the motor car." It is perhaps more usual for philosophers to idealize the good old days and emphasize the curse of modern industrialism. But any one who sets foot in a Chinese town will not envy the lot of the ricksha-puller, or the carrying coolie, or of any one of the many casual labourers of both sexes, who do their work like

beasts of burden, and have done it hitherto as uncomplainingly. There too, he will see the idealized home industries : the parents at the wooden weaving frame in the tumble-down house, and the little girl, with a smaller baby strapped on her back, at the spinning wheel on the cobble-stones of the street ; he will hear the click of both frame and wheel long after the light is gone, and see the faint flicker of the smoky oil lamps.

Nearer to the jovial Middle Ages of the historical novel will seem the shops and small factories, with the master, his sons, his craftsmen and his 'prentice-boys. He will see them—for all the world as if all were sons—sit at the same table when twice a day the rice is brought in ; or rush together to the street as a procession, or a sweetmeat-seller, or a " Punch and Judy " passes by ; or gossip with the same free air of equality with the customers who chance to call. Yet I have heard complaints. " We work fifteen hours a day and our wages are not more than a pound a month. The employers can dismiss us at will. Also they are unwilling to let us study. Apprentices suffer even more. They come from poor homes which put them out to work. For three years they work without pay."[1] Of course it must be added that those hours do not mean continuous uninterrupted work, as in a modern factory ; that the wages are more than they seem, because the workmen often (in the picturesque Chinese phrase) " eat the master," and sleep in the workshop at nights ; besides which, the general standard of living is so low that even middle-class

[1] *Shopmen of Wuchang*, Nov. 1926.

people often spend no more than ten or twelve shillings a month on food.

Industry and trade, run on the basis of the family, or of family-like relationships, have many attractive features; but our realization of the evils of the only system which we know in the West (apart from history books) should not lead us to idealize the old too freely. In China the Industrial Revolution has only recently begun, and the greater part even of town life was, until still more recently, based on the family: either the actual family with its own industry or trade, or the enlarged family of the shop and small factory, where master stands in a paternal relationship to man. Indeed, just as, in a village, peace and law and order depended upon family—the heads of families and the village elders—so in a town the order of society has been an elaboration of the same—these family industries, the Guilds, and the town gentry. L. L. T'ang describes it thus:

> The town dwellers, mostly engaged in various trades, form different guilds, which arbitrate in trade disputes, provide for the maintenance of the poor members and the education of their children. Collectively the guilds maintain orphanages and poor-widow institutions. The leading members of the guilds, together with some retired officials and men of literary distinction, form the city gentry, who are, in fact, responsible for the government of the city.[1]

The same writer goes on to say:

> It was only after the Russian Revolution that working-class organizations became of great import-

[1] *China in Revolt.*

ance. The first Trade Unions, as distinct from Trade Guilds, were set up at Canton in 1919, and the movement spread all over China. On May 1st, 1926, Canton alone accounted for one hundred and ninety unions with two hundred thousand members. A year later over two hundred unions were reported with a membership of about three hundred thousand.

Once the door was opened, modern industry was bound to come. A family could not run a railway, or a "go-down," or a liner; perhaps even a family-like community could not. And now there are many other kinds of foreign style employ: electric light plants in the larger towns, arsenals in some of them, match factories, tobacco concerns, antimony works, iron foundries, silk filatures, cotton mills, and I know not what.

Of these foreign style factories, there are a very few that are foreign owned,[1] notably some of the cotton mills in the International Settlement, Shanghai. It was a strike in one of these, a Japanese mill, which led to the reported casualty, which in turn led to the "Shanghai incident." It was not "the root of all the China trouble," but the occasion for raising questions of wider issue, the stone which stirred the waters and brought to the surface mud which had been there for years. The attention of the British public has in recent years constantly been called to labour conditions in the International Settlement, a Commission drew up a report in July 1924, and the British Foreign Office published "Papers Respecting

[1] Something like $10,000,000 of British, as compared with $375,000,000 of Chinese and Japanese capital.

Labour Conditions in China" (Cmd. 2442) in July 1925. These factories sprang up because of the cheapness and abundance of Chinese labour, and they, like their Chinese competitors, employ women and children on a large scale. Thoroughgoing reform by the foreign municipality has so far been hindered, because general opinion considered that it would place the foreign mill-owners at a disadvantage, until there should be a Chinese government willing and able to enforce similar reform elsewhere; or, stated in more moral, and therefore more convincing, terms, that limitation of child labour, for example, within the Settlement, would only drive the children to Chinese factories outside where conditions were still worse. The capture of Shanghai by the nationalists, who promise to "establish laws for labourers and manufacturers, the rules of the labour unions to determine the minimum wage, to prohibit ill-treatment by both foreign and Chinese employers and foremen, to improve sanitary conditions of factories and especially to protect women and child workers," is too recent for us yet to say what difference it will make in this respect.

It will be seen that the foreign owned mills are a mere drop in a bucket compared with the number of foreign style industries, and that these themselves are a drop in the ocean compared with old style industry and trade. A representative of the International Labour Office at Geneva gives it as his opinion that "the material labour conditions in modern industry [in China] are superior to those in the old industry in matters of workshop hygiene and

hours of work." On the other hand, one still hears of accidents through lack of safety devices in the cotton mills, of men being slowly poisoned by sulphur fumes in the match factories, of girls with their fingers scalded and raw to the bone through picking up cocoons from boiling water in the silk filatures. Perhaps we understand better the ills of modern industrialism because they are historically nearer to us; and perhaps theirs seems a more crying need for reform because massed labour is naturally more vocal. At any rate, the old conditions were not Utopian, and the new ones, not very far-reaching as yet but increasing rapidly, bring their own evils, evils from which we in the West still suffer.

It was natural that the rise of foreign style industry should result in the rise of foreign style labour organization, that the passing of the family and family-like conditions should mean new groupings in the social order. But this re-grouping has suddenly far outstripped the reformation of industry. In one town there are two hundred unions! I doubt if in any place there are one-tenth as many new style manufactures. In the town life of new China we are now to find all the social effects of the Industrial Revolution of the West, while the Industrial Revolution itself has barely begun. Why?

First are the natural causes: the example of the old patriarchal guilds in their "peaceful protests" against taxation; the knowledge that workers in the new factories, the first to be organized, were using their weapon, the strike; the spread of the newspaper, with news of labour and of labour troubles abroad

—these, all these, have played their part. But most important are those other causes that lie in the sphere of China's recent politics: labour organization has been a leading feature of nationalist "awakening" propaganda, and the boycott, thus made possible, a chief weapon of the nationalist cause.[1] As an article in a nationalist newspaper says:

> The mass is being taught—taught by student groups who go out in lecture bands, taught by leaders who tell them of better wages and fairer treatment, taught by organizers who impart to them the secret of the strike and the boycott. What else could have made Hong-Kong willing to negotiate for commercial peace with Canton?

Many of these unions have developed on more radical lines, owing to the alliance with Soviet Russia and the rise of the China Communist Party. Thus, since the split with the Communists in the spring of 1927, the Nationalist government has had repeated cause to fear that its bases might be endangered by this weapon of its own forging. Again we must leave the issue between Nationalist and Communist as still in doubt. All that is certain is that in the towns of nationalist China—and it seems that this before long will mean the greater part of China—the old family and family-like relationships in industry are scrapped, even ahead of China's Industrial Revolution, and that a new class consciousness and class organization are to be permanently established in their place.

[1] See Appendix IV.

IV

In Chapter III it was briefly stated that the nation is to be the basis of the new society. This foundation is being laid by the training of national consciousness and the practice of national control. The Unions are organized bodies of opinion, which, by persistent propaganda, by their prominent share in political demonstrations, and by their close connection with government through the Ministry of Labour, may become organized national (and nationalist) opinion. Each Union as it is formed applies to the government for registration, and in labour disputes the government is regarded as the friendly arbiter. Thus the foundations of the new society are being laid.

But what is being built upon them ? It is too soon yet to talk much of positive and permanent achievement, for good or ill : Nationalist and Communist still strive, and the work of the one is in danger of being pulled down by the other. The nation is not yet built, nor is the foundation itself secure. Construction is still at the experimental stage. It is difficult to talk of positive achievement for another, and more final, reason—lack of information. Especially is this true of the village communities. Stories which find their way back to the coast have to be unusual to get here at all. Of the more moderate Peasants' Unions we know little.

With regard to town life, an official survey of the local Labour Movement was published in Canton in the summer of 1927. This was the work of a com-

mission appointed by the civil government, and under the direction of Mr Y. L. Lee of the Y.M.C.A. As Canton is the home of this social revolution, as of the political revolution, its conditions are of more than local interest, and from this report we may glean some answers to our question, What is being built ?

Is it Communism ? The Labour Unions of Canton are almost all affiliated with one of two federations, and only twenty-two per cent belong to the more radical one.

Has the standard of living been raised ? As many of the union members are either casual labourers or engaged on piece-work at home, some unions cannot report on this matter. The average wage of those reporting, however, is $23.25 (nearly two pounds) a month. This means a tremendous increase. On the other hand, the cost of living has advanced by leaps and bounds (the commission is instructed to enquire into this subject next), and twenty per cent of the union members are unemployed. The reasons for unemployment reported are :

depression in trade	69 unions	seasonal employment	4
strikes	22 ,,	introduction of machinery	3
political boycotts	17 ,,	scarcity of raw materials	3
inter-union strife	6 ,,	prevalence of bandits	1

Thus, much of this unemployment is due to the same revolution which produced the rise in wages.

Have hours been shortened ? Again casual labourers and piece-workers seem for the most part unaffected, and two such unions report a twenty hour day. On the other hand, thirty-four trades are

reduced to ten hours, and twenty-six to only six hours. Of these reductions some are caused, not by the need for leisure, but because of the little employment for many hands to share.

Is there sound leadership? This question only future history will answer, but three considerations from this report will convince you of its importance. First, finance. Take, for example, the Ricksha-men's Union. It has, from its levy of one copper per man per day, an income of about four thousand dollars a month, while its members are men who live on the borderline of starvation. Whence come committeemen who will stand against so great a temptation? Then, literacy. Ninety-four and a half per cent of the union members cannot read even a newspaper. Who is to direct the growing powers of this ignorant mass? Who is to shape the uninformed opinion of this mighty public? Lastly, politics. Of union members twenty-five per cent are also members of the Nationalist Party; and what is more, labour is the best organized section of the new community which government has to consider. In what direction will its influence be felt?

What is being built? An attempt to answer that question results only in the raising of many more—questions of politics and of economics, which all over the world are making members of parliaments scratch their heads, and chambers of commerce tear their hair. To them no construction is going on at all: young China is fulfilling long-established expectations, and is raising nothing but gigantic question marks! But this is primarily a social revolution, and, what-

ever the vagaries of militarists and politicians in the unknown future, whatever of financial stability or economic chaos the future may bring, the one change from which there can be no going back is this regrouping of society.

Philosophers spend their energy discussing the complexities of modern life, and whether a more primitive form of existence is not nearer the ideal. But surely it is impossible to put back the clock. Sociologists, and some of us too humble to aspire to any such high-sounding name, occupy themselves with details of industrial change, such as conditions in the cotton mills of Shanghai. But this is such a small part of the whole problem. It is necessary to strain out gnats, and it is highly inadvisable to swallow camels, but there is one other question, not so wide as the whole issue of industrialism, nor so narrow as the details of its workings here and there, which should engage the minds of Christian men who think of China : Is class organization going to make for the Kingdom of God or against it ?

V

Whence came the plans for this rebuilding ? From Russia ? There is no doubt that Russia is responsible for much of the excesses and extremes of the Labour Movement's beginnings. But as a nationalist article declares, " Russia has increased, not caused, the perplexities of the situation." She has contributed not only to the amazing speed of the changes, but to local variations of the scheme. The allies from the start

worked with common means but at cross purposes. For the scheme of the majority of nationalist leaders was not to follow the Russian plan. When Sun Yat Sen said, " I must awaken the masses," were his eyes turned towards the half-starved masses of Russia, or towards the great democracies of the West ? Let a Chinese writer answer :

The underlying essence of *The Three People's Principles* was conceived in the mind of Sun Yat Sen while he was suffering in London [a somewhat misleading reference to his being kidnapped by the Chinese Legation, London, 1898]. At this time he made an exhaustive enquiry into European methods.

In that case Russia was twenty years late upon the scene ! Sun himself writes :

My *Principles* are a compilation of foreign theories as arrived at in the course of world history. . . . They are in line not only with history but with the trend of events in the modern world.

The facts are that the plans came from the West, that the new society, growing up with even greater speed than factories like ours, is meant to be a copy from, an extension of, an improvement upon, the principles of our own social system : a copy in that organization is that of class and class ; an extension in that national control is to be wider, and the nation more definitely the basis of life ; an improvement in that it has been introduced in time " to prevent future society from suffering the evils of extreme poverty and extreme wealth." The main plan of

rebuilding came from the West . . . from the Christian West.

For the old society there was the old morality, and in those days it mattered little to China how we conducted either our homes or our industries. For while society was based on family China was sure that "filial piety is our countrymen's peculiar virtue, to whose heights no other country can aspire" (Sun Yat Sen). But what now, when family is no longer all in all, and our own class organizations are appearing in China? Change, sudden change, has meant a loss of balance: the old morality no longer fits and the new has not yet grown. A time of no morality (or even immorality) in social intercourse does not mean that China is "going red." Ultimately the new order must attain to a new morality and the plans from the West surely include the Christian morality of the West!

It appears very well on paper, but look at the facts: the facts in China, and, no less, the facts in the West. What do the plans from the West include?

A few weeks ago I was cross-examined most unexpectedly on the station platform of an obscure village. The young booking clerk wanted to know all about the British coal dispute and its settlement. And I, with the memory of the failure of Christian arbitration (deemed the meddling of busybodies by the masters, and rejected in favour of "fight to a finish" by the men), could find no text for a Christian sermon.

A man in constant touch with government officials here asked a friend of mine, just back from furlough, how many were shot down in the London streets

during the General Strike of 1926. " Well, of course *your* newspapers would not be allowed to say so," was his sceptical comment. Christian morality ? The Labour Movement is being zealously flooded with anti-Christian propaganda, and it is not all young China's blame. When he looks to the West, he does not see us as we are : he looks through a war-cloud of propaganda, he judges by the measure of the " war-mentality " that is abroad. But if we were a little more in line, his vision could not be quite so distorted.

I am no economist, and I feel too ignorant of home affairs even to be a partisan, but this is how it seems to me in China :

The foundation of the new structure, young China's nationalism, is, if not a copy, at least a caricature of our own, with all our tendencies exaggerated. And some of us, who came nearer to 1914 than any of young China, can hear voices from the grave which still are saying, " Patriotism is not enough." Ours is a nationalism which all the holy water of Holy Church has seldom altogether sanctified.

Similarly the new society, which is being built on this foundation : that too is a caricature of our own, with all its lines extended in their inevitable direction —class strife more bitter than we have known, a struggle of the fittest to survive such as we have never allowed except in our philosophy. Our industrialism has gone for a century unbaptized. And our industrial society, the organization of class and class in mutual rivalry, and the spirit that exists about them, between them, and within them, are

still far distant from the consecration of the Christian Church . . . or of Him who was Himself a working man, from the farming district of Galilee.

This is the plan of society as young China has seen it. It is for us to say whether this is the plan of society as society should be.

CHAPTER VI

REBUILDING THE RELIGION (1)

THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT AND THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

"The Master said, There are some with whom we may study in common, but we shall find them unable to go along with us to principles. Or if we may go on with them to principles, we shall find them unable to get established in those principles along with us. Or if we may get so established along with them, we shall find them unable to weigh occurring events as we do."

Analects, IX. 29.

"For the Gentiles, when they hear from our mouth the oracles of God, marvel at them for their beauty and greatness. Then when they discover that our works are not worthy of the words which we speak, forthwith they betake themselves to blasphemy, saying that it is an idle story and a delusion."

CLEMENT'S 2 *Corinthians* xiii.

I

MOST of China's important happenings seem to belong to the spring of the year, showing that, in China at any rate, there is no knowing to what a young man's fancy may turn.

Again we must mark the months of April and May, this time of the year 1922: it was then that the Anti-Christian Movement was beginning its stormy career. In April the World Student Christian Federation met in Peking; in May that encyclopædic review, *The Christian Occupation of China*, was published; the

same month saw the first National Christian Conference gather in Shanghai ; [1] a little later there were set forth in *The Report of the China Education Commission* statesmanlike Christian plans for the future. It is well to remember that the factors leading to the organization of the Anti-Christian Movement, whose purpose was to demonstrate the weaknesses of Christianity, were none other than these sure signs of the strength of the Christian cause.

The beginnings of the opposition first appeared when the magazine of the Y.M.C.A. (which in China, as in America, includes the Student Christian Movement) outlined the programme for the gathering of the World Student Christian Federation. In reply a student group in Shanghai began to prepare an anti-Christian programme, and gave notice of the organization of an Anti-Christian Students' Federation.

We oppose the World Student Christian Federation because we wish to guard the happiness and welfare of humanity. . . . Capitalism in the world has gone through its stages of development, first ripening, then coming to decay. Thus it is that capitalists of all nations, British, American, Japanese, French, are afraid and try all manner of clever means to eke out their dying breath against ten thousand odds. They are therefore taking steps, one after another, to rush into China, to carry out their plans of economic exploitation. And present-day Christianity and the Christian Church are the vanguard of this exploitation. . . . The World Student Christian Federation is the progeny of present-day Christianity and the Christian Church. They are preparing to call together Christians

[1] See p. 183.

from all over the world, and to hold a Conference on 4th April at Tsing Hua College, Peking. What they intend to discuss is nothing more than such schemes as how to uphold capital and how to extend capitalism in China. We regard this conference as a conference of robbers, humiliating and polluting our youth, cheating our people, and stealing our economic resources. Therefore, following the dictates of our hearts, we are organizing this Federation to declare war upon it.

Students ! Young men ! Workers ! Who among us does not know the sins of the capitalist ? Who among us is blind to his heartless cruelty ? What can we do but rise and oppose them when we see with our own eyes these bloodhounds of the capitalist gathering to decide our fate ?

Rise ! Rise ! Rise !

Whatever of sympathy you have found in your heart for other "movements" reviewed in these pages, here is one which rouses only your indignation. A gross slander, a monstrous lie ; or, if you can interpret it as genuine misunderstanding, then ignorant prejudice, which but a little examination of Christian student aims would have dispelled ! It is the work of either knaves or fools ; it springs from either false hearts or diseased minds. This is a fair sample of the poisonous propaganda with which a short stay in modern China would make you as familiar as with your daily paper. But indignation, however righteous, of itself achieves nothing, and we must be careful lest we ourselves allow prejudice to blind our eyes and forget to make that little examination which we so readily recommend to the other side.

Remember the time : we have seen that young

China's energies were then being directed towards the organization of Labour in furtherance of the nationalist cause. Behind such a declaration as we quote above it is obvious that there are not only student sympathizers with Labour, but also members of that extremist minority condemned by Sun Yat Sen himself, obsessed with the idea of "Marxian class war and control by the non-propertied class." Remember the place: Shanghai was its source, the one spot where the changes of China's Industrial Revolution were most advanced, and where the influence of Russia's Revolution was at that time strong. Remember the occasion: in its beginnings the Movement could not have been predominantly nationalist, or the target for its first attack would hardly have been the Y.M.C.A., the first Christian organization in China to attain to Chinese control. Its nucleus seems to have been a student minority, in an exceptional environment, applying extremist theories from abroad.

Perhaps such extremist and unrepresentative beginnings account for the fact that the Anti-Christians made little stir until towards the end of 1924. Then the Movement began to spread to other places, newspapers in various centres were led to publish anti-Christian supplements, and propaganda was widely issued in preparation for Christmas week, the time fixed for demonstrations against Christianity on something like a national scale. The secret of its widening influence is contained in these later declarations: both ground of appeal and ground of attack had widened. No longer is the point of view limited to that of Shanghai students engrossed in labour

problems, no longer are the prevailing features so reminiscent of an importation from Russia. The features correspond more closely to the background of change throughout the whole of China, and the tone, happily, is more convincing of the presence of honest doubters among China's own youth.

Here is a declaration upon this broader basis. Reading it, it would be well to keep in mind the diagnosis of young China's ills made in Chapter II, and filled in with more details of the symptoms in succeeding chapters :

We oppose Religion because :

We are progressive, religion is conservative : it forbids doubt of ancient custom and creed.

We make for union, religion for disunion : witness the Crusades and the Thirty Years' War.

We follow science, religion follows superstition : in a college at Shanghai anti-evolutionist views are held by students.

We seek self-realization, religion seeks self-abasement : prayer and repentance make man dependent.

We care for the whole life, religion for the soul-life : " other-worldliness causes the patient suffering of unnecessary evils by the working classes ; this is destructive of true morality."

We especially oppose Christianity because of :

Science : evolution, astronomy, psychology, and physiology destroy belief in creation and immortality.

Morals : the doctrine of Redemption encourages sin. Other doctrines, *e.g.* sacrifice and universal love, we have apart from Christianity. Christianity adds to these sound doctrines unsound commentary, as in the exhortation to " turn the other cheek."

Nationalism : Christianity is the vanguard of imperialism and a means of exploitation, *e.g.* indemnities and the ceding of territories arose out of troubles caused by Christian missions. To-day Christianity destroys the spirit of independence, and then imperialism steps in.

We especially oppose the Christian Church :

It is a respecter of persons, lives under the shadow of officialdom, seeks to use people of influence, and welcomes rich men.

Its members are self-seeking : the church entices them with prospects of material prosperity.

Its ministers are self-seeking : depend for a living upon the church ; religion is simply their profession, a profession with which their lives are inconsistent.

It interferes with government ; takes advantage of foreign imperialist support to evade local government, or to influence the law courts in cases where members are involved.

It interferes with family : buys children in order to train them as Christians, interferes in marriage settlements.

It is a failure : over four hundred years of preaching have merely changed the idol into God. The only result upon conduct has been to make Chinese subservient to foreigners.

We oppose Christian education because it is :

Despotic, there is no freedom of thought and action.

Superstitious, children are threatened with the devil.

Compulsory, non-Christians are forced to worship and to study the Bible.

Tyrannical, non-attendance at Sunday service results in stoppage of leave or going without a meal.

Conservative, text-books, matter, methods and discipline are old-fashioned.

Unpatriotic, reproach is cast upon China, and students are forbidden to take part in patriotic movements.

Uneducational, it hinders the development of individuality by stereotyped Christian teaching.

Therefore uphold Truth, Freedom, and the spirit of Revolution. Oppose the exploitation of imperialism, which includes opposition to Christianity, the Christian Church, and Christian education.

If it is true to say that the factors leading to the organization of the Anti-Christian Movement were the signs of Christianity's strength, it is equally true that its success was assured by young China's characteristic weaknesses: severance from the historic past, lack of adjustment to new and larger relationships, absence of any determined philosophy of life—the weaknesses inevitable to life in a ruin.

II

But the weakness is not all with them: the truth is rather that the failings on the one hand too often match the infirmities on the other. I must confess that I have sometimes felt that, were I a young Chinese, I might to-day be an ardent anti-Christian. Not an atheist, perhaps, nor a bolshevist, nor a jingo, nor a member of any of the more extreme groups which supply the movement with its leaders; but a doubter, seeking new truth and speedier solutions to life's pressing problems, the kind of youth among whom the movement finds its sympathizers and the men who do its bidding.

I felt like this a few years ago, when in a little country town I heard the Chinese preacher examining candidates whom he had prepared for baptism. They were simple country folk of the farmer-coolie class, and to one I listened with especial interest—a woman in blue cotton homespun with her baby on her back.

" A-Sham," said the preacher, " tell me what you mean by ' God.' "

" God is three persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit," she recited glibly. A few more similar questions, and then—

" Tell me what you know about Jesus."

Silence. . . .

" Anything at all that you know about Jesus."

A blank stare. . . . She knew the catechism and the commandments, but . . .

" Changing the idol into "—the Trinity! I must confess that was pretty much my own thought. Since then I have come to know that preacher, a good man, whose religion means to him a daily walk with God. I know him well enough to be sure that, before long, that woman would " come to Jesus " through him. But where does it all begin? For him, for that woman, for old China and all her children, truth began most naturally with authoritative statements, handed down from the past. That preacher is not inefficient: probably he is far more effective than a younger man of the modern student type could be among the villagers. It matters little *how* a man arrives at Christianity, whether through the Law and the Prophets, or (perhaps in doubt and despair of these) by simply meeting Jesus. All that

I say is, that man could not have brought me to Christ, and he cannot bring young China. He belongs to the age which was content to look back, the age from which young China is poles apart, the age to which anti-Christians relegate the whole of Christianity with its dependence on " ancient custom and creed."

And if I were a young Chinese, on which side should I stand ?

I sometimes wonder what I should do if it had befallen me, as it has befallen some of my friends, suddenly to awake to so many problems that seem to require a radical, revolutionary solution. There are problems of the individual life. In the old days family stood in the way, and God knows it was hard enough to accept a gospel which said " He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me," a gospel which did indeed make a man's foes to be those of his own household. But in these days new-found individuality is the stumbling-block. Here is a man, married in his boyhood to a wife he did not choose and does not love ; with whom he has no interests in common except the hope of children—and then with widely different purpose for their lives ; an ignorant country girl, with whom he cannot talk, cannot think, cannot share his life, but with whom he has to live. This and innumerable other problems of an age of change, problems of discipline in an age of freedom, have affected the attitude of many young Chinese (from Sun Yat Sen himself downwards) towards Christianity. Here are knots which they did not tie and cannot loose. Endure them, or cut them ?

Is patience the remedy, the patience that " turns the other cheek," or the energy that by opposing cuts them ? Self-abasement or self-realization ? Restriction or revolution ? If youth in the West rebels against the narrowness of conventional life, what of young China and " stereotyped Christianity " ?

> *True, 'tis a strait and thorny road,*
> *And mortal spirits tire and faint*
> *But they forget . . .*

No, in China they do not forget ; they do not sufficiently *know*. For to the old scholars religion meant ethical teaching. The terminology and the idea remain, even with regard to the Christian religion. To become a Christian is still " to enter the teaching," or " to have learned the true way." We had to use old terms, and only slowly can we fill them with new content. But outsiders have heard more of Christianity as the following of a set of somewhat narrow rules than they have seen of strong-living saints fed by the mighty God.

Then there are pressing problems of society : not of a submerged tenth, but of a submerged nine-tenths. In the old days men wondered, as they saw our medical pioneers, at the care of Christianity for maimed and helpless individuals. But now young China looks for the salvation of a society that is maimed and helpless too. If I were a young Chinese, I might be intolerant of our village preacher, as behind the times and out of touch with modern needs. If so, I might listen to those who say that he is subsidized by money that comes—I know not how—

from a " capitalist " country. I might even be ready to suspect—if I did not know his miserable pittance—that so long as he himself was raised above the struggle for a living wage, he would go on " saving souls."

Souls ! Yes I too should be engrossed in bodies and houses and wages and welfare, more intent on theories which change a social system, than on a religion which says to individual men, Repent ! Four hundred millions, one by one ! Can youth wait for that, even if he believed that it would work ? But these others talk of quicker and (supposedly) more radical measures, measures which leave no room for " the patient suffering of unnecessary evils," or a heaven where all will be put right.

Repentance, sin, the frailty of human nature, these were unwelcome doctrines in the old days, foreign to the philosophy of China, which, in the words of the school-book, declared that " Men one and all from infancy are virtuous at heart." But what now, in days when youth is hopeful of its future, trustful of its leaders, confident of building a new heaven and a new earth by the dispelling of ignorance, not sin, and the teaching of new principles, not a change of heart ? Some even of our Chinese theological students are inclined to doubt the preaching of repentance, to neglect Christianity's central theme, redemption, to suspect emphasis upon the weakness of human nature (of which in recent history there is such abundant proof) as " casting reproach upon China." Indeed, such young Christian leaders seem half in doubt themselves as to whether Christianity can fit the needs

of the age without a little trimming. One hears of some whose preaching tends more and more to consist in extolling Jesus as a radical and a revolutionary, in proclaiming the social implications of Christianity, in showing the principles of Sun Yat Sen to be little more than a restatement of the Christian gospel. Some of it is good and timely and true, but if I were a young non-Christian Chinese I should suspect it. When overdone—and it is being overdone—this preaching for the times may resolve itself into a " face-saving " device, a mere strategy of self-defence. Is it not true, I should ask, that Jesus died because He was not intent enough upon political revolution ? That His Gospel is primarily concerned with the individual heart and with God ? That, if you measure Jesus by the standards of Sun Yat Sen, you thereby confess that you are going to the greater to justify the less ?

If I were a young Chinese, where should I stand ?

Or, if I surmounted all these obstacles, there would still be science, my new-found science, and my scientific search for truth. And here it is not necessary to imagine myself Chinese—only to recall the doubts of my own adolescence, my rebellion still when I hear Christians make religious truth the antithesis of scientific truth. If this was so, is so, with us, the difficulties of young China are multiplied a hundredfold. The Christian leader of a Chinese country town has little opportunity to catch up or keep up with modern thought, and all too little training to make him one of the student class, and at one with the problems of the student world. As for

the missionary, Christianity is represented here by all the different points of view, not only of British denominationalism, but also of American sects, among many of whom the "fundamentalist" controversy still drags on. Little wonder if young China answers, What is truth?

Here are sufficient obstacles to the entry of any modern Chinese youth into the ranks of the Christian church. But an obstacle is not necessarily a rampart, and that which we feel to be difficult we are not necessarily moved to destroy. Here are reasons, and reasons with which the youth of the West will sympathize, for passive rejection: but why active opposition to the Christian cause?

III

This, as so many other forms of present-day activity, must be ascribed to that burst of new life which we call Nationalism. I do not mean that nationalism is essentially anti-Christian. Among nationalist officials, committee-men, propagandists and publicists, a sprinkling of influential Christians is to be found. Most educated young Christians are themselves nationalists —a fact which sometimes, when we have endured our kicks in Kwangtung, robs us of our ha'pence in Peking! What I do mean is that nationalists naturally tend to be suspicious of any other strong movement within the nation, as a diversion of energy; suspicious of purposes different from their own, as possibly at variance with their own; and, in these days of "war mentality," especially suspicious of

hidden purposes behind a movement fostered by the foreigner. Add to all this the further factor, important to remember in all the " movements " of these last few years, that the allies of the nationalists when the Anti-Christian Movement began to gather strength (1924) were the protagonists of world revolution, and you have gone far to explain whence came the leaders for the campaign against Christianity. To explain its appeal to the rank and file of patriotic youth is another story.

A few days ago, my own cook, a youth who has been in the employ of missionaries for nearly ten years, asked me if it was the British government that paid my salary ! Why ? Because disinterested service is hard for non-Christians to understand ; because the patriotism of the foreigner is looked upon as his outstanding characteristic ; because, under the system of extra-territoriality, the necessary connection of a British citizen with his Consul may easily be misinterpreted in a land where connection with government has been for officials only. But if a man with such close and constant experience of us can misunderstand, what of the masses, whose only knowledge is the propaganda which they hear and the pictures which are shown to them ?

Here is one such picture : it shows the foreigners entering through the hole they have battered in old China's wall. First comes the missionary bearing the Bible and the Cross. A mask covers his face, but his ears stick out—wolfish, devilish ears. Behind follow a cannon, a gunboat, and evil, smirking " imperialists." Surely, says the youth, it cannot be as bad as that !

But stay—here are articles from newspapers and magazines which talk of " political aggression," and they prove that Christian missions have all along been its tool : " Britain, France and Germany compelled China to cede territory in compensation for the murder of missionaries. Eight nations together forced China to pay the huge Boxer Indemnity owing to trouble caused by Christianity." They almost imply that the deliberate intention of foreign Christians was to provide an opportunity for " imperialism " by being murdered ! In the first flush of patriotism, youth forgets that it takes two to make a quarrel—or even a homicide—and the case against Christianity looks blacker than any murderer's.

Nor is that all. Writers bring abundant proof that missionaries who, as foreign citizens, share inevitably in the " unequal treaties," have often used their prestige as foreigners, or the security of their property as extra-territorial, to befriend their Chinese colleagues and members of the church. It may be that interest in a law-suit was an attempt to get a little justice from a corrupt court (though, of course, the writers do not say so) ; that the provision of " sanctuary " in the mission compound was from looting, raping soldiery (though the articles, of course, omit to mention this also). But, whatever the occasion, in these days of nationalism who is a foreigner to interfere ?

The young Chinese may never have heard of the persecution under Diocletian, or of the Roman fear of *imperium in imperio*, but, as he reads, it is some such danger to the nation that young nationalist China fears. He stays to ask no more, but dashes off to join

the procession which even now is shouting in the street, as it marches to obstruct a Christmas service at the church. He may be stirred sufficiently to break up a piece or two of church furniture, and a few windows as well—perhaps even to the extent of breaking a few heads, if need be. And " Down with the Imperialists ! " he cries. Poor misguided young China.

Here is another poster. It shows a minister preaching patience to a bound and burdened workman, while the foreign " capitalist " from behind fills the collecting bag with gold. Young China has often wondered about that money. Even young Christian China has no manner of conception how holy mission money is. For he has never seen, as we have, the missionary box in the cottages of those blessed poor whose is the Kingdom of God.

And the papers still talk, as did that early declaration, of " economic aggression " and of Christianity as its "vanguard" in the preparation of markets, training people to be " running dogs of the foreigner," and " to oppose the independent spirit of the Chinese." To the youthful patriot who does not know, it seems a plausible explanation of mission finance ; to many it must seem the only explanation. For China is a land where the sum total of gossip is the price of things, and the motive for most actions is the hope of gain.

But it is not left there. More writers set forth plainly how missionaries, being allowed by the " unequal treaties " to live in the interior, have thus extended the sphere of " consular jurisdiction " far beyond the treaty ports and further diminished

China's sovereignty. Thus far other foreigners have been confined to the towns of the coast and of the Yangtze valley, which China was compelled to open. But the missionary is the thin end of the wedge; ere long, merchant, mill-owner, miner—who knows what?—will follow in his steps. If it were not so, why should Japan include among her Twenty-One Demands "that Japanese subjects shall have the right of missionary propaganda in Buddhist China"?

What need of further evidence? They, "being moved with jealousy, took to them certain vile fellows of the rabble, and gathering a crowd, set the city in an uproar . . . crying, these that have turned the world upside down are come hither also." Students and labourers together have repeated the history of the early church—repeated it in the numerous riotings, repeated it in the vengeance wreaked on fellow-townsmen, repeated it in the modern version of perpetual misunderstanding: "Down with imperialistic Christianity," which turns the world upside down!

"Political aggression," "economic aggression," and thirdly, "cultural aggression"; this last is added to the original list[1] as the name for all this preparatory infiltration of Christianity which is to make China subservient to the foreigner's will. They are vague and clumsy words, but here again are placards which explain. One shows young China seated in a chair. A missionary from behind has blindfolded him; and the words on the bandage are "Holy Bible."

If that is not enough, further explanations will not fail you, for this is now the leading phalanx of the anti-

[1] See Appendix IV.

Christian attack. There is a good deal of jealousy of Christian schools, and jealousy and suspicion are related not only in dictionaries but in life. The budgets of Christian schools cannot be upset by appropriation of the funds; their discipline is less disturbed by the lawlessness of the student body; they stand out from the prevailing ruin, and, like everything outstanding, they are watched. Thus it becomes known that, while there is instruction in civics, no party propaganda is allowed; while there are students' societies, they are none of them political; while they keep "Double Ten" and a few other days, they do not have holiday every time there is a demonstration. And yet Bible teaching is prominent in the curriculum; morning prayers and Sunday services are compulsory;[1] they celebrate all the Christian, if not all the nationalist, feasts. Foreign religion, instead of Chinese nationalism! "Christian schools denationalize."

Moreover, if their discipline is harder to upset, it is also harder, in these days of liberty and licence, to endure. There are malcontents within, and defaulters who have been put out. These have an eager audience when they prove conclusively (in public meetings or in newspapers, for there is no law of libel) that those secure funds are from "capitalist" sources, that this enforced discipline is a miniature "imperialism." "Every student who enters a mission school is one good soldier lost to the Revolution." And lo! these youths are defaulters and malcontents no more: in the twinkling of an eye they have been changed into

[1] See pp. 155 *et seq.*

patriots and martyrs. They even regard themselves as such, for China is somehow to be saved by " movements "—movements of arms and flags, and of fists that beat the air : " Down with the imperialism of the Christian schools ! " Some indeed love the darkness better than the light ; but, blind leaders of the blind, they are more to be pitied than blamed.

" Cultural aggression " has been the loudest war-cry, and Christian schools and colleges the chief objective, of recent anti-Christian attacks. The strategy employed is well summarized in the following plan of campaign. It was published by the National Federation of Student Unions in preparation for the winter of 1925-6 :

The week about Christmas is to be anti-Christian week. In the winter holidays local student unions should send students to cities and villages, publishing the evils of Christianity. To aid this, handbills, circulars and booklets, simple speeches, and plays should be used. Special point should be made of the backwardness of Christianity, the plot of cultural aggression, stirring up students of mission schools to agitate for improvement in school affairs. Some members should themselves participate in Y.M.C.A. and other Church work, in order to agitate for bringing expenditure and work more into the open, and to oppose the small group of functionaries who keep everything in their own hands.

The Y.M.C.A. usually finds opportunity for organizing sports clubs and establishing free schools, in order to preach Christianity. This leads astray the political aspirations of youth and hinders the patriotic movement. Therefore we should refuse the participation of Christians in all kinds of physical training, and make

some plans to forbid their establishing schools and hospitals.

Local student unions should co-operate with the anti-Christian Movement in planning opposition to Christianity.

The student unions should have some specially selected members to assist Christians to disentangle themselves from the toils of Christianity. Whenever and wherever we hear of Christians so doing, we should publish their names and the reason for their secession in all the newspapers, to show that these have been aroused, and so help other infatuated Christians to see the darkness of Christianity.

Later plans of the movement are said, by a Chinese writer, to be:

To establish its organization in factories, young people's societies, even in mission schools and in the Church itself; to continue agitation for getting back [*sic*] control of education (*i.e.* by government); to get students leaving mission schools admitted into government schools unconditionally; to continue to give care to agitation which will lead Christians to denounce Christianity; to investigate the weak points of the Church.

These last two years they have advanced, at some points in the line, far beyond their objective. In many places soldiers, by occupying Christian schools and churches, have found an opportunity of striking an easy blow against "imperialism"—and, incidentally, of getting easy billets for themselves. In others labour unions have wrecked or closed schools, plastering them with placards. In many towns riots have taken place; in some, Christians have been led about

the streets with placards on their backs. Some bear on their body the marks, the stigmata, of the Lord Jesus; and a few have followed Him to prison and to death. . . .

And now it is over: at any rate, it seems as if the worst is over.

From the start it was obvious that much in the anti-Christian Movement belonged to a temporary phase, part of the whirlwind of a destructive storm that must blow itself out in the end. It is the fashion these last few months in China to put down all excesses and extremes to the credit of departed Russians and executed Chinese communists. We need not wholeheartedly follow the fashion, but two facts are worthy of note. First, that since the fall of the Communist party from power, less and less has been heard of anti-Christian agitation. And second, that such agitation plainly has no basis in "orthodox" nationalism. The only significant reference to Christianity in *The Three People's Principles* is surely significant enough. After comparing the teaching of the philosopher Mo Tzu about love with that of Jesus, Sun Yat Sen continues:

With the increasing intercourse between Chinese and foreigners, some have come to think that the love Chinese have talked of is surpassed by the foreigners. For they have set up schools and opened hospitals in China, to teach and to save Chinese. This belongs to love's *expression*. . . . Chinese, with regard to love, have not yet equalled foreigners in this kind of expression.

However else we are misrepresented and misunderstood, it seems that Sun Yat Sen did not misunderstand us here.

IV

Of the questions raised in these years of storm, there is one which remains to demand an answer. The demand is not only from anti-Christians, but from all nationalists; not only from nationalists, but from the northern government as well. The question is that of the future relation of Christian schools to the government system. That there should be some relation, most of us would agree. For the sake of self-defence there should; it is expedient that we should escape suspicion of being "a state within the state," a separate Christian society, complete and self-contained. But still more, for realization of our task there should; it is a matter of principle that the leaven should ultimately find its place in the very midst of the lump. Thus far expediency and principle go hand in hand. It is when the terms offered by the governments for registration of Christian (and all other "private") schools are discussed that differences of opinion arise. Is it expedient to accept, and remain open, or does principle demand that we refuse, and be prepared, if necessary, to close till a better day?

Of the terms offered by the nationalist government, those which give rise to most discussion are:

1. "Foreigners cannot be principals." "On the Board of Directors (controlling the school) Chinese members must form a majority; no foreigner can be Chairman of the Board."

2. "No religious subjects can be made required subjects; no religious propaganda is allowed during

a regular lesson." "Private schools when holding religious services must not compel students to attend or participate."

3. A subsequent regulation making *The Three People's Principles* a compulsory subject, and enforcing the Monday morning commemoration of Sun Yat Sen.[1]

Requirements similar to 1 and 2 are made by the northern government. A foreign principal is allowed, however, provided that the vice-principal is Chinese. With regard to religious teaching, the wording is briefer and the meaning more ambiguous: "The institution shall not have as its purpose the propagation of religion. It shall not include religious courses among the required subjects." Objection to the former clause has led to its interpretation as the prohibiting only of an *uneducational* propagandist aim.

The first section raises little difficulty. It is entirely in accordance with the aim of Christian schools, and to make them Chinese controlled throughout is only the speeding-up of a policy adopted from the first.

The third section (affecting nationalist territory only) need not be discussed here. Appendix IV will give an idea of what is entailed in this demand, sufficient to make the reader able to judge for himself whether or no it can be met: that is as much as any one in China can do. I will only pause to point out that the spirit of the teacher into whose hands the task of instruction in "nationalism" may fall, seems

[1] See p. 85.

to me to make all the difference to the possibility of its inclusion in a Christian curriculum.

The second section brings us to the question of religious teaching: Should it be optional or compulsory? Optional, says young China, as far as I can see, almost to a man. These are days of liberty —in theory if not in fact—and compulsion of all kinds is in disrepute. Foreign opinion is more divided. Some say that religious instruction should have been voluntary from the first, and that the change will be all gain. Others content themselves with stating that, by making it voluntary now (with suitable alternatives, of course) we shall suffer no loss. They emphasize a point with which all who have experience of a Christian school will agree, that Christian education's being truly Christian does not depend upon a subject in the time-table, or a service on the Sunday, but upon the Christian background to every subject and the Christian atmosphere of every classroom. A third and by no means negligible section maintain that all this is the very antithesis of that religious freedom promised in the Constitution: that no one is, or ever was, compelled to send his children to a Christian school, but that Christian parents, at any rate, ought to be free to put their children under a thoroughgoing Christian discipline. They contend that religion as an optional subject will share the fate of other optionals—scamped work done in odds and ends of time; to make it optional is to sacrifice, for temporary expediency, an abiding principle fundamental to Christian education, namely, that education without Christianity is an impoverished

and hopelessly incomplete preparation for life. Whichever is right, and whichever is wrong, here indeed is the very heart of the problem: ours is a task of reconciliation, but—where does expediency end, and where does principle begin?

Finally, we may say that any solution to the problem must prove inadequate which has not taken into consideration some such review of the problem's origin as was attempted in the brief outline of plans of reconstruction in Chapter III. If nationalism is to be fundamental to the new culture, schools are naturally regarded as the most necessary field for nationalist propaganda. If the nation is to be the basis of the whole of social life, where should its influence be more controlling than in the education of its children? If love of country is indeed "not a creed but a passion, a religion," when should it claim its adherents so well as in their youth, and where so zealously as in "religious" schools?

The anti-Christian Movement in its influence on young China has left to us the task of reconciling a religion which has its roots in history with a company of youth in violent reaction and rebellion against the past. There are moral problems of individual life and of social relationships for which we must show a more adequate Christian solution. There are intellectual doubts arising from theories which oppose science to religion. Above all, there is reconciliation of love of country with love of God. Who is sufficient for these things?

Well, they are not *new* problems: "God gave unto

us the ministry of reconciliation," says Paul, and I find that Paul includes them every one.[1]

Severance from the historic past? "If any man is in Christ he is a new creature; the old things are passed away: behold, they are become new. But all things are of God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ."

Science and non-Christian philosophies of life?—"Through Him it was the Father's good pleasure to reconcile all things in Christ, the things in the heavens, and the things upon the earth."

New and larger relationships, especially new-found nationalism?—"He is our peace, who . . . brake down the middle wall of partition . . . that he might reconcile them both [Jew and Gentile] . . . unto God through the cross, having slain the enmity thereby."

[1] A reference to the words "reconcile" and "reconciliation" in a concordance will show far more resemblances than are mentioned here. 1 Cor. vii. 11 *et seq.*, for example, deals with social problems of striking similarity.

CHAPTER VII

REBUILDING THE RELIGION (2)

THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH

"Loud mockers in the roaring street
Say Christ is crucified again:
Twice pierced His gospel-bearing feet,
Twice broken His great heart in vain.

I hear, and to myself I smile,
For Christ talks with me all the while."

RICHARD LE GALLIENNE.

"Blessed are they that have been persecuted . . . for theirs is the Kingdom."

St Matthew v. 10.

I

THERE are many surprises in store for the man who, having read about the East and dreamed about the East, at last comes East. Fiction about China is notoriously untrustworthy, whether it be the slander of the silent-gliding, inscrutable villain, or the idealization of romance and oriental splendour. But in no respect are fact and fiction more divergent than in their witness to religion: the contemplative, mystical, spiritually-minded East may be a true picture of some lands of Asia; of most it is but a half-truth; of China it is a positive untruth.

Before coming to China, one devours Legge, De

Groote, Soothill and other sinologues. After several years here, most of us have to confess that, for the greater part of what we know of China's religions, we are still dependent upon such sources, with little opportunity for first-hand knowledge. One's first opportunity will be the language teacher. He will probably be a man of purely Chinese education, a fair sample of old China's students—what better chance could you have? "What is the meaning of that little shrine by the street gate, and who is the god that sits behind the incense-sticks?" He will smile and say, "Oh well, you know, it's the womenfolk who burn that incense. It brings luck, they think, to the street. But of course book-read men . . ." And that is the end of that line of enquiry.

What have you discovered of the mystical East? If one sentence could sum up my own impressions of the attitude of old China's scholars towards religion, I should make it that saying of Confucius himself, "Honour the spirits, but leave them alone." They touched only that part of religion which belonged essentially to their place in the social order, whether as fathers of families or as officials of the people; and even this many of them approached in a spirit of reverent agnosticism like that of their master.[1] With regard to the multitude of unorthodox, unclassical superstitions of the masses, they smiled: they smiled at the veneration of queer-shaped rocks and straight grown trees; at the "guardians of the gate" in the street, and all the crowd of godlings who are guardians of the house. They smiled too at the Buddhist temple

[1] See p. 29.

with its accretions of superstitious practices, little better than the animism of the cottage, street and field ; at the monastery with its monks who gabbled prayers which they did not understand, and who for the most part lived an ignorant careless life of ease ; at the convent where (so at least they would tell you) in many cases nuns were nothing more than prostitutes.

Whether this is a just and sufficient appraisal of China's religions for my part I cannot but doubt. For our present purposes that question matters little. It is the judgment of the old literati and of all who share the superiority of the " book-read " man. They smile, but yet they think, " There may be something in it. Perhaps it's just as well. It answers the needs of the masses, if it meets no need of mine." They " honour the spirits, but leave them alone."

But what of young China who now stands in their place ? He has come into the inheritance of their superiority—but in addition he has something which is entirely his own.

Before you question him, go yourself to one of the famous temples and stand before the great gilt images ; you may find a group of new China's students there, sightseeing like yourself, but not so reverently. A woman is kneeling, shaking a box of divining sticks. As she prays and shakes, one stick falls to the ground. Eagerly she consults the priest : she has been praying that her daughter-in-law's child may be a boy, and here is the answer—is it favourable ? Young China watches her with less understanding and with more contempt than you, if you are a decent Christian, can find it in your heart to feel.

Visiting a pagoda with a band of schoolboys, I have had to reprove a boy for rearranging the idols in grotesque and humorous positions. To me it savoured of blasphemy ; to him it was just fun. In the street I have seen a youth light his cigarette from a candle that burned before a wayside shrine. It made me shudder ; it saved him a match. The Principal of a university tells me that, of the students entering, most register as either Christian or Confucian, but that in his experience the latter is nowadays just another name for nothing at all.

But young China does not only smile ; animism is ignorance, and ignorance must quickly be dispelled by science. Monasteries are anti-social and must give way before the new society. Old China's religions belong to the Dark Ages, and this generation ushers in the Age of Enlightenment and Progress. Down with superstition ! They do not only despise, they oppose. And their opposition tends to go further and question even that fundamental worship of ancestors and honour to the family dead, which (supplying as it did the necessary religious basis of the patriarchal system) to Confucius and the old scholars seemed unquestionable. They are talking of individual homes instead of family compounds ; of marriage by civil contract instead of by worship before ancestral tablets ; of fulness of life for the living more than fulness of honour for the dead. Another sentiment, expressed by Confucius, but driven to its logical conclusion neither by him nor by any of the older generations of literati, these modern students are consistently driving home : " Not being able to serve men, how

can we serve the spirits? Not understanding life, how shall we understand death?" If old China's literati were agnostics, new China's students are agnostics with a bias towards materialism.

Some will tell you of a revival of Buddhism which has begun; but do not think that this is anything to be compared to the movement under a similar name which is challenging Christianity in Ceylon. It is small and local, appealing to the remnant of old-fashioned scholars rather than to modern youth. Others tell of secret societies, which have always flourished in China, and of a new religious syncretism among them, which may bring life to the old religions. But this again seems only a stir as of rats in the mounds of the ruin, or a slither of stones that have not yet crashed to the ground. As for the revived interest in the Confucian classics,[1] that is critical, wholly intellectual, and has nothing to do with the revival of any religion.

The fact is that for young China the old religions are down and dead and done with; the only religion which to-day is sufficiently alive to make a bid for the soul of young China is Christianity; in a word, if young China does not become Christian, young China will very soon have no religion at all.

The most important difference between the old scholar and the modern student lies in their respective attitudes toward other classes of the people. The one was consciously superior and content in his superiority; he had no wish that the people should all think as he did—why should they? How could they? It is the whole burden of this book that the course of

[1] See p. 102.

recent history really means the transference of young China's ideas to the masses: this we have seen to be the main policy of nationalism, the confessed aim of the New Culture Movement, the inner meaning of the social revolution. Apply this "transference to the masses" theory in the sphere of religion, and what is the result? The result is something too big to be readily believed, or for that matter to be carelessly set down. If it were a conclusion reached merely by the application of theories, I too should hesitate. But here in the southern provinces you may see it for yourself in fact: not only for young China, but for the masses in increasing number, the old religions are in ruins, apparently beyond hope of repair. For here in the southern provinces, there has been a Nationalist government longer than anywhere else, a government which, whether representative of the people or no, does represent young China, and does provide examples of young China's philosophy translated into life.

A recent article (by Wang Chih Hsin) gives us a picture of Sun Yat Sen as a student of seventeen or eighteen. He was forced to leave his ancestral home because he had shown his contempt for the gods of his fathers by breaking off the finger of Pei Ti (the God of the North) in the village temple. In this respect he was indeed the forerunner of modern student youth.

The Three People's Principles gives us some idea of Sun Yat Sen as a political and social theorist. In outlining the rise of democracy, he says:

Before men's knowledge had unfolded . . . when sages set forth the doctrines of the gods, supernatural

authority had its uses as a support for the social system. But now we have arrived at the age of democracy, and supernatural as well as monarchical authority is but the relic of a bygone age.

In this again he truly represents young China's thinking. The history of these last few years shows us Sun Yat Sen as the founder of the southern government. The child is father to the man; this man is father to the government—and what is government policy towards the old religions?

I think of an old Buddhist monastery on a hill: a very English-looking hill, with a very English-looking wood at the top. Perhaps that is why we so often climbed it. I have stood in that monastery as the sun was setting, the time of the monk's evening round: the smell of incense filled the place, and through the smoke the candles flickered in the twilight, while in the distance boomed the deep-toned gong. And looking down was the gilt image of the Goddess of Mercy, the "Holy Mary full of grace" to Chinese peasant women, surely representing a true element—the mother-element—in God. At least I know one Christian who has felt that he might fall on his knees and find something of God there. . . .

But if you went into that monastery to-day you would not pray; you might feel more like cursing. It has long been the barracks of vandal soldiery. They are gone by now, but they have hacked at the images with their rifle-butts and littered the place with their filth. The Goddess of Mercy now looks down on dirt, desolation and ruin.

I think of a temple which I passed the other day; outside flew the Nationalist flag, and over the door were newly painted characters on a new white board —" Village Primary School." A crowd of uniformed youngsters was struggling in at the door, and a schoolmaster followed to take his seat where once the gods held sway. I think of other temples in the city : some of them have already disappeared, wholly or in part, others will soon make way for modern buildings. For a few years ago these temple lands were up for sale, offered for sale by the government to raise funds for munitions of war.

A few days ago I visited the Temple of the Five Hundred Genii, and there I talked with a sad-faced monk. This is one of the five most famous temples of Canton—to us foreigners the most famous of all, because it is here that an image of Marco Polo stands among the Buddhas. The monk told me that now his brethren number only forty, where once they were more than two hundred strong ; that only one-third of their property remains—the rest has been pulled down and the bricks and roof-tiles sold by the government, though no one has dared as yet to buy the land.

Most " religious houses " in the cities and towns of the province have had a similar situation to face. As much remains of each temple or monastery as its devotees could afford to buy back from the government ; to redeem the whole of its property would have required tens, often hundreds, of thousands of dollars ; so the greater part—sometimes the whole—had to go. If in the end some few of the famous old

buildings are spared (without redemption), this scant mercy will be due to the desire to leave, not landmarks of Chinese religion for posterity to revere, but curiosities of ancient architecture for the ferro-concrete age to see!

To the repetitions of which history is forever guilty, we in Canton have to add not only a renaissance like that of Europe, a social revolution more far-reaching than Britain ever knew, but a dissolution of the monasteries [1] perhaps more extreme still. It *is* more extreme in that it reaches down to temples too: and if on the one hand suppression is not complete, on the other hand must be weighed the fact that there is no accompanying Reformation. At present it is naturally difficult to find out how completely this policy has been followed in the more recently acquired nationalist territory, but after all that is not the main consideration. More important is the undoubted fact that to young China this does appear as an enlightened policy, in line with his own ideas of progress, social reconstruction, and scientific life.

If the southern provinces are indeed a point of vantage from which one may look into the future, it seems that, not only for young China, but for the whole of China, Christianity is the only serious competitor in the field. If you seek evidence which is beyond dispute, some movement which is already nation-wide, turn back to the preceding chapter. Did it not occur to you all the while that here was a misnomer—that the movement is anti-religious, not

[1] The comparison is suggested by my own theological students in the course of their study of Church History.

merely anti-Christian? Yet anti-Christian is what they themselves call it, these modern students. And why? Because Christianity is the only foe that counts, the only force worth opposing, the only real alternative to a materialistic philosophy of life.

This is the position in which, at the end of these days of persecution, the Church in China finds itself. Not long ago in England I was talking thus, and an enthusiast shouted, "Hallelujah!" But this is no time for hallelujahs—yet. These are tidings, not to lift us up into the seventh heaven, but to weigh us trembling to our knees. Here stands the cause of Christ, but stands how firmly? Firmly enough to be built up into the third and mightiest pillar of new China's new civilization, massive enough to be the *key* pillar to the new literature and the new society, as ancestor worship was to the old? Or will it prove unable to bear the strain and give way to its only alternative—materialism trimmed with vague ideals, nationalism without a God?

II

It is, of course, impossible to give a full statement as to the present strength of the Christian Church. The experience of any one missionary is too limited, and most written records are out of date by years—by very fateful years. All that remains is to write of those general features of the situation which are being discussed throughout the greater part of China, illustrating them from one's more intimate knowledge of this particular section of the field.

First of all, the cause of Christ does stand.

Those newspaper reports, which occasionally during these last few years have sounded the death-knell of Christian work in China, sometimes with unrelieved gloom, oftener with ill-disguised glee, were from the outset denied by men of faith. They may now be denied by men of knowledge too. Most came from people who never had much use for the missionary, people who provide a healthy reminder that not all rabid nationalists are Chinese—nor all anti-Christians. Some few may have come from missionaries, but any one who has experienced the first bitterness of apparent defeat will know how hard it is at such a time to bite one's lip, say nothing, and wait for a more normal frame of mind.

Church members may be divided into three groups: the lapsed, the wavering, and the faithful. As in all persecutions there are the lapsed; as in most persecutions of Christianity they are comparatively few. Nor is the loss in numbers wholly loss. The charge that the church is composed of "rice Christians"—to opponents in China so favourite a means of disproving Christianity, to similar folk at home so frequent a cry in discrediting Christian missions—is surely silenced for ever. Social, legal, financial benefits from connection with the Christian religion have disappeared, and with them any whose Christian connections depended on such benefits.

The wavering are a bigger group. I hear from Chinese colleagues of members "sending some one else with their church subscriptions—and to the back door!—and not attending service, especially

at Christmas when anti-Christian propagandists were abroad"; of some who look askance at the visit of the pastor to their homes; of some who (like the "Libellatici" of the Decian persecutions) while not having forsworn Christ, would be heartily relieved if their neighbours thought that they had.

Here some special allowance should be made for that pacific temperament which always led old China round an obstacle instead of through it. I have little patience with those many writers who compare the Chinese love of peace with the westerner's pugnacity, and do so wholly to the westerner's disadvantage. Both can become Christian virtues when baptized, but we should distinguish between conciliation and compromise, just as we do between conviction and mere pugnacity. True love of peace has nothing to do with unwillingness to face up to the facts of a situation. The Chinese temper is one which in many ways one cannot but admire, but here, as so often in China's history, one sees its accompanying weaknesses. I mention this, not in condemnation of Chinese in general, but in explanation of these waverers in particular. Disloyalty seems less like the unpardonable sin when you think of it as the Chinese characteristic of compromise, which in some Christians has not yet been born anew into the more stable Christian quality of conciliation. Yet, while we are judging thus, it is well to ask ourselves how the mild churchgoers even of the pugnacious West might act, if called upon to bear the brunt of opposition such as this; and how many in the churches of

England would hold to a religion which had, or indeed which could, cost them everything.

The third group are the faithful, the leaven of all the churches, who by their calm confidence are adding to their numbers less courageous souls who might not stand alone. I could choose examples of more extreme danger, and therefore of greater courage, but here is a Chinese report which must be considered as more ordinary and typical, and yet which reads like a quotation from the Apostolic Fathers :

A procession of soldiers and students halted outside the church, yelling " Down with Christianity ! Down with the Christians ! " A group of us stood quietly at the open doorway, until the neighbours, seeing us unmoved, turned their taunts on the procession, and began to say, " You shout ' Down with the Christians.' There they are !—why don't you ' down ' them ? " But nothing happened.

Everywhere there are groups of leaders such as these and around them the Church of Christ still stands.

Christianity stands—but does it merely stand still ? Is its relation to the many " movements " we have reviewed only that of strain-bearing, shock-resisting ? Among all these modern movements, Christianity must be reckoned as itself a movement : Christianity not only stands, but moves, and moves with the times.

Formerly, in the sphere of propaganda, Christianity (plus such foreign concerns as the ubiquitous British and American Tobacco Company !) alone held the field. One outstanding feature of China's modern

movements has been persistent and widespread propaganda, beyond anything we have known, even in war-time, in the West. One often hears it said that non-Christians have beaten us at our game, and that is partly true. But what has the "Christian Movement" to show?

Take first its relation to anti-Christian propaganda. The first time that I heard details of organized opposition was at a small gathering of Chinese ministers early in 1924. One of them had been investigating the anti-Christian Movement, attending its meetings, reading its literature, and he set his reports before us. As I listened, I confess that I began to fear: there were brains behind it, and money, an intimate knowledge of our weakest spots, a marshalling of all the rationalist forces of both East and West. The Chinese minister gave greater detail, and I quaked the more. Then he ended with some such words as these: "Brethren, this is for you and me a time of opportunity. People both within and without the Church will be roused to an interest in Christianity such as they never felt before. We must prepare ourselves and our members to know and to tell the reasons for the faith that is in us." And I felt ashamed of myself as less than Christian—thinking of opposition, while old Cheen saw only opportunity. I know now what Paul meant when he said, "Some indeed proclaim Christ even of envy and strife . . . thinking to raise up affliction. . . . What then? Only that in every way . . . Christ is proclaimed; and therein I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice."

At Christmas, 1925, when anti-Christians were fill-

ing the city with filthy blasphemies about the birth of Jesus, and the leading newspaper had big black headlines : " Jesus Christ, the —— son of a Jewish ——," Cheen put on his church notice board, " Jesus Christ, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords." A year later, when the fever of extremist agitation was by no means over, I asked him how things stood. Small wonder that he could answer, " Congregations are bigger than for several years. It is a direct result of the anti-Christian Movement, which has drawn members together and made them anxious for news of Church affairs " !

Turn now from anti-Christian to nationalist propaganda. In October 1926 a group of theological students found themselves holding an evangelistic mission in a neighbouring market town just at the time for celebrating Sun Yat Sen's birthday. On that day crowded and enthusiastic gatherings for the encouragement of patriotism were being held throughout nationalist territory, and were our young Christians to be left behind ? They arranged a special service, and invited local nationalist associations, government schools, labour unions, and all manner of societies to attend. Chinese Christians know how to use one method of appeal which has been lost to the churches of the West since the Middle Ages—the drama. The students arranged a play of three acts on incidents in the life of Sun Yat Sen. Act I was based upon an authentic letter, written by Sun, at that time a Christian, to an elder of the church in Hong-Kong. He tells of his being kidnapped and imprisoned by the Chinese Legation in London, and

how, in the prison, he prayed. " God gave me grace," he writes, " and received my prayer, comforting me. It was certainly God who moved the heart of —— (English attendant at the Legation), and made him willing to bear the message for me (to Dr Cantlie)." The letter ends with gratitude to God for his release : " I have experienced a great deliverance, like the escape of the prodigal from the far country, like the return of the lost sheep to the fold. And this is all from the boundless grace of the heavenly Father." This was staged effectively—especially the prayer.

Act II contained no reference to Christianity, but showed Sun's escape from a difficult situation in Canton in 1922.

The final Act emphasized the fact that China's hero in the last few hours of his life turned again to Christianity. They quoted his confession to his son, Sun Ko, " I was a Christian to begin with. I have been struggling with the devil more than forty years. You all must struggle as I did, and above all you must trust in God." They acted the scene at his death-bed, when he asked that he should be buried according to the rites of the Christian Church. Many in the audience were weeping at the close. Some of the members of political organizations present confessed that they had misjudged Christianity, saying, " We had never realized that one could be both an ardent nationalist and an ardent Christian."

Turn, finally, to Communist propaganda. Early in 1927 I had the opportunity to visit what was then the headquarters for training cadets and propagandists for the nationalist armies. At that time

there was no doubt about the strength of Communist influence, and nowhere could be found more radical opposition to Christianity. At the end of our visit we gathered in the auditorium, a great hall whose walls are decorated with three life-size pictures: one of the beginning of the "Opium" War with Britain, 1839; another of the Allies' assault on Peking after the Boxer Rising, 1900; the third of the "Canton incident" 1925. The guests were asked if any of them would like to speak of the impressions of their visit. An American and a British missionary first spoke. Then a Chinese minister rose. Truly representing every Christian there, he faced that vast crowd—not only fellow-visitors, but soldiers and propagandists in their hundreds—and said something like this: "The three pictures in this hall we can understand, but there is a fourth at the main door, about which some doubts have been expressed. The Bible and the Cross are shown lying on the ground, while the group of revolutionaries hold high above their heads *The Three People's Principles*. A friend asked me if it meant that the *Principles* had superseded Christianity. I told him, 'No, the Bible and the Cross are at the bottom, because they are to be the foundation of all things, and the *Principles* are up above, because all that is best in liberty, equality and fraternity is sprung from the Christian religion itself.'" He raised a storm of opposition from Communist propagandists who followed, but he had "witnessed the good confession," and I for one was thrilled at this amazing piece of Chinese Christian audacity.

Of this we may rest assured: not only that the

propaganda of the Christian movement continues with the rest, but that in China there are great-hearted Pauls of this modern age, who make bold to declare "All things are yours," whether anti-Christian propaganda, or nationalist propaganda, or Communist propaganda, "All things are yours, and ye are Christ's and Christ is God's."

Christianity stands; Christianity moves; and I must add one word more—Christianity builds. From what we already see of Christianity in China we can dare to say that this Christian "movement" is a process of construction, which may, by our faithfulness and God's grace, rebuild that third key pillar of religion, provide that safe rock-founded centre for the future culture and the future society.

This is a big statement to make, perhaps too big to prove. Here I can only show in broad outline a few of the ways in which Christianity meets modern needs, fits yawning gaps in China's scheme of rebuilding. Something of what is lacking in my statement of the case you can make up from my outline of China's needs and your own experience of Christianity.

I have described the literary revolution and the new culture movement as the rebuilding of the first pillar of the new civilization. And I have described them hopefully. But the first few pages of this present chapter look at that reconstruction from another point of view: the new culture is making impossible the survival of the old religions. In this respect new and old cannot continue side by side; so far from their becoming complementary pillars of the new civilization, the building of the one means the

destruction of the other. For China it is a question of either scientific culture or the old religions, and, since the one is rising rapidly and the other is far gone towards decay, there can be no manner of doubt about young China's choice. I have described these movements hopefully, but I believe with all my heart that a literature, or a culture, with no religion at the back of it, will soon lose the motive for its goodness, the inspiration for its beauty, and the test for its truth. It is truth with which the new culture is chiefly concerned, but it were a thousand times better that young China had never awakened to these small fractions of the truth, unless he is to have the whole truth. There will be a hopeless gap in the rebuilding, a dangerous gap, a gap that promises more crashes and more terrible destruction, unless China is to find, in place of the old religions, the truth as truth is in Jesus.

The second pillar, the new society, has proved harder to discuss, and its description has, I fear, been more scattered and confused. My comfort is that any confused descriptions of which I may be guilty are only a partial reflexion of that mass of confusion, that pile of unsolved problems, that almost total lack of reconstructive achievement, which we call the social revolution. How much of this failure to rebuild society is due to the fact that China still waits for the rebuilding of the third key pillar of religion, we may perhaps realize if we divide social problems into three: problems of family, problems of labour, and problems of the nation. Such a division is purely artificial, for nationalism is at the heart of

them all: nationalism, that is the process of making the nation, instead of the family, fundamental to the new civilization. Let us first recall the gap caused by the weakening of family ties, family religion, and family morality, asking ourselves this time what power on earth can fill it.

In many Chinese conversations and reports about work done these last few years, one feature again and again has caught my attention. Take this for example: "Outsiders stirred up the labour unions against the Church. This meant that ordinary evangelistic preaching had to stop. But there are meetings held in the homes of members and of scholars whose relatives are non-Christian." It has carried me back to the upper room in that Jerusalem home, where the doors were shut for fear of the Jews; to those Christian women of the first century whose names the Epistles so often link with "the church that is in her house"; to the first Christian churches that ever were. Opposition has driven institutional religion back again upon the home.

This is of more than passing significance. At a time when half the problems of adjustment are caused by the rise of individualism in place of family solidarity, and the other half by the rise of nationalism instead of family limitations, Christianity is again emphasizing home, and family, and God there. Christianity comes into the home, a religion which has at its heart the Fatherhood of God and is thus, even more truly than ancestor worship, a "family" religion; Christianity comes into the home, a religion which finds God in Christ, the Saviour of the world,

and is thus free from the limitations of former family relationships.

I have friends for whom Christianity has shown a more excellent way than divorce for problems of their old style marriages. I have still more friends whom Christian homes have saved from having any such problems at all. The question of how to preserve the best of the old and at the same time gain the best of the new is one which runs through the whole of modern life. (Witness such writings as those of Sun Yat Sen.) Here it finds its solution—some of us believe, its only solution.[1]

Look next at the confusion caused by the rise of labour and the growth of class consciousness.

To say that Christianity will build cosmos out of chaos here is rather a venture of faith than the testimony of experience. Even in the West, with our long Christian history, we have not seen the New Jerusalem. But of Chinese Christianity at least it may be said that, short as its history is, it has been saved from our historic blunders. For years now, from the very beginning of China's Industrial Revolution, a Christian bureau in Shanghai has been studying industrial problems, creating Christian public opinion, and suggesting Christian solutions and reforms. This work began under the Y.W.C.A. more especially to watch over women and child workers, but since the establishment of the National Christian Council in 1922 it has been continued by a department of that Council.

August 1927 saw another sign of the times. Fifty-

[1] *Cf.* Sun's idea of "extending" family unity, Appendix IV.

six Christians from many parts of China gathered for a ten days' "Swanwick" in Shanghai. Their formidable subject was "The Christianizing of China's Economic Relations." Most members were young Chinese interested in recent movements among farmers and labourers. One of their guests was a Christian labour leader from Japan. Meetings of such groups are significant in themselves, apart from the value of their findings.

I do not imply that such wide-awake interest is universal in the Chinese church; I do believe that it is a thousand times more widespread than in Europe at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution there. Nor would I have you think that it is confined to an unrepresentative committee in Shanghai, or to a few leaders scattered through the country. Of the churches which I know there is hardly one without its society for social service. I do not know of a single Christian high school where you would not find in an evening a classroom full of dirty ragged boys from the streets, given a chance of education through schoolboy gifts of money and service.

If Christian solutions are not being sought outside, it is not due to shortcomings within the Chinese Church. It was the first nation-wide organization to face these problems of society. But its numbers are only one in a thousand.[1] As Dr T. T. Lew told the World Conference on Faith and Order (August 1927), "The issues arising out of the relationship between employer and employee are knock-

[1] This book does not deal with the missions of the Roman or Orthodox Churches.

ing at the door of the Church, demanding explicit answers. Such a demand is loudly heard in China to-day." To the small voice of the growing Christian opinion in China there needs to be added the answer of world-wide Christendom.

It is when you turn to the deepest, widest movement, nationalism itself, that you will see the deepest, widest gaps for Christianity to fill.

National unification is the cause (or at least the pretext) of all this welter of civil war. We Christians have gone far towards its achievement. In September 1927, when the nationalist armies were already divided into several camps and their politicians into as many different governments, when relationships between them were revealing provincial attitudes and personal jealousies, often belying the very name of nationalism, there met in Shanghai the first general synod of the Church of Christian China, and the fifth National Christian Conference. Chinese from nearly all the eighteen provinces were there: from Chang Tso Lin's Manchuria, from Li Chai Sam's Kwangtung; all showed a unity of spirit and all were drawn together in the bond of peace. The conferences deprecated any alliance of the Church as such with party politics, but voiced their support with heart and soul of all that (in the widest and non-party sense of the term) was nationalism. These two organizations together afford China's best, almost her only, example of national unity. With regard to the first, it may be said that unity of spirit has resulted in this beginning of organic unity: Churches established by the London Missionary Society, the American Board

(Congregational), the United Brethren (American), and the Presbyterian Missions of America, Great Britain and Ireland, Canada and New Zealand, have united to form "The Church of Christ in China." Other Churches, meanwhile, continue to draw closer to these and to one another in the work of the second organization, the (annual) National Christian Conferences, and the corresponding permanent committee based at Shanghai, the National Christian Council. Co-operation is indeed the most striking feature of Christian work throughout China to-day, and this in spite of the fact that Christianity came to China through the many denominational churches of many different lands. What reason is there but that, bigger than the differences of nationality, firmer than established usages, more central than the details of our creeds, is "the One Foundation that hath been laid?" We have achieved working unity within the Christian Church long before it appears on the distant horizon of the political world.

If unification is one cry of modern China, it is only part of the universal emphasis on nationality. The new culture movement demands not a mere copy of the West but a culture which is essentially Chinese; the patriotic movement works for freedom from foreign interference and independence of foreign control. What of the Christian movement?

For years now, missionaries and missionary enthusiasts have echoed and re-echoed that ugly-sounding word "indigenous." When I first learned missionary jargon—in study groups before the War—it expressed the aim of Christian missions. Now

in China it stands for something of actual achievement. The day of the foreign mission as the centre of Christian work is over; the day of the Chinese Church has begun. Whatever of loss these last three fateful years have brought, they have given rise to greater advance in this direction than three decades of ordinary history would have seen. I do not mean that there has been any extensive anti-foreign or anti-missionary movement among Christians, no feeling that the time was ripe to shake off an unwelcome authority imposed from without. The advance (in contravention of all theories current in China!) has not come by way of rebellion or revolution at all.

Take my friend Cheen, for example. He has been used to working with a British colleague, and the two were always interdependent. He used to consult the foreigner as one who had had a wider experience of Christian work, a clearer understanding of Church organization and (generally) a better training in the implications of the Christian faith. His British colleague would consult him as one who had a wider experience of China, a clearer understanding of Chinese Christians, and a better training for the translation of Christian truth into terms of Chinese thought. In the old days, though both were essential, the foreigner inevitably took the lead: the work on the foundations belonged chiefly to him.

Then came the rise of nationalism, and naturally, almost imperceptibly, the scales began to swing: the missionary's dependence became more marked. What did the anti-Christian Movement mean?—Cheen told him. How should it be met?—Cheen knew. Who

should meet it?—none better than Cheen. The foreigner had his share: in his own land seventy years ago many of the same arguments were bandied back and forth; he could tell how the Church of the West had fortified itself against attack. Some of young China's doubts he himself had felt and faced in his own life as a first year "theologue." Building now belonged to both, but first and foremost to Cheen.

Then suddenly, in 1925 (or 1926 in Central China), foreigners were boycotted and continuance of their work was made impossible; or they were withdrawn by their consuls for fear of "incidents" and international complications. Cheen was left to do the job alone, and for twenty months he did it. Now that the crisis is over and the foreigner is back, the progress made is not to be thrown away. For Cheen illustrates not only the new responsibilities undertaken by Chinese ministers and preachers, but the new spirit of responsibility among the rank and file of Church members. They welcome back the missionary: his absence made them feel their need. But the work did continue while he was away, and that has made them hear their call. Obviously the missionary comes back to a new situation. In the old days the Chinese Church was the dependent offspring of the foreign mission; now the foreign mission has become the auxiliary of the Chinese Church.

There are many problems of adjustment which these next few years will have to settle, and their solution will not be uniform.[1] We cannot generalize, except

[1] See Appendix V.

to say that all solutions will make the church more and more Chinese, and more and more under Chinese management and control.

III

At a time when the old religions are discredited and doomed, not only because they are not true in the light of scientific culture, but because they bear no relation to the new society, Christianity in China has already begun to face the problems and to meet the needs of family, and of labour and of the nation, as no other religion is doing, and indeed as none can do.

Of the three pillars of the new civilization, we have seen that the first has much to show of permanent reconstruction. The New Culture Movement is in harmony with the spirit of the times, and many of its reforms meet permanent needs of the new society. Yet on all hands one hears of its neglect: students are too busy with demonstrations and their minds too disturbed by politics, to give themselves wholeheartedly to their studies. The burst of new life has been captured by a political party, told "This, only this, is nationalism," and set to work on problems of society and politics alone. The building of the first pillar is being neglected for the sake of the second, the new society.

It is not then surprising that the third pillar should have been still more widely overlooked. We have seen that a sound new pillar of religion *is* being built in China; that more and more, in its unity and national character, its social service, and its extension

of the family, it fits the times; that there are many gaps which it and it alone can fill. But the day when the eyes of most rebuilders shall turn its way has still to dawn. And yet, no Christian can live long here without feeling that the day is coming. The reason is need, obvious and universal need, crying need that cries to you in every slogan, cries to you every time you hear "The Revolution is not yet complete!" Young Christians are coming back to that need, youth here and there outside is feeling it, some may only recognize it as they meet their own despair. It was such a one who said the other day to me, "The Revolution will never be complete until we have had a revolution in the hearts of men."

We have talked in all these chapters of the three outstanding pillars of civilization. But deeper than all their foundations is this one underlying need. China is building a new culture. It was once the fashion to welcome, as one of its ornaments, a vague Christian idealism. But fashions change and the ideals did not reach down to the foundations. Students to-day are seized with a strange restlessness for lack of underlying principles; the restlessness that welcomes the newest doctrines one day, welcomes, say, Communism, and shouts in derision the next, when the teachers of that doctrine are led out to die; the restlessness that spends itself howling down this "aggression" and that because it dare not look down into the depths of its own need; the restlessness which Augustine has explained, and none better (because there is no other explanation), "Our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee."

China is building a new society. And again many of its ideals are borrowed from Christianity. But there is little to show for work deep down in the foundations. Reform environment first, and think of religion after! Clear the mass of foreign restrictions; on the cleared site build a new government; and crown all with laws against social inequalities and the sins which poverty begets! Some who have set out to build a tower without first counting the cost, have to try and fail before they realize it. But when failure comes home to a man there is that other parable of the failure who had a home and a Father to come to.

And what shall we say of the new religion? Religion for so many has been a party loyalty, and their creed a political programme. Already some are wondering where are the men to work the programme, and what, after all, these parties have achieved.

There is only one reason on earth to make a man glad to come to unhappy China: and that is the chance to save souls—not from the burning so much as from blank materialism and black despair.

CHAPTER VIII

YOUNG CHINA AND THE YOUTH OF THE WEST

"Christianity, a far more powerful force than any political ideas or political institutions, since it works on the inmost heart of man, has produced nearly all the moral progress that has been achieved since it first appeared, and can in individual men transmute lead into gold. Yet Christianity has not done these things for *peoples*, because, checked or perverted by the worse propensities of human nature, it *has never been applied in practice*."

LORD BRYCE, *Modern Democracies*.

"Traveller to God's last City, be glad that you are alive. Be thankful for the City at your door and for the chance to build its walls a little nearer Heaven before you go. . . . And day by day as you awake to face this great and needy world, learn to 'seek a City' there, and in the service of its neediest citizen find Heaven."

HENRY DRUMMOND.

I

A FEW years ago my station was on the northern borders of the province of Kwangtung. To get there one has to travel on a railway which runs into the heart of a country said to be rich in coal. Indeed I have heard it said, though I do not vouch for the accuracy of the saying, that some day that district may well become one of the important sources of the world's supply. It is a sad sign, not of foreign "economic aggression," but of China's economic dependence, that the greater part of the coal burnt on

that railway comes from abroad ! The reason is that, of her vast resources, China has only scratched the surface. Beneath, there may be unknown stores of the world's best anthracite, but the surface stuff is insufficient in itself to run a railway. I have pondered this parable many a time, sitting on those hard wooden seats, with a swarm of coolies, farmers, merchants, students, travellers of varying shades of yellow and of all manners of life, packed so tightly all around. The hidden resources of China's manpower will some day enrich the world. But, for the present, Christianity has touched only the topmost layer, and Christian progress is possible only by the addition of the best we have from abroad.

That, I confess, was my thought a few years ago. After the events of 1925–7, does the parable hold good ?

This is a real question : most missionaries who have suffered enforced exile from their stations have felt the difficulty of deputation work in times like these. After our review of modern movements in China, we may be able to stand for a moment in the shoes of the most despondent, and look at the prospects through the eyes of their dismay. The New Culture Movement is non-religious. The rights of Christian schools are called in question. The continuance of many is for the present impossible, and what conditions may be imposed upon their future is uncertain. The new society is marked by the rise of Labour. Here in Canton extremist unions have caused the closing of the Christian Hospital for the Insane (the only asylum in the whole of China), and of the largest mission

general hospital. Elsewhere, in south and central China, though most hospitals are working busily, the labour movement has added to their difficulties, and their future shares the general insecurity. With regard to missionary participation in the ordinary work of the Church, the Anti-Christian Movement bases much of its attack upon the foreign connections of Chinese Christianity. Fundamental to all is nationalism; and in the eyes of foreign beholders, if not the whole of its spirit, much, at least, of its expression is that which the newspapers describe as "anti-foreignism." Educational, medical, evangelistic work —all are affected. Surely this is no time for appeals for missionary service!

It all depends upon the conditions under which men are willing to offer. There are recruiting pictures on the hoardings of British towns now: "See the world with the R.A.F.," they say. Twelve years ago the picture was of a man in a steel helmet standing on the parapet of a trench, crying, "Come over here!" And when were recruits more plentiful? If a man wants to be sure of his job, some special certain job, sure of a welcome, and a hearing, and gratitude, and glory—then this is not the time. But if he is willing just to "Come over and help us" . . .

If we can understand the "Wait-and-See" policy which expresses the doubts of some missionary advocates, perhaps after reading these chapters we can understand too the doubts of some Chinese patriots. One young Chinese of my acquaintance, a Christian he calls himself, and his friends believe at least in his sincerity, is a good example of the Chinese doubter's

point of view. Religion, he says, is a lovely thing, like gold or precious stones. But when Robinson Crusoe rescued from the wreck his treasure chests, the Spanish doubloons and pieces-of-eight were of less immediate value than the hammers, nails and boards for building himself a dwelling. Young China to-day is in such a strait, wrecked, homeless, and alone. This is no time to call him to consider religious values—the hard things of everyday life come first. But when the house is built and bare necessities assured, then young China too will be ready to seek the Pearl of Great Price.

Again it all depends—it depends upon your answer to that age-long question, " What think ye of Christ ? " If He is a precious stone, a luxury, some super-added thing, then this is not the time. But if He is of all life's building the chief Corner-stone . . .

We may sum up the difficulty—perhaps may solve it—if we acknowledge that there are two sides to every question, and that we are for ever in danger of fixing upon the one which is more obvious. There are two sides, for example, even to the simple statement, " The Revolution is not yet complete." We may imply, " Best wait for its completion : our work will be easier, safer, surer then." Or we may say, " Now while the plan of rebuilding is still unfinished, before the foundations are firmly fixed, before the walls have had time to rise, *now* is the chance for that Stone which the builders rejected." There are obstacles which to-day loom large, and which threaten to prove an effective barrier between the youth of the West and young China's need. For my own part I cannot help but

feel that this one fact is greater than them all: that once the building is complete the time has gone, and gone for a lifetime, when you may talk of the one Foundation.

So, with regard to each of these hindrances to missionary service in modern China, let us turn from the more obvious and try to find that other point of view.

II

The youth of the West, listening to the calls of the world, and trying to discern among them all that still small voice which may claim his own life for the service of God somewhere, hears little to encourage him to expect God's call to China. Most news from this troubled land gives him the impression that the prospects of work are indefinite, its continuance uncertain, and its scope for the future limited.

Take the first, indefiniteness. Every one knows of the evacuation of thousands of missionaries from south and central China. Every one knows that, except in the south, the return has (1928) barely begun. Consequently to the majority of Christians at home, China, as a possible field of service, is out of the picture. What other point of view is possible?

I write from the point of view of the Church in south China—not merely of the mission, mark! but of the Church. Again it should be remembered that it was in south China that this most recent stage of the Revolution began, and it is here that the whirlwind of destruction has first passed. Hence our point of view to-day is likely to be that of central China on a not

far distant to-morrow. And with regard to future missionary service, our point of view *is* different from that outlined above.

Here in south China we have had time to see not only how many foreign props and stays were temporarily withdrawn from the Church in our twenty months of crisis after June 1925, but also how many of these must now be counted permanently lost. And it is too many for our peace of mind. Many of the men evacuated were seniors, who, under normal conditions, might have served one or two terms more. But they were near the end of active service, and present uncertainties have hastened their retirement. With these must be reckoned the many who, because of the exceptional strain of these last few years, are added to the list of casualties invalided home, a list which even normally is every year a long one. In my own district since 1922 our staff has dwindled down, for reasons such as these, to less than half its numbers. Since 1924 no new men have been sent out to prepare to fill the gaps. Many of the vacant stations it would be possible, here in the south, to fill immediately, if we had the men. All of them ought to be filled as soon as the possibility is clear. But how can that be? When new men do come, they will need two years of language study, and (still more important) study of China, before beginning their real work, and five or six years before that work attains to anything like its full value. If something is not done, and that speedily, the Church in many parts of China will indeed soon stand alone; but its independence will not be the fulfilment of our missionary forefathers' wise policies, nor of our Chinese

colleagues' brave hopes ; nor will it have been conditioned by the increasing strength of the structure. It will be due to the crumbling of the supports, the rotting of the scaffolding, the unfaithfulness to China and to God of our generation. And such an independence, unlike the one towards which all missionaries work, would be defeat, not triumph.

Now—not in one or two years' time when the demand for reoccupation is still further out of proportion to the supply of men—now, while still there is breathing space for study of the old language and study of the new life of this new-old country, now is the time for recruits to prepare to fill the gaps. But those who realize the need, members of mission boards, for example, find themselves hampered by the fact that there are few definite posts to offer, or at least little detailed description of future openings to give. Which stations will it be possible first to reoccupy? When occupied, how far will it be possible to resume old work, and to what extent will opportunities lie along altogether different lines? Few societies are in a position to say, "We want a man for this particular place, and his work will be exactly thus and thus." Rather it is the vague expression of a general need. And young men and women, thinking of their life's service, prefer to consider the claims of a vacant vice-principalship in an African college, or work in an outcaste district in India, to the prospect of having "to turn a hand to anything" in unknown China.

While recognizing this indefiniteness, we need to turn to the other side of the picture and see indefiniteness as, after all, only the symptom of universal understaffing

and the sign of new opportunities still to be explored. Ours is a call to work far removed from that of the old pioneers, but it is a call to be pioneers of the new order, and we need to recapture something of their spirit. They went forth not knowing whither they went; they faced indefiniteness beyond our experience and almost beyond our comprehension; they came to make their position before they filled it, to create opportunities before they seized them. And one youth (William Milne, who became Morrison's first colleague, and the second Protestant missionary to China), before the Candidates' Committee of those distant days, exclaimed: "Anything! anything! if only engaged in the work. I am willing to be a hewer of wood or a drawer of water." Such words, and only such, are a worthy answer from those called to-day to share with young China the splendid enterprise of China's rebuilding.

The second difficulty is the uncertainty as to how long it may be possible for missionary work to continue. The whirlwind has shaken many things that we counted sure, and no one knows when it may blow up again and with what intensity. It is a whirlwind, a veritable vicious circle of stormy problems, in which we are all caught. So long as China's internal revolution remains incomplete, so long must the readjustment of her foreign relationships await its completion; until such readjustment has taken place, the direction of political propaganda may at any time be turned against the foreigner; such propaganda is the harbinger of "incidents," and crises of this kind require, if still more serious international

complications are to be avoided, the temporary withdrawal of the foreigner—even of the foreign missionary, however necessary he may know his task to be to the cause of new China's "completion." But if you are to give your life to the service of God in a foreign land, you naturally wish to know that it will be your life, not a mere miserable month, nor a few futile years.

Again I remind you that I write from south China, where the storm seems to be nearing an end. Every time I make the half-hour trip up the river from the suburb where I live to the city of Canton, I look around me rather than at my newspaper, to read the signs of the times. First, we pass the wharves of a British shipping firm. Three huge new warehouses, built since the boycott, stand ready to be opened for future trade. Directly opposite is a new British factory, which will begin work within the next few weeks. Farther along are more wharves and a new four-story structure—Japanese this time. (An embargo on Japanese goods was lifted, by the political society which works the boycotts, only a few days ago !) Immediately I land I pass the stately building of a new Japanese bank. . . . And I have no need to ask what the foreign business community thinks of the prospects. The heads of foreign firms are saying, "To return to her ancient seclusion can be no permanent part of China's revolution. It is impossible to think of China cut off from the business of the world. We believe in the future and are determined to go ahead."

Meanwhile, strikes, boycotts, "incidents," are the

order of the day. Trade for the present is almost at a standstill. Tariff autonomy is already conceded in principle, and the minor privileges of extra-territoriality are fast disappearing. Trade in the future will be under new, as yet unknown, conditions. But the business man does well to remember that here is one quarter of the human race, with much that the world needs, and much that they need from the world. He looks beyond conditions of to-day, and does not stop at the immediate to-morrow.

Shall the emissaries of Christ do less? Is their vision more limited? . . . "I saw a new heaven and a new earth." In that part of it which is called new China, shall business connections, in spite of uncertainty, remain to make their contribution to the future, and shall our co-operation with the Chinese Church be cut off?

These last few pages were written on December 11th, 1927, a red-letter day, which will stand blood-red in China's history. On that day, as if to afford an example of present uncertainties, came the sudden reaping of the whirlwind after these three years of sowing. As I wrote, I heard the rat-tat-tat of machine guns, the crack of rifles, the crash of cannon. Over Canton arose a pillar of smoke, which became, as darkness fell, a pillar of fire—witness to the presence, not of God, but of evil men. Thousands of Peasants' Union members (including brigands) had marched in from the countryside, to be joined within the city by extremist Labour Unions and a band of rebel soldiers. The prisons were broken open, and criminals swelled the ranks. The Soviet Government of Canton was

proclaimed. Then began the looting of the Treasury and the banks, of shops and wealthy homes; the massacre of political and private enemies, of all who resisted and of many who did not; followed by arson which caused the destruction of two million pounds' worth of property and the death of innocents the more. It was a second storming of the Bastille, a second Reign of Terror, all the horrors of all revolutions crowded into three awful days.

Now the city has been retaken, and is nationalist again. As I write there is the sound of an occasional shot, as some guilty Communist or some unfortunate suspect pays the penalty. The fires are out, the refugees returning, the dead have been taken in cart-loads from the streets, and we are left with the question of how it all happened.

Of the answer there can be little doubt to any one who has read these chapters. In 1925 the Communists were the allies of the Nationalist Party. In the spring of 1927 the split began—the first, as usual, in Canton. Soon the anti-Communist "Purge the Party" Movement had spread to the whole of nationalist territory. Communist unions began to be suppressed, Communist agitators executed, and foreign Communists, the victims now of feeling more extreme than any other "anti-foreignism," had to flee. The cause of Communism in China seemed doomed. But however one may condemn their methods, or their doctrines, one must admire the tenacity of these foreign leaders.[1] Their position was more than un-

[1] It is reported that at least ten Russian leaders of the *coup* have been shot.

certain, but these protagonists of world revolution did not forget that China is the biggest section of humanity the direction of whose development is still largely undetermined—and therefore their biggest opportunity.

Uncertainty? If we talk of uncertainty as a hindrance, we have much to learn, not only from the foreign capitalist, but from the foreign Communist as well. If the future were fixed, the foundations firm, the rebuilding done, he too might have considered "safety first" and smiled at talk of special urgency. The capitalist remains in spite of uncertainty—the Communist comes back because of it. The future—not merely the future of the foreigner's position, but the whole future—is uncertain; China is a gigantic question which waits to be answered, and whose answer our generation must see. Therefore China challenges any men who have doctrines which they believe will make for her rebuilding; and groups in China who have embraced such doctrines demand help from the youth of the West—that is the challenge as the followers of Lenin have heard it. That is the challenge which the followers of Christ must hear.

Uncertainty may seem an obvious hindrance, but who will say that this is not the truer point of view? Uncertainty is itself the call, and, since the failure of Communism, a more insistent call than ever to the Christian youth of the West.

III

Men can turn indefiniteness into enterprise, and make uncertainty but another name for adventure.

But the third, perhaps the greatest hindrance of all, is of a different character, and one which seems to make enterprise and adventure impossible. The call of China to-day is not one to capture the imagination, not a call to apostolic service in a missionary church ; instead, what one chiefly hears is surmise as to the future of the missionary " in an advisory capacity " to Chinese leaders.[1]

In the Shanghai Conferences of September 1927,[2] Chinese themselves criticized this much-used phrase. One speaker said that it seemed to relegate the foreigner to an inferior position, and to set up a new inequality, as impossible to-day as the old. Its emphasis is a true one : our future work may indeed be summed up as alliance with Chinese leaders, filling up that which is lacking in their numbers both by our own presence and by our help in training more. But how ? " In an advisory capacity " is a vile phrase, and ought to be scrapped, not only as bad English but as bad sense. If we are to describe ourselves as advisers, we must define the term, and the definition will prove too big for the term to contain.

Leaving vague theories and vaguer terms behind, let us ask—where the return of the foreigner is already an accomplished fact, how is the new relationship working out ? In most such places, the missionary is glad to find himself less of a " paymaster to the forces " and more of a force in himself, less like the manager of a puppet show with all the strings in his own hands and more like a fellow-worker in a real concern, less burdened with a thousand trivialities and freer for a

[1] See pp. 229-30.

[2] See p. 183.

more truly spiritual task. It was a glad day, not only for the disciples, but for Jesus, when He could say, "No longer do I call you servants . . . but I have called you friends." And surely there is rejoicing in heaven among the old pioneers when they hear the words "missionary" and "catechist" fading into the echoes of the past, and the word "colleague" resounding through the Church of the present.

At a recent meeting of the board of directors of my own college, the foreign Principal illustrated the spirit of the modern missionary by asking that he himself be reduced to the position of an ordinary professor, and that a Chinese principal be appointed over his head. Everyone waited for the Chinese members of the board to express their opinion first. They in turn illustrated the spirit of the modern Chinese Church by saying something like this: "If we had another man, just as capable, and free to accept the post, and he happened to be a Chinese, we should say that his nationality made him the more fitted for the work. But since we haven't, nationality is not the deciding factor." In the more recently disturbed parts of China not all Christians have yet thought their way through to so definite a position, but their ultimate conclusion too will be just as true to common sense —because they are Chinese, and because they are Christian.

It seems to amount to this. For a man who cares little about status and much about work, the scope in China is as big as ever it was. For a man who is man enough to fill it the Chinese Church has just as big a place. Indeed one Chinese leader writes, "The mis-

sionary will have a very much bigger place, and be expected to do a greater work in the future than in the past." [1]

This last quotation may appear to exaggerate. "As big" we might have accepted, but "bigger"—can it be?

There is one respect in which modern movements are making possible to the youth of the West an actually bigger place. Nationalism, emphasized in these pages as fundamental to all, may seem to remove us further from young China, not to bring us nearer to his aid. But that again is only the more obvious one side to the question. This book deals not only with nationalism, the new foundation, but still more with the problem of the superstructure, the new civilization. And while consciousness of nationality may indeed for a time divide, the new civilization is destined to bring us closer together for ever. That sentence of Timothy Richard [2] might have been placed at the head of each succeeding chapter: "This [Renaissance] doubles the students of universal problems in the world." As he implies, it is less obvious but more nearly true to say that we who are to work among young China to-morrow will be less of foreigners than any of our forefathers: our outlook on life, our problems of self and society and nation, our approach to truth and to God—in all these things we are much more nearly one.

Think first of the new culture. A few years ago I conducted a "campaign" in a Chinese university.

[1] S.C.C. Chen in *The Chinese Recorder*, February 1927.

[2] At head of Chap. IV.

We chose a quiet room where between meetings students might come to discuss with me their own religious difficulties. I was new to China then, and very conscious of being a foreigner. I know now that there were few Chinese ministers to whom those students felt they could have gone—not because Chinese ministers are of an inferior standard, but because most of them grew up in old China, a world to which the difficulties of modern student youth are wholly foreign. To me, a foreigner, they came. Those students felt their problems to be new—startling products of a new and startling world. To me they were old doubts discussed in our own student circles at home, familiar difficulties through which I myself had had to fight a way to reach my faith.

Is there no scope for the foreigner ?

Think of the new society. Here is the outline of a conversation, in all but one respect commonplace and unworthy of note, between a missionary and a young Chinese workman. Its origin was nothing deeper than an illustrated magazine, which advertises the doings of Chinese cinema stars. The talk proceeded to a discussion of their morality—apparently copied direct from Hollywood, and of their divorces. It widened to the discussion of moral issues in modern Chinese society, then narrowed again to a confession of the young workman's own doubts and difficulties on the question of marriage and of individual and family choice. (It might equally well have proceeded to questions of labour and of politics, but so far as I know did not.) And at the end he made this surpris-

ing statement, " I can talk about these things to you : you are a foreigner and used to thinking of them. My own father doesn't understand."

Is there no scope for the foreigner ?

But the real point is when you think again of the Chinese Church, and of its chances of becoming the new religious basis of society. I think of people such as my own students here, soon to be out in the work of the ministry, as the hope of the future Church. They belong heart and soul to the new generation. They are the men most needed if the Church is to reach young China. And since young China is the most significant part of modern China, they are surely the most precious ministers we have. What will be their task ?

Take the case of a boy I know who was with these theological students in high school. When they left to enter the theological college, Tang left to enter his father's business in the neighbouring country town. He, as they, had come to know Jesus in the thoughtful study group of the school C.U., and in the reverent services of school chapel. Last time I saw him I asked what part he was playing in the local church. " I have not joined," he said, " I feel I have no part there."

This is not intellectual snobbery : it is progress, new and wider relationships, science, and the complete break with the past that this revolution in thinking implies. The same problem faces Student Christian Movement work in England, but here it is greater a hundredfold. Here the old is not Victorian, but mediæval. Here the new not only is modern, but

tends to be as extreme and impatient as all new-found modernity.

The hold of Christianity upon young China is, thanks to our educational work, strongest in the medical, nursing and teaching professions, where many, after training, continue in close relationship with Christian institutions, and continue to share the religious life of their hospital or school. Other Christian students, entering business and professional life, feel that in leaving school and college they have left their religious home—a home they too often fail to rediscover in a backward, limited, old-fashioned local church. Tang, and the hundreds of young men and women like him, represent the task of the new ministry.

Knowing my students, I am hopeful of the future. But I foresee pitfalls before these pioneers. Chinese youth, Christian and non-Christian alike, is at that dangerous stage of rebellion against the past, that revolutionary stage when there is often too little value set upon older ways, older thoughts, and older people. If they are going to win Tang into Church membership, they are just as likely to scandalize their senior colleagues. If they are going to feed Tang's soul, their preaching may easily raise religious doubts in the minds of others. And, surrounded by such dangers, they are going to be lonely, and to miss the fellowship of kindred spirits here ; especially to miss the guiding hand of some one of their kind who is at the same time stronger, more developed, with wider sympathies touching both old and new, and with maturer judgments.

It is little use some of us trying to multiply ourselves by training young ministers for the service of young China, unless there are other similar men ready for fellowship with them in the actual work of the Church. And just as Chinese leaders confess their numbers too few to carry the first responsibility alone, so too most leaders that we have lack experience in this second kind of service.

To you, the youth of the West, the task is neither new nor foreign. Has God been preparing you, in your own Christian Union and in the work of your Church, in the enthusiasm of youth for youth, for service with men like yourself in China ?

There is no more to say : the gaps are here to fill, the call is here to fill them. If this is work " in an advisory capacity," there was once a Man who spent most of His ministry in such work. He came at a time when the old had failed and broken down, not to destroy the old but to fulfil. He came to men when they were as sheep having no shepherd, to let them call Him friend, to listen and to understand. He spent himself preparing young men—a mere handful—for the work of preaching, teaching, healing, and He sent them out two by two. When they came back weary, by working with them He refreshed them, to send them out again. And most of it, I suppose, was work in an advisory capacity. But lo ! the world is at His feet.

The call is still the same, " Follow thou Me ! "

IV

But there are many whose hearts may be in China, but whose feet can never follow to any foreign field. Placing myself in the position of such a one, I have often felt that there is but cold comfort, however warm-hearted the appeal, from those who say, "Work for us, give to us, study about us, pray for us." For my own part, I find it hard to do any of these things worthily, and hardest of all to pray for a cause to which the rest of my life and thought and Christian service seem unrelated. But to the great task of China's rebuilding, how can the life of a stay-at-home bear any direct relation?

Consider for a moment. We who live with our eyes on the distant horizons, whether we travel thitherward or no, know that our generation has seen a mighty destruction. Old-established certainties have everywhere been tumbling down, and their upbuilding seems beyond the strength of "all the king's horses and all the king's men." It is true, in part, of post-war Europe, where many seek their former ease yet doubt if it might not be gone for ever. It is truer still in the Far East, where old civilizations are in ruins, beyond the hope of patching up again. It is truest of all in China, where "the Revolution is not yet complete." But though all this belongs to our own day, we do not feel its full significance. We are too near to the whirlwind to see the destruction clearly; our eyes are too blinded by the dust for us to know what the future may mean. We shall realize better if we look back from our own generation to the one that went before.

The first great civilization of the East to find its home in ruins, its old life on the eve of decay, was Japan. That was sixty years ago. The old was crumbling, and something new must be raised in its place—what was the new to be? Japan sent her youth to the West (whence came the cause of her destruction) and her orders were, "Search for the best and the most enduring. See how it is done. Come back and do it here." They came, they saw, they thought, and they conquered the question of Japan's rebuilding.

They saw that the finest fleet in the world was the British fleet. They ordered their first men-of-war from British dockyards; their first naval officers were trained by Englishmen. They went back and built the Imperial Navy of Japan.

They sought for the finest army in the world, and their search led them first to France. After the disaster of Sedan, they turned their eyes towards Prussia. They went back and built the Imperial Army on the German model.

They saw and studied our centralized governments, and in 1871 abolished the disunity of their feudal clans. They built the semblance of a western parliament. They saw our legal system and before the end of the century Britain had led the way in recognizing, by the abolition of extra-territoriality, the worthiness of the code of laws which they had built.

They saw the wealth of our islands, crowded like their own, where prosperity was possible only because of our industrial revolution. And the chimneys began to rise whose smoke was soon to

hide from heaven the sweated labour of Kobe and Yokohama.

This and much more than this, good, bad and indifferent, Japan's envoys learned from the West, and took back for the rebuilding of their civilization. Progress instead of backward-looking, patriotism instead of local loyalties, science instead of their ancient insularity—these are the changes which have built the new Japan, Japan whose revolution the world considers to be complete.

Japan [says Sun Yat Sen] is a good example. Her former civilization was learned from China . . . but lately she has concentrated on learning that of Europe and America. These last few decades have seen her rise to be one of the world powers. If we awake as did Japan . . . China's population is ten times as numerous, our territory is wider thirty times in its extent, our wealth too is greater far ; if we do as Japan did, we shall become the equivalent of ten world powers !

And again :

We in the East have an island nation which may be called the Britain of the East. That nation is Japan.

What is it that " exalteth a nation ? " As I read words like these, words which the whole of young China is reading, I ask myself and you, what makes Britain Britain ? The fact that she is an island with a great fleet, or a world-power with a far-flung battle-line ? Is it her industrial organization, or her scientific life ? . . .

China, young China, do you not realize that Japan

has missed the best that we had to offer? Britain, young Britain, do you not realize that she missed the best, because in our common life its fundamental presence was not obvious enough? There is a "Stone which the builders rejected"—and whose was the fault?

As for China, where "the Revolution is not yet complete," its incompleteness may prove to be our hope, may give to the Christian West, for all our failures, yet one more chance. Some of us who live in China have, these last few years, been dreaming dreams. If day-dreams are, like those others which the psycho-therapists analyse, compensations for what is lacking in waking life, perhaps the origin of ours was life in this land of virulent anti-British propaganda. They may even have been "imperialistic" ideas which we have sublimated. Or thoughts of British exiles turning home may have been the very truth from God.

We dreamed that the nations of the East, seeking to rebuild their ruins, desolations of a former generation, turned and beheld in the West a country worthy to become their plan. Its progress was towards the likeness of heaven upon earth. Its culture and society and religion were fitly framed together, withstanding all the rains, floods and winds because they were founded on the Rock. Its science was wholly dedicated to the spread of goodness and beauty and truth. Its citizens found expression for their individualism in that service which is perfect freedom: their family life in a continual remembrance of Him from whom all families are named. Their industrialism was wide

enough to have room for all the wonders of the Sermon on the Mount. Their national loyalties and international relationships were but a part of their still wider loyalty to God. . . . And the Far East said to its sons, "Go, see how it's done, and come back to do it here!"

And we awoke, and behold, it was but a dream. For there never was such a country—*yet*.

It was a dream like that of John, when he saw "the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God . . . and the nations shall walk amidst the light thereof, and the kings of the earth do bring their glory into it." And he awoke, and remembered that there was no New Jerusalem—only what Titus had left of the old, its stinking streets still full of everything unclean, the ruins of its brothels, the poverty of its poor, the lingering pride of race, all, all an abomination and a lie. . . . But John arose.

You too will dream your dreams.

It was in a dream that Paul saw a man from Macedonia, and heard him cry, "Come over and help us!" I think it was to God that the man was praying: perhaps he had never heard of Paul, nor even of Jesus. But Paul was close enough to the heart of God to catch the echo of his prayer—and come.

"The Revolution is not yet complete," I hear as just such another cry. It is not yet made with thought of you, nor yet perhaps with thought of God, for most of the youths who shout the slogan doubt whether God *can* hear or save. But hearts that are

in tune with God will catch the message, for nearness to God means nearness to the needs of men.

And you who hear will come, wherever you are, and some day, please God, the cry will go up to heaven,

> The stone which the builders rejected
> The same is become the head of the corner.

Then shall we make answer,

> This is the Lord's doing ;
> It is marvellous in our eyes.

APPENDIX I

THE CHINESE CLASSICS

A. The Five Classics:

1. Yih King: *The Book of Changes* (from 3000 B.C.). Explanations of this book (*e.g.* "a cabalistic logomancy," says Williams !) are almost as hard to understand as the book itself. It is a series of word-puzzles of mystic meaning, the key to which no one seems able to find.
2. Shu King: *The Book of Records* (2300–600 B.C.). A more or less contemporary history of proclamations, addresses and principles of early dynasties.
3. Shi King: *The Book of Odes* (1700–600 B.C.). A collection of songs from all the Feudal States, compiled by the Grand Music Masters of the Court; the subjects are varied—nature, love, religion, and ancient custom.
4. Li Ki: *The Book of Rites* (500–100 B.C.). Describing ceremonial usages at the time of Confucius. A translator of this work, M. Callery, summarizes its contents thus: "The natural relations of created beings essentially link themselves in ceremonial. . . . Ceremonial is man in his multiplied relations with family, country, society, morality and religion."
5. Chun Tsiu: *Spring and Autumn* (attributed to Confucius). This is certainly not all the work of Confucius; it is a history of the court and state of Lu covering two and a half centuries, with the addition of running commentary.

B. The Four Books:

1. Ta Hioh: *The Great Learning*, a discourse on "the improvement of oneself, the regulation of a family, the government of a state, and the rule of an Empire," by a disciple of Confucius.

2. Chung Yung : *The Doctrine of the Mean*, by the grandson of Confucius ; a dissertation on human virtue, centring in the ideal conduct of the " Princely Man," the man of immaculate propriety who " leans not to either extreme."
3. Lun Yu : *The Analects*, sayings of Confucius preserved by his disciples, more like the Oxyrhynchus *Sayings of Jesus* than the connected narratives of the Synoptics.
4. *The Book of Mencius*, writings in the form of conversations with great personages of his time. His method is Socratic, and his zeal for social righteousness may be compared to that of Amos. He maintains the principles of Confucius, but applies them with greater vehemence.

The standard English translation is Legge's *Chinese Classics*, in 7 vols., prefaced with critical introduction. (Out of print, and in few libraries ; in any case somewhat dull unless one has some knowledge of Chinese.) More accessible are such books as *The Middle Kingdom*, by S. Wells Williams. In Vol. I, Chap. xi, will be found a useful outline with numerous selections translated in full. (Out of print, but obtainable in Mission House and other good libraries.)

A still briefer and almost as useful a summary is H. A. Giles's *China and the Manchus* (Cambridge University Press, 2s. 6d.) Chaps. I and II. Chapter I is a fascinating article on ideograms and hieroglyphics.

Smaller still, and most easily obtainable, is the same author's *The Civilization of China* (Williams & Norgate, 2s. 6d.).

The Chung-Yung, translated by L. A. Lyall and King Chienkun (Longmans, 6s.), is a new translation of *The Doctrine of the Mean.*

APPENDIX II

CHINA—THE OLD SOCIAL ORDER

The whole country, a little larger than Europe

Province, varies from the size of France to rather less than the area of England

Circuit

Prefecture

District, comparable with English county

The Emperor, Son of Heaven

Provincial Governor or Viceroy

Taotai

Prefect

District Magistrate

VILLAGE ELDERS (from heads of families)
(semi-official)



APPENDIX III

THE WILL OF SUN YAT SEN

I, Sun Wen,[1] have pushed on the cause of the People's Revolution for forty years, in order to achieve freedom and equality for China. These forty years have impressed upon me the fact that before reaching this goal I must awaken the masses, and in our struggle co-operate with those nations which deal on a basis of equality with our people.

The Revolution is not yet complete. All my comrades must struggle on in accordance with my *Plans for National Reconstruction, The Three People's Principles,* and the declaration of the First National Conference of the Nationalist Party Representatives, in order that our revolutionary goal may be finally attained. My proposal for holding the People's Convention, and for abolishing the unequal treaties, must be carried out in the shortest possible period of time.

APPENDIX IV

OUTLINE OF THE THREE PEOPLE'S PRINCIPLES OF SUN YAT SEN

The Three Principles are the Race of the People,
the Authority of the People,
the Welfare of the People.

Their aim is national salvation, *i.e.* equality in international, political and economic affairs, making China fit to survive.

I. The Principle of Race

1. *Meaning*: race developed by natural forces (common blood, life, language, religion, customs), *e.g.* Chinese nation developed by force of arms, *e.g.* members of British Empire.

[1] His original name, Yat Sen, has been little used in recent years, and since his death "Sun Wen" has been superseded by still a third name "Sun Chung Shan." To prevent confusion the one name best known to foreigners is used throughout this book, with the exception of Chinese quotations.

In China, race practically synonymous with nation, because practically pure ; but sense of unity has stopped short at family and clan ; no spirit of race or nationalism.

2. *China's Danger of Extinction*:

A. Natural Forces, Population. Other nations, because of advance of science, rapidly increase, while China's population remains at 400 millions.

Formerly China absorbed invaders because of vast size.

To-day China impossible to partition by the Powers for same reason.

In 100 years this will not hold good.

B. Human Forces, Aggression. More terrible than nature, these forces need only 10, not 100 years. They are of two kinds :

(1) Political Aggression. China's losses of territory—Kowloon, Kwongchauwan, Weihaiwei, Port Arthur, Dairen, Tsingtao ; earlier, Burma, Annam ; earlier again, first one part of northern Manchuria, then another. Besides these are Korea, Laochao Islands, Siam, Borneo, Sumatra, Java, Ceylon, Nepal, Bhutan —former " tributaries."

Partition of China checked by Revolution of 1911 and dissension among Powers. Therefore change of policy to

(2) Economic Aggression : more dangerous because works unseen. This has made China a " second-class colony," not of one Power, but of all. Six kinds at work—

(*a*) Foreign control of customs—makes protective tariff impossible. In 1921 imports exceeded exports by 500 million dollars.

(*b*) Foreign banks—more trusted than Chinese ; people prefer their notes, make deposits and negotiate transfers with them. Annual loss to China, 100 million dollars.

(*c*) Foreign shipping—China's undeveloped. Annual loss, 100 million dollars.

(*d*) Foreign control of concessions and surrendered territories—taxes, ground rents, land values there. Annual loss, 400 million dollars.

(*e*) Foreign enterprises (*e.g.* S. Manchurian Railway) by treaty privilege. Annual loss, 100 million dollars.

(*f*) Foreign speculation—tempts greedy Chinese. Annual loss several tens of millions.

Without reckoning losses through Chinese nationals living in foreign possessions, total losses exceed 1200 million dollars annually; they will continue to increase until country is squeezed dry.

3. *China's Loss of the Principle of Race* has been due to—

A. Foreign domination by the Manchus. The literati regarded Manchu conquest as merely a change of dynasty. Thus Revolutionary societies consisted only of lower classes, composed of ignorant men; they were easily duped and destroyed.

B. "Internationalism":

(1) Old China, when herself a great Power, more interested in breaking down national barriers than preserving her own nationalism.

(2) The Powers:

(*a*) Pre-War Imperialism. Europe over-populated —white men colonize—competition—wars. In 1914 Britain and Germany competed for sea-power; all the Powers competed for colonies.

(*b*) Course of the War—"Self-determination." Britain, being defeated, called in America. America, doubtful of own sufficiency, tried to attract neutrals by above principle. Thus all the small weak races joined the Allies.

(*c*) Post-War—"Internationalism." Self-determination had served its purpose, therefore scrapped. But old imperialism of Powers must be disguised, therefore internationalism.

(*d*) Russian Revolution—the one great hope. Opposes imperialism at home by overthrow of old regime, abroad by peace with Germany and assistance to all oppressed races.

Formerly world position was

1100 millions oppressed by 400 millions (white races).

Now

1250 millions (oppressed and Russia) against 250 million oppressors.

The small weak races, including China, are awakened. Therefore hypocritical "internationalism" of Powers to lead astray young China. But nationalism must come first.

4. *China's Recovery of the Principle of Race*: two means:

A. Awakening countrymen to sense of crisis.

(1) Political Aggression:

(*a*) Military force. Only reason China not conquered is dissension among the Powers. China could not resist for two months. But the Powers have chosen to use the alternative method:

(*b*) Diplomacy. Sounds innocuous, but remember partition of Poland. China could be dismembered in a few minutes with stroke of pen.

(2) Economic Aggression. Financial losses of China to foreigners = poll tax of $15, or (excluding women, children and aged) $45 per adult male per annum.

(3) Population.

Propaganda everywhere must inspire men to sacrifice to the death against their enemies. "When the beast is cornered it will fight."

B. Uniting countrymen. Starting from family and clan unity, extend it in stages to national unity—an easier task than in the individualist West.

Transform inter-clan contentions into anti-foreign contention.

To these may be added one destructive method—the boycott: the example of Gandhi in India against Britain.

5. *China's Recovery of her old Status*: China must recover—

A. The Principle of Race.

B. The old morality. Formerly highest in the world, secret of China's survival. Foreign oppression and cultural invasion has brought it low. Loyalty—now to nation; filial piety—always a special feature; trustworthiness—excelled other countries; love—fell short of Christian countries only in love's expression; love of peace—special Chinese virtue.

We must recover and extend the spirit of this old morality.

C. The old ability. We used to be inventors (compass, printing, gunpowder, porcelain). We used to be philosophers and our philosophy emphasized a regard for character which we have lost to-day.

D. The advantages of the West. Not following foreign ways blindly. Not repeating their stages of progress but adopting newest. Example of Japan, could be followed within 10 years.

6. *China's Future*: When all this is done, and China has become a Power, how shall she use her wealth and strength? She must be a "raiser of the fallen and a helper of the weak," opposing imperialism still, and working for good government and peace on earth.

II. Authority of the People

1. *Origin of Democracy.*

A. Struggle for Existence.

Man strives with	Period	Weapon
beasts	primitive life	individual strength.
nature	supernatural authority	prayer, etc.
man	monarchical authority	rise of independent countries and decline of Papacy.
monarchs	popular authority.	revolution.

B. Rise of Democracy.

Ancient—theory as old as Confucius and Mencius—
practice as old as Greece and Rome.
Modern—practice begins with America and France in 18th century.
theory based on "natural rights of man": theory disproved by evolutionary view of history, but acceptable then because time was ripe for democracy.
The time is ripe in China to-day.

2. *Western and Chinese Revolutions compared.*

A. Three People's Principles and Three Slogans of West.

Race —Liberty, but national liberty.
Authority—Equality, but of political status.
Welfare —Fraternity.

No theory of "natural rights" divinely bestowed: this belongs to West where aristocracy was upheld by religious sanctions, so democracy had to follow suit.

B. Liberty.

In West struggle for individual liberty, because of feudalism.

In China individual liberty already excessive, *laissez-faire* of old China, thus no cohesion, no means of opposing aggression, thus "second-class colony."

National liberty means sacrifice of individual liberty.

C. Equality.

In West, struggle for social as well as political equality because of aristocracy and class distinctions, hereditary nobility and hereditary wealth. (In this struggle England failed, 1642; America and France destroyed political inequalities; Russia destroyed social inequalities too, *i.e.* capitalism.)

In China, no feudal aristocracy for last 2000 years, office not perquisite of aristocracy but by examination. (Thus China must beware of western interpretations of equality: signs of fallacy already among Chinese labour,

i.e. rejection of non-labourers as leaders, on grounds of social inequality.)

Political equality is China's goal, *i.e.* Authority of People.

3. *Western Democracy.*

A. Three Set-backs to Democracy in West.

(1) America. Two parties after Revolution:—

man's nature good — full democracy — local self-government.

man imperfect — limited democracy — centralized government.

The latter prevailed.

(Some Chinese hold American success to be result of division into states; actually, result of union of what was originally divided. China originally an ordered unity, now a disorderly division because of militarists. Remedy lies not in provincial development (division) and subsequent federation. True analogy to America would be a federation of Asiatic states—originally divided—against the West.)

(2) France. Reign of Terror, followed by reaction—Napoleon.

(3) Monarchies recognize that democratic age makes compromise necessary.

England adopts policy of conciliation { extension of franchise, independence of Ireland and Egypt, recognition of Labour government.

Germany: Bismarck restrains democratic movement by national control of public services, fixing of working hours, pensions, insurance.

B. Extent of Western Democracy: people have right of election—gradually extended.
drafting and revision of laws—added in Switzerland.
dismissal of officials—added in America.

But: still incomplete, mostly indirect, *i.e.* representative. Government by people direct a new idea, not worked out.

4. *China and Democracy.*

A. Example of West: Old China old-fashioned and self-satisfied, blindly opposes foreign ways. Since Boxer rising, as blindly copies them.

Thus, Revolution copied western representative government—none of its benefits, its faults a hundredfold!

In applying to China the experience of the West we should be critical because

(1) progress greater in physical than in political science,
(2) Chinese social structure different.

B. China's need is for a government stronger than those of West:

Western democratic governments usually weak because people still fear oppression by government, have fallacious ideas of "liberty" and "equality."

But: Power and Authority are not the same:
Power belongs to government, authority to people.

e.g. (1) In old China, an incapable emperor would retain authority, but delegate power to his officials.

In modern China, no emperor, but in his place four hundred millions of people: they too for most part incapable: must delegate power to specialists.

These, if good, should have unlimited power,
if not, "emperor" (*i.e.* People) has authority to dismiss.

(2) Machinist ought not, through fear of machine, to choose one of smallest horse-power; Chinese machinists must be able to control machine (by Authority of People), and must therefore have one of greatest horse-power.

C. China's Future Democracy.

(1) Full and direct Authority for People:
election, dismissal, drafting and revision of laws (as West).

(2) Full and complete Power for Government: (best from both old China and West).

	As in West—legislation, jurisdiction, administration.
Old China's best (always independent of royal power)	examination (for officials), censorate (body with power of impeachment).

III. Welfare of the People

1. *Meaning:*

A. Fundamental problem of Socialism, Communism and Internationale.

Savage—life easy.
Hunting, pastoral, agricultural man—harder.
Industrial Revolution—unemployment, social problem, socialism.

B. Why new name (*i.e.* "Welfare" instead of "Socialism")?

(1) Divisions in western Socialism make meaning vague.
(2) "Welfare" *is* latest interpretation :—

Before Marx —Utopians, unpractical moralists and emotionalists.
Marx —Scientific socialism: life determined by material conditions; materialistic interpretation of history and progress.

Newest theory—Not materialism, but survival, the pivot on which history turns, *i.e.* Welfare of the People.

2. *Some Marxian Fallacies:*

Marx's theory	*Facts of modern history*
Progress:	Progress:
Production, therefore surplus, therefore struggle to share surplus, therefore class war, therefore social progress.	attained in West by (1) Abolition of monopolies, taxation of income and inheritance, therefore increase of national wealth.

(2) This wealth helps to nationalize transport, etc., improve general education and condition of worker, *i.e.* to increase productivity.
(3) This increase benefits both capital and labour.

i.e. co-operation, not struggle, secret of progress.

Labour:
Profits of capitalist wrung from Labour, as if Labour an isolated entity.

Labour:
Spinning industry, for example, depends on agricultural expert growing cotton—scientist (machines and manures) inventor of transport, consumer's demand.

i.e. society is inter-dependent.

Capitalism:
Self-destructive.
Middleman will disappear next.

Capitalism:
Still prospering.
Middleman may be first to disappear, *e.g.* by rise of co-operative societies.

Profit:
Capitalist's profit depends on reduction of wages, extension of hours, rise in price.

Profit:
Henry Ford.

Success:
Two factors enough to ensure:
Productivity.
Capital.

Success:
The ironworks, Hankow.
Failure because insufficient market in China.
Thus further factor necessary.

Revolutionary Labour Party has had chance of applying its theories in Russia:

Has solved the political, but left the social problem unsolved.

Marxians say reason is undeveloped state of Russian industry: Marxian methods would fail in China, because still less developed.

Chinese Nationalist Party holds *ideals* of Marx and Communists; we are not only not opponents, but close friends; our *methods* necessarily differ.

3. Nationalist Party's policy: must be related to China's condition.

A. China's condition. General poverty; no particular wealthy class; only different degrees of poverty.

Thus scheme must include, not only re-distribution, but development.

B. Policy:

(1) Re-distribution:

(*a*) Restriction of capital, by means of income-tax, national control of monopolies and concerns too big for private enterprise (easy, since latter undeveloped).

(*b*) Equalization of land ownership.

Rise of land values (in developing cities like Canton) makes fortunes almost like those of West—unearned. Unearned increment belongs to society; land owners still small, so now is the time to act; not by irresponsible and wholesale appropriation, but by owner fixing land value (if too small, government has power to buy), on which tax of 1 per cent. is levied; any rise in value goes wholly to the government—increasing revenue and reducing general taxation.

(2) Development:

(*a*) Food: farmer basis of society; landless farmer loses much of produce to landlord; must be protected by law, and ultimately provided with land.

Machinery doubles production at one-tenth of cost; must make it ourselves, not give profit to foreigner.

Manure, nitrate of potash, dear: harness water-power to make electricity, and electricity to manufacture nitrate.

Rotation of crops.

Blight pest, prevention by scientific means.

Preserving of food, not only Chinese methods of salting and drying, but foreign method of canning.

Transport: canals, railways, roads, porterage.

Prevention of drought, by afforestation and irrigation.

Prevention of flood by dredging and dikes, etc.

Distribution, motive of private capital is gain, thus sometimes necessaries of life exported.

If motive is welfare, conserve supplies until surplus.

(*b*) Clothing: silk, linen, wool, cotton.

Silk, biggest export—now unable to compete with foreign methods of production.

Linen, trade lost to foreigners.

Wool and cotton (most commonly used by Chinese).

Chinese raw materials, good manufacturing process backward, thus export them to be made up, then re-import (300 million dollars a year).

After war, some Chinese mills: they lose money because unequal treaties—unequal taxation[1] of Chinese goods.

Therefore abolish treaties.

Use national strength for scientific production.

Distribution.

Nation should open tailoring works to supply suitable clothing to all.

People should work willingly as national servants, not needing government to force them.

Thus, end of wastrels.

universal production.

universal sufficiency.

[1] The reference here seems to be to the purely Chinese tax, "likin," from which foreign business suffers too. The accusation is misleading.

APPENDIX V

SOME PROBLEMS OF THE FOREIGN MISSION AND THE CHINESE CHURCH

In the past, administration of the missionary work of most Churches has been carried on thus :—

A. Mission Board (London).
B. Mission (on the field).
C. Church (Chinese and missionary officials of the Church).

I. The future relation of the Foreign Mission Board (A) and the Chinese Church (C).

(1) What has been the aim ?

To establish churches which may ultimately unite with churches of other missions to form a national church ?

or To establish national branches of a world-wide denominational church ?

How far should our aims be modified in view of modern movements ?

(2) What degree of control is to remain ?

When should independence be granted, and in what stages ? (See II (1) below.)

Should self-support be a condition to the achievement of self-control ? Is money an unworthy basis for solution of this problem ; or is the proverb " easy come, easy go " relevant to the question of unconditional handing over of money from abroad ?

II. The future relation of the Foreign Mission (B) and the Chinese Church (C).

(1) Should the Mission and the Church continue side by side, the one the complement of the other ?

or Should the Mission be merged in the Church and each missionary regarded as an individual worker lent by the mother Church to the Church of China ?

(Doubts on this subject are not due to any jealousy with regard to their own status on the part of mission-

aries. The question is bound up with I (2) above: Is the way of progress to abolish B and make C directly dependent on A? If so, would this direct control be more repugnant to nationalist feeling—especially outside the Church—than the former indirect control? Is B an inevitable mediator between C and A who are impersonal strangers to each other?)

(2) Who shall be responsible for the management of institutional work (educational and medical)?

(These burdens are far bigger in proportion to the strength and size of the Church than any which the Churches of the West have had to carry in their own lands. Management seems to require a degree of experience and specialized knowledge not to be found in many members of ordinary Church Courts, either at home or abroad.)

There seem to be three possibilities:

(i) The Mission, as hitherto.
(ii) The Church Courts, along with their other new responsibilities.
(iii) Specially chosen Boards of Management.

(One's choice will largely be determined by one's outlook on the future of this work. Will it remain a branch of "church work," or will it at some future date become, like most hospitals and many schools in the West, work carried on by outside organizations of Christian people as distinct from the Church?)

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

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